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Preface 
THIS BOOK IS A SLIGHTLY MODIFIED VERSION OF MY PHD THESIS 'Nanshin : the case 
of Japanese settlers in Papua and New Guinea 1 890- 1 949' ,  which I wrote as 
a student in the Division of Pacific and Asian History, Research School of 
Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, and sbmitted in 
September 1995. The content and ideas in this book do not differ much from 
the thesis . The book is shorter than the thesis, and the thesis has more 
detailed information on statistical data and quotations from Japanese 
material which I translated into English. 
Japanese emigration to Papua and New Guinea began around the tum of 
the 19th century, as an offshoot from the settlement of Japanese pearl divers 
on Thursday Island. An adventurous Japanese skipper, Komine Isokichi, 
explored the waters of New Guinea in a schooner for new shell fishing 
grounds. He reached Rabaul in New Britain in 190 1  where he met Governor 
Hahl. Komine managed to develop a good relationship with the German 
administration. In 1910  he acquired leases in Manus Island and Rabaul and 
began operating a copra plantation, and trochus shell fishing and 
boatbuilding businesses. More importantly, he began to bring in Japanese 
employees. However, after the outbreak of World War I, immigration policy 
and trade restriction by the Australian military administration and later by 
the civil administration blocked the expansion of the Japanese settlement. 
The Japanese population declined from 1 1 9 in 1 9 14 to 36 in 1 939. At the 
outbreak of the Pacific War, Japanese residents were all arrested and interned 
in Australia just before the landing of Japanese troops. Most internees were 
never allowed to return on security grounds. Thus the Japanese settlement 
vanished. 
The national policies of both Japan and Australia determined their fate. 
Advocates of Japanese nanshin-ron (southward advancement theory) and 
Australian officials created the image of the settlers as pawns of nanshin 
(southward advancement) . However, their perceptions, based on the national 
interest of each, are partial. In this book I aim to present a wider perception 
of the settlers in order to construct a more comprehensive history. I set my 
analysis in the contexts of Japanese social history and the colonial history of 
Papua and New Guinea, attempting to conceptualise the position of these 
migrants in a European colonial apparatus. 
IV JAPANESE SETrLERS IN PAPUA AND NEW GUINEA 
While writing the thesis, I was most grateful to my supervisor, Professor 
Donald Denoon, and adviser, Professor Hank Nelson, for instruction on how 
to conduct my research and how to write a thesis in English. I also thank Mr 
David Sissons for bringing to my attention some important archives.  I thank 
many other people-staff in the Division of Pacific and Asian History, 
librarians, archivists, and those who agreed to be interviewed in Japan, 
Papua New Guinea and Australia. My fieldwork in the three countries was the 
most pleasurable and unforgettable part of my research. For publishing this 
work, I am deeply grateful to The Journal of Pacific History, particularly the 
Executive Editor Jennifer Terrell. Finally I acknowledge that I am responsible 
for all information and views in this book. 
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Introduction 
A MASSIVE EXODUS OF PEOPLE WAS A WORLD-WIDE phenomenon during the l 9th 
centmy. About 50 million Europeans emigrated to the Americas and 47 
million Chinese and Indians emigrated to the Asia-Pacific. 1  However, the scale 
of Japanese emigration was small. Rough estimates of Japanese emigrants 
before the Pacific War are at least 1 .6 million: from 1 868 to 194 1 ,  776,304 
Japanese emigrated to areas other than Manchuria, Korea and Taiwan, and 
from 1 936 to 1940 about 820,000 people emigrated to Manchuria.2 
Comparative figures were 23. l million from Britain, 4 .3 million from France, 
seven million from Holland, 33.9 million from Germany and 22 million from 
Italy between 185 1  and 1950.3  The number of Japanese emigrants to Papua 
and New Guinea was tiny: it was never above 200. 
The smallness of Japanese emigration is attributed mainly to Japan's 
seclusion policy which prohibited overseas emigration until 1 868 and its 
integration into world capitalism. Destinations for Japanese emigrants were 
limited, because by the time Japan began to modernise, most Pacific-Asian 
countries had been colonised by European powers. Although Japan's rapid 
modernisation from the late l 9th century with colonisation of Korea, Taiwan, 
Manchuria and Micronesia created space for emigration, this was only 
possible in a short period of 50 years ending with the Pacific War. 
Japanese emigration to Papua and New Guinea began around the tum of 
the 1 9th century. It was an offshoot from the settlement of Japanese pearl 
divers on Thursday Island where they were squeezed out by Australian 
restrictions on migration and by the exhaustion of pearl beds. The migration 
was also a result of a series of searches for new beds and a place to settle by 
an adventurous Japanese skipper, Komine Isokichi. From 1 890 to 1 894, 
Komine explored the waters of New Guinea in a schooner for a new shell-
1Tsunoyama Sakae, 'Sekai shihon shugi to ajia no shihon-19 seiki kohan kara 20 seiki 
shoto-[World capitalism and Asian capital-late 19th century to early 20th century-'. Sekai 
keizai shi gaku [Socio-Economic History] (Tokyo 1981), 47(4), 1. 
2Kokusai kyoryoku jigyo-dan (Japan International Cooperation Agency), Kaigai ijrl tokei 
[Overseas emigration Statistics) (Tokyo 1991), 9-12; Gaimu-shO ryoji iju-bu [Consul-lmm1gration 
Section, Foreign Ministry], Waga kokumin no kaigai hatten, ijrl hyaku-nen no ayumi [Overseas 
development of Japan, the footprint of one hundred-year immigration], Vol. l (Tokyo 1971), 97. 
3Gaimu-sho iju-kyoku (Emigration Bureau of Foreign Ministry), Kaigai ijii t6kei [Overseas 
emigration statistics] (Tokyo 1964), 72. 
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fishing ground. In November 1 894 he made a second voyage with Tsuji 
Ken'nosuke, an agent of the Yoshisa Emigration Company on Thursday 
Island. After this voyage, Tsuji showed a strong interest in New Guinea as a 
possible emigration destination and he approached the British New Guinea 
administration unsuccessfully. Komine's application for naturalisation in 
Queensland was also refused in 1 898. Those events drove him to German New 
Guinea. He reached Rabaul in New Britain in October 190 1  and met Governor 
Hahl. Their relationship developed based on mutual benefits-Komine's 
search for a place to settle and Hahl's need of a vessel. After that, Komine was 
able to acquire leases on Manus Island and in Rabaul and began operating a 
copra plantation, trochus shell-fishing and boatbuilding. More importantly, 
he was allowed to bring in Japanese employees. 
Komine was successful in all his business ventures and their expansion 
contributed to the increase of the Japanese population. As a result, a 
Japanese settlement of about 1 00 emerged in the last years of German rule. 
Most migrants came from the rural areas of southwest Japan-Kumamoto, 
Nagasaki and Wakayama. Most were from coastal areas (Amakusa in 
Kumamoto, Shimabara in Nagasaki, southern Wakayama, and the Miura 
peninsula in Kanagawa) . However, after the outbreak of World War I ,  
immigration and trade restrictions imposed by the Australian military 
administration and later by the civil administration blocked the expansion of 
the settlement. The Japanese population declined from 1 1 9 in 1 9 14 to 36 in 
1 939. At the outbreak of the Pacific War and just before the landing of 
Japanese troops Japanese residents were all arrested and interned in 
Australia. On security grounds, most internees were never allowed to return 
and the Japanese settlement vanished. 
National policies of both Japan and Australia determined their fate. The 
Japanese government was indifferent to them until the late 1 930s when 
nanshin-ron (southward advancement theory) advocates started beating the 
drum of nanshin (southward advancement) , and portrayed the settlers as 
patriot pioneers. Again, the government was indifferent after the war. On the 
other hand, the Australians, including many in New Guinea, always perceived 
them as part of nanshin: the settlers were all spies. The Pacific War intensified 
these perceptions and the settlers were eliminated from New Guinea. Did 
those perceptions tell all about the settlers? How did the settlers identify 
themselves? Did they think they were pioneering the undeveloped land for 
empire building? What did those who actually interacted with them and 
observed them think about them? Were the Australians in Papua and New 
Guinea always suspicious about their activities? If not, why was that? How 
did Papuans and New Guineans perceive them? Vice-versa, how did the 
settlers perceive Papuans and New Guineans? Without attempting to answer 
those questions, the settlers' image remains that of the nanshin-ron advocates 
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and of the Australian officials who had never been to Papua and New Guinea 
or seen the settlers, and as a result the public history of the settlers remains 
partial. 
In this book I aim to present wider perceptions of the settlers in order to 
construct a more comprehensive history. In each chapter I analyse the 
Japanese interest in the South Seas in terms of policy, trade, emigration and 
ideology for two purposes: to set the migration to Papua and New Guinea in 
the context of overall Japanese involvement in the South Seas; and to 
examine the validity of the perceptions of both nW1Shin-ron advocates and the 
Australians in Melbourne. I devote the main part to empirical accounts of the 
settlers from both written materials and oral evidence. I analyse them in 
terms of demographic trends, diplomacy of both Ja pan and Australia, 
Australian colonial polices, settlers' economic activities and their relations 
with other races. To conclude, I focus on the implications of the Japanese 
presence for Japanese social history and the colonial history of Papua and 
New Guinea, conceptualising the position of the migrants in a European­
Australian colonial apparatus. 
THERE HAS BEEN no interdisciplinary approach to explain international 
migration. Social geographers present demographic analyses; anthropologists 
and sociologists focus on ethnological aspects, mainly migrants' adaptation 
to their new environments; historians relate migration to diplomacy; 
economists are mainly concerned with the migrants' economic impacts on 
both their countries of origin and destinations; and scholars in political 
economy attempt to conceptualise the patterns of migration in colonisation. 
In this book, I test the political economy approach. 
This approach is relatively new and its emphasis is on the role of migrants 
as labourers in the international labour market. In the case of Ja pan, her 
integration into world capitalism in the late l 9th century caused the 
development of ambivalent migration; Japan had a position as a colonial 
power sending out emigrants or colonists like other European colonial powers, 
as well as a position as a 'peripheral' nation supplying labour to Western 
powers. 4 An example of the former is the emigration to Korea, Taiwan, 
Manchuria and Micronesia, and of the latter is people leaving for Hawaii , 
North America, Australia and South America. 
Tsunoyama also uses the notion of the 'peripheral' nature of Japanese 
emigration, adopting the world-system model presented by Wallerstein which 
divides the world into core, semi-periphery and periphery, in which the 
4Hayase Shinzo, 'Bengetto imin' no kyozo to jitsuzo: kindai nihon tonan ajia kankei shi no ichi 
kosatsu [Image and reality of 'Benget migrants': thoughts on modem Japan's relations with 
Southeast Asia] (Tokyo 1989). 34. 
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economic development of the core is only possible by the exploitation of the 
periphery or semi-periphery. In this model, Asian emigration was the 
response to the reformation of the labour market in peripheries in the process 
of colonisation or semi-colonisation of Asian countries by European powers.5 
Although Japan was not colonised like other Asian countries, its role as a 
supplier of labour to Hawaii, North America, Australia and South America put 
it in the category of periphery. At the same time, Japan began to play a role 
as 'core' with the beginning of its colonial control over Korea, Taiwan, 
Manchuria and Micronesia. 
I test this model in the case of Japanese emigration to Papua and New 
Guinea, based on the hypothesis that the emigrants came from peripheral 
Japan to Papua and New Guinea as part of rural-urban migration that 
happened in the process of Japanese economic development; they came to the 
periphery of Australia to supply labour to the Australian core; but as Japan 
began to emerge as a core from the early 20th century, they began to serve 
the Japanese core by exploiting local labour. Incidentally, I note that the 
results will not provide a general model for Japanese emigration, because the 
number of emigrants is extremely small. 
IN THE CASE OF the Japanese settlers in Papua and New Guinea, most written 
sources are by officials (both Australian and Japanese) and nanshin-ron 
advocates, and scarcely any by the settlers themselves. The voices of the 
settlers or of those who actually interacted with them are unheard . In order 
to overcome the unevenness of these sources, I have used interviews and 
collected oral evidence.6 I consider interviewing to be as useful in collecting 
information as researching archives and literature, and I treat oral evidence 
as equally as valid as written evidence. 
There are advantages and disadvantages in collecting and using oral 
evidence . The major advantage is that informants can provide information 
which is not recorded in written sources. 7 The major disadvantage is that the 
information can be biased: it can be exaggerated; the informant may be telling 
only one side or part of the story deliberately. That is because, as Neumann 
argues, interviewing is a 'dialogue' between researchers and informants who 
5Tsunoyarna Sakae, op.cit. , 5. 
61 prefer using the term 'oral evidence' to 'oral tradition' for two reasons. First, 'oral tradition' 
generally indicates the information derived from an illiterate society. Papua New Guinea society 
was largely illiterate when the Japanese settlers were there , and historians and anthropologists 
generally acknowledge that Papua New Guineans did not have a tradition of writing down their 
history. But quite a few of my informants were literate and had ability to write down their history 
if they wanted to. Second, my Japanese informants were all literate. 
7David Henige, Oral Historiography (London 1982) , 1 .  
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expect their stories to be written down.8 As a result, selection, omission or 
dramatisation can happen according to the interests of the researchers and 
informants. However, this can be an advantage, as Donald Denoon claims: 
Where a real difference crops up, is that the writer does not know who will read 
the book a hundred years later: the oral informant does know his or her 
questioner, and will probably change the form (or the substance) of a story to meet 
the requirements of that questioner. Now, this is not always a disadvantage. An 
oral historian can, with great efforts, see how the informant is moulding the story, 
and can ask more questions: but you can't ask questions of a book's author, who 
has set the evidence out once and for all time. In other words,  it is possible to 
understand some oral evidence better than some written evidence. 9 
The arguments of both Neumann and Denoon suggest the importance of 
interaction between researchers and informants. 
TABLE 1- 1 .  The number of informants by locations 
descendants non-descendant ex-settlers total 
elders 
Pa!!ua New Guinea 
Milne Bay 1 3  2 1 5  
East New Britain 5 5 10 
New Ireland 
West New Britain 1 1 
Manus 4 25 29 
Japan 
Tokyo 
Nagoya 1 1 
Kyushu 5 2 8 
Australia 
Brisbane 4 5 
Total 35 34 2 7 1  
Source : interviews by the author with descendants, non-descendant elders and informants in 
Japan from June to July 1993, Papua New Guinea November 1993 to March 1994, and Australia 
March 1994. 
I recorded most interviews on tapes and also took notes. Usually I brought 
a small gift (biscuits, cakes, green tea, etc.). I could not afford cash due to a 
small fieldwork budget. Apart from my native language, I am fluent in English 
but my Pidgin English is limited. Most interviews with Papua New Guineans 
were conducted in English, but when the informants could not speak English, 
I had an interpreter. I approached all informants with the utmost politeness, 
and all responded amicably. Quite a few wanted to offer a meal or 
accommodation or to keep in contact. Most interviews were conducted at 
informants' homes or cool places such as under shady trees in Papua New 
8Klaus Neumann, Not the way it really was: constructing the Tolai past (Honololu 1992) . 249. 
9Donald Denoon, 'Introduction', Denoon, Donald and Roderic Lacey (eds) . Oral Tradition in 
Melanesia (Port Moresby 198 1 ) ,  6. 
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Guinea. In most cases of interviewing non-settler elders in Papua New 
Guinea, the interviews were public, and other villagers gathered and listened. 
At the interviews I normally started by introducing myself and my 
research, and briefly outlined what I knew about the settlers from my 
research in written sources. In most cases, I knew more than the informants 
about biographical information on the settlers and events, so I could avoid 
collecting inaccurate information. However, I knew that the major problem 
would be that informants would tell me what they thought I would be pleased 
to hear, as two anthropologists, Zelenietz and Saito, experienced in 
interviewing Kilenge people about their wartime experiences: Zelenietz 
(American) got many stories about good Americans and Saito (Japanese) got 
many of good Japanese. The two found that: 
The narrator sizes up his audience and then delivers an appropriate recital, secure 
in knowing that no other IGlenge will openly contradict the account . . .  Story 
telling is a leisure activity, meant to entertain, and 'facts' are much less important 
than the sense of conveying a 'good story' . . .  No one is openly insulted. No one 
publicly takes offence. Only when the stakes are high, only when 'facts' count (as 
in ownership of an important resource) is public disputation and resultant social 
tension deemed worth the cost. 10 
To avoid this problem, I always challenged informants about the accuracy of 
the information and asked whether they knew bad stories about the Japanese 
settlers. I also tried to avoid intimidating them and to maintain a relaxed 
atmosphere. Occasionally I got negative stories, such as brutal Japanese 
masters or low wages, from New Guinean informants. 
THE NUMBERS OF JAPANESE TRAVELLERS declined sharply after 1 9 1 4  (see Table 
I-2). Most Japanese migrated in the late German period when no migration 
restrictions were applied, as in the Australian military and mandate periods. 
Migrants to Papua and New Guinea were overwhelmingly males. Out of 
1 72,  only 3 1  were females ( 1 8.0  per cent). The distribution of age groups is 
shown in Table I-3. The average age of the migrants was 25.5 years: 26.7 for 
males and 25.8 for females. Young working people ( 1 5  to 29) made up the 
largest group (69.2 per cent) , whereas the proportion of dependent children 
(0- 14  years old) was significantly low (only 3.2 per cent). That indicates that 
most migrants came without their families or that they were single. 
1°Marty Zelenietz and Saito Hisafumi, The Kilenge and the War: an observer effect on stories 
from the past', Geoffrey M. White. and Lamont Lindstrom, The Pacific Theater: Island 
Representations of World War II (Honolulu 1989) , 1 8 1 -2 .  
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TABLE 1-2.  Japanese migrants and travellers to Papua New Guinea 1 894- 1 939 
year no. of Japanese in PNG no. of travellers to PNG 
from Kaigai ryoken kafu hyo 
New Guinea Papua 
1 894 2 n.a. n.a. 
1 895 2 n.a. n.a. 
1 897 n.a. n.a. 
190 1 n.a. n.a. I 
1902 n.a. n.a. I 
1905 n.a. 7• I 
1 906 n.a. 7• n.a. 
1907 n.a. 7• n.a. 
1908 n.a. 9 n.a. 
1909 n.a. 7 n.a. 
19 10 n.a. 6 1 2  
19 1 1  25 8 
19 1 2  n.a. 7 50 
1 9 1 3  n.a. 9 22 
1 9 1 4  1 19 ( 103)** 9 33 
19 15 n.a. 9 n.a. 
1 9 1 6  77 8 1 6  
1 9 1 7  92 n.a. 3 
1 9 1 8  n.a. 8 3 
19 19 I l l 7 8 
1 920 n.a. 4 
192 1 87 10 
1922 73 n.a. 
1923 67 n.a. 
1924 59 n.a. 
1925 54 n.a. 2 
1926 46 n.a. 5 
1927 47 n.a. 2 
1928 49 n.a. 
1929 45 n.a. 
1930 45 n.a. I 
193 1 40 n.a. I 
1 932 35 n.a. 
1933 44 14  
1934 45 n.a. I 
1935 39 n.a. 
1936 48 n.a. 1 2  
1937 40 n.a. 4 
1938 42 n.a. 2 
1939 36 n.a. 1 7  
•Eastern Division only n.a.: n o  data available 
**From a different source, Australian Archives , A518/l-0918/2, 1939, 'Admission of Japanese' 
Source: AnnualReport(Kokopo 1895), 42; (1896), 41; (1898), 51; 'a telegram to Vice-Admiral Takenaka', 8 July 
1919, Japanese Diplomatic Record (hereafter JDR) 7.1.5.-10; GovemmentGazettelV(6) (Rabaul 1917), 69; AA, 
AWM33-57 /5, 20 September 1920, 'memorandum for the secretary, Department of Defence, Melbourne'; 
A518/l-0918/2, 1939, 'Japanese population'; A816/l-19/304/188, 20 January 1939, 'Japanese activities: 
a report by H. Page. acting administrator to the secretary, Prime Minister's Department'; 1906 British New 
Guinea Annual Report (Melbourne 1906). 30; (1907), 30; Papua Report (Melbourne 1908), 49; (1909), 26; (1910), 
26; (1911), 41; (1912). 50; (1913), 57; PapuaAnnual Report(Melboume 1914), 61; (1915), 111; (1916), 101; 
(1917), 11; (1919), 18; (1920), 13; (1921), 15; Territory of Papua Annual Report (Canberra 1949). 34; JDR. 
3.8.5.8 .. J2.2.0.Jl3-7. 
TABLE I-3. Age 
0- 1 4  
15- 19 
20-29 
30-39 
male 
2 
25 
69 
24 
female 
2 
3 
1 1  
5 
40+ 1 1  4 
unknown 1 0  6 
total 1 4 1  3 1  
Introduction 
Source: JDR, 3.8.5.8. (for 190 1-25) . J2.2 .0.J l3-7 (for 1926-40). 
9 
Social status is not so clear, for Kaigai ryoken kafa hyo [The list of overseas 
passport issues] does not always make this clear. The status of only 45 people 
is recorded. Of these, only four were shizoku (former samurai or descendants), 
while 42 were heimin (commoners) and there were no kazoku (peers) . From 
the limited data, the majority of migrants may be assumed to be have been 
commoners. 
TABLE I-4. Household status 
household head 
firstborn son 
number 
33 
30 
16  
22 
16  
wife accompanied b y  household head 
second born son 
brother to a household head 
third born son 
fourth born son 
firstborn daughter 
adopted child 
other 
unknown 
total 
8 
6 
5 
5 
1 7  
1 4  
172 
Source: JDR, 3.8.5.8. (for 190 1 -25) . J2. 2.0.J l3-7 (for 1926-40) 
percentage 
19. 1 
1 7.4 
9.3 
12.7 
9.3 
4.6 
3.4 
2 .9 
2 .9 
9 .8  
8. 1 
100.0 
Most migrants were central members of a household. 11 Three 
groups-household heads, firstborn sons and wives accompanied by a 
household head-make up almost half of the total; respectively 19 . 1 per cent, 
17.4 per cent and 9.3 per cent (Table 1-4). Although the number of second 
born sons is relatively high ( 12 .  7 per cent) , the proportions of other family 
members like third born son, fourth born son and firstborn daughter are 
quite small (respectively 4.6 per cent, 3 .4 per cent and 2.9 per cent) . This 
pattern contradicts the general perception that migration occurred mainly due 
to poverty, and second born or third born sons, who became an economic 
burden in poor peasant families, migrated overseas to attempt to improve 
11The social status of some migrants changed when they revisited Papua or New Guinea. In 
such cases, the household status for the first visit is counted, ignoring the changes of status in 
later visits. 
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their economic situation. It is presumed that Papua and New Guinea provided 
a strong attraction even for central members of a household. 
TABLE 1-5. Birth places of migrants 
birth places no. of migrants (%) birth places no. of migrants (%) 
KumamQ1Q-k�n 40 (23.2} Hiroshima-ken 9 (5.2} 
Amakusa-gun 39 Aki-gun 4 
Kumamoto-shi 1 Hiroshima-shi 2 
Na��aki-k�n ;l� (22.§} Kurtoka-gun 1 
Kita-takaki-gun 17 Toyouchi-gun 1 
Nagasaki-shi 7 Toyota-gun 1 
Minami-takaki-gun 5 FulmQka-ken .6..11:.fil 
Higashi-sonogi-gun 4 Mizuma-gun 5 
Nishi-sonogi-gun 3 Onga-gun 1 
Nishi-takaki-gun Kurume-shi 1 
Kita-matsuura-gun Miyako-gun 1 
Minami-matsuura-gun Osaka-fu fillil 
Wakaysm!a-k�n 24 ll;rn1 Osaka-shi 6 
Higashi-muro-gun 13 Kagoshima-ken 5 (2.9} 
Nishi-muro-gun 7 Aira-gun 3 
Kuchikata-gun 2 Kagoshima-shi 1 
Hiyoshi-gun 1 Izumi-gun 1 
unknown 1 TQkyo-fu 5 (2.9} 
Saga-ken 9 (5.2} Tokyo-shi 4 
Naka-gun 3 Niijima-moto-mura 1 
Saga-shi 2 Chiba-ken filLll 
Higashi-matsuura-gun Kimitsu-gun 2 
Miyaki-gun Awa-gun 1 
Harumoto-gun Okayama-ken 3 (1.7} 
unknown 1 Oda-gun 2 
Kanags:i.wa-ken 9 (5.2} Kojima-gun 1 
Miura-gun 9 other 12 (6.9) 
Total 172 (100.0) 
Source: JDR. 3.8.5.8. (for 1901-25) and J2.2.0.Jl3-7 (for 1926-40). 
A pattern of chain migration, which 'moves sets of related individuals or 
households from one place to another via a set of social arrangements in 
which people at the destination provide aid, information, and encouragement 
to new migrants' ,  12 can be seen from birth places. Table 1-5 shows that groups 
of migrants came from particular towns or villages. 13 Kinship also indicates 
chain migration (Table 1-6) :  59 migrants are related to one another (34.3 per 
cent); they include a high proportion of married couples-31 persons. 
12Charles Tilly, 'Migration in Modem European History', Williams H. McNeil! and Ruth Adams 
(eds). Hwnan Migration: Patterns and Policies (Bloomington 1978). 53. 
13Administrative zones of Japan consist of, from the largest, ken or fu (prefecture). shi (city). 
gun (county), ch6 (town) and mura (village). 
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TABLE 1-6. Kinship 
persons in couple (no children) 
couple (accompanied by children) 
blood relations of other kinds 
total 
no. of cases 
8 
4 
13 
25 
no. of people 
16 
15 
28 
59 
Source: JDR, 3.8.5.8. (for 1901-25) and J2.2.0.Jl3-7 (for 1926-40). 
Most migrants were artisans. As Table I-7 shows, the largest occupational 
group was shipwrights, followed by carpenters, traders, fishermen and 
planters. This shows clearly that most migrants were recruited specifically for 
Komine's business-boatbuilding, shell-fishing, and plantation management. 
TABLE 1-7. Occupation of migrants 
number percentage 
shipwright 55 31.9 
carpenter 18 10.4 
trader 18 10.4 
sawyer 14 8.1 
fisherman 13 7.5 
planter 8 4.6 
maid 4 2.3 
clerk 2 1.1 
cook 2 1.1 
labourer 0.5 
store assistant 0.5 
drafts man 1 0.5 
straw mat maker 1 0.5 
dried bonito processor 1 0.5 
other 32• 18.6 
total 172 100.0 
"'11lis group mostly includes people accompanying migrants, such as wives and children. 
Source: JDR, 3.8.5.8. (for 1901-25) and J2.2.0.Jl3-7 (for 1926-40). 
Occupations are closely associated with birth places. Nearly half of the 
shipwrights came from Kumamoto-ken, almost all sawyers also came from 
Kumamoto-ken, most carpenters from Nagasaki-ken and Osaka-fu, and half 
of the planters from Wakayama-ken (see Table 1-8). Furthermore, most 
migrants with the same occupation came from the same TTU1ra (village) or cha 
(town) . For example, out of 23 shipwrights of Kumamoto-ken, 1 3  came from 
Goryo-mura. Out of six traders of Wakayama-ken, four came from 
Oshima-mura. Out of four planters of Wakayama-ken, three came from 
Kushimoto-cho. All fishermen of Kanagawa-ken came from Misaki-cho. And 
out of five carpenters of Osaka-fu , four came from Imaki-cho. 14 
14JDR, 3.8.5.8. (for 1901-25) and J2.2.0.Jl3-7 (for 1926-40). 
Introduction 
TABLE 1-8. Relation between birth places and occupation 
occullation of migrants 
birth places shipwrights carpenters sawyers traders fishermen planters other 
Kumamoto-ken 23 4 10 0 0 0 3 
Nagasaki-ken 8 6 2 6 5 0 12 
Wakayama-ken 3 2 0 6 2 4 7 
Saga-ken 4 1 0 0 0 0 4 
Kanagawa-ken 0 0 0 1 4 0 4 
Hiroshima-ken 7 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Fukuoka-ken 3 0 2 0 0 0 3 
Osaka-fu 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Kagoshima-ken 1 0 0 3 0 0 
Tokyo-fu 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 
Chiba-ken 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 2 0 0 0 0 3 10 
total 55 18 14 18 13 8 45 
Source: JDR. 3.8.5.8. (for 1901-25) and J2.2.0.Jl3-7 (for 1926-40). 
TABLE 1-9.  Japanese who married Papua New Guinean women 
name of Japanese date of birth/ occupation"' birth place of wife 
migration/ marriage 
Arata Gunkichi 1877/1916/n.a. plantation manager Manus 
Asanuma Ichimatsu 1883/1917/1933 mechanic Micronesia 
Endo Shigetaro 1892/1913/1931 shipwright New Ireland 
Hagiwara Hikota 1892/1913/1934 plantation manager Manus 
Ikesaki Tokuyoshi 1875/1913/1932 plantation manager Manus 
Izumi Eikichi 1894/1914/1930 shipwright New Ireland 
Kawamura** n.a./pre-1921/pre- 1921 n.a. Manus 
Kikuchi lchisuke 1892/1918/1930 fisherman West New Britain 
Kimura Hideichir6 1897 /1916/1939 fisherman Micronesia 
Koto Jimmy n.a./pre-1900/pre-1900 fisherman, trader Milne Bay 
Murakami Heijir6 1877/1901/1918 fisherman, trader Milne Bay 
Nakamura Soshichi 1902/1917/1932 fisherman West New Britain 
Sakane** n.a./pre-1924/pre-1924 n.a. New Ireland 
Sasaki Hikokichi 1893/1917 /1936 fisherman Madang 
Tabuchi Yoshimatsu 1899/1917 /1925 clerk New Ireland 
Tamiya Mabe n.a./pre-1910/pre-1910 fisherman, trader Milne Bay 
Tanaka Taichir6 1875/1902/pre-1906 fisherman, trader Milne Bay 
Yamashita Shichinosuke 1903 / 1913 / 1920 plantation manager Manus 
n.a.: no data available *At the time of marriage **First names unknown. 
1 3  
Source: JDR 3.8.5.8; AA, A367 C72533-C72588, A373/l 11505/48, MP1103/l 
MJ18500-MJ18533; Admission 1 901 -63 (boys and girls), Vunapope Catholic Mission School; oral 
evidence collected by the author, December 1993 to March 1994, PNG 
Intermarriages were common: 1 8  cases can be confirmed (Table 1-9) , in all 
of which Japanese males married local non-white females. There are about 
200 mixed-race offspring, including second and third generation (Table 1- 1 0). 
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TABLE I- 1 0. Mixed-race descendants (excluding deceased) by birth place 
2nd generation 3rd generation total 
Milne Bay 6 22 28 
East New Britain 10 46 56 
New Ireland 1 9 10 
West New Britain 6 62 68 
Manus 9 38 47 
total 32 177 209 
Source : oral evidence collected by the author, December 1993 to March 1994, PNG 
MODERN JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS of the 'South' date back to the early l 5th 
century when 'a new geographical term nanban (the South), which meant 
mainly the Southeast Asian region, was added to the traditional Japanese 
idea of the world hitherto restricted to Nippon, Kara (China), and Teajiku 
(India) '.15 In the Meiji period ( 1868- 19 12) . the Japanese perception of the 
South extended to the Southwest Pacific centred on Micronesia and a new 
term 'nan'yo (the South Seas) was created. But the term ' nan'yo is imprecise 
in Japanese literature. It can include all South Pacific islands but it can also 
include Southeast Asia. Also in English literature, as Peattie points out, it is 
ill-defined. 16 In this book, I define nan'yo as a region that contains the islands 
of Micronesia, Melanesia, Polynesia and Southeast Asia, and I use it with 
flexibility according to the context. 
15Henry Frei, Japan's Southward Advance and Australia (Melbourne 1991), 12. 
16Mark Peattie, Nan'y6: The rise and fall of the Japanese in Micronesia 1885-1945 (Honolulu 
1988), xvii-xviii. 
Chapter 1 
Exploration, 1890-1901 
FROM TIIE MID- 1 880s, EUROPEAN ENTREPRENEURS operating mines and 
plantations 'tapped the long-established Asian labour market' to overcome the 
shortage of labour supplies from Melanesia. 1 Among the Asian workers were 
Japanese, most of whom were brought to mines and plantations as labourers, 
and some recruited for shell-fishing in Torres Strait as skilled divers and 
tenders. The latter are generally known as pearl divers on Thursday Island. 
In the 1 890s they began to dominate the pearl industry and provoked 
anti-Japanese feeling among their European counterparts.2 As a result, 
Australians restricted Japanese migration. In addition, the exhaustion of shell 
beds induced the Japanese to search for an alternative location for shell­
fishing and settlement. 
An adventurous and energetic Japanese skipper, Komine Isokichi, from a 
base in the Japanese settlement on Thursday Island, began to explore the 
waters of New Guinea in the 1 890s. After a series of voyages, Komine 
eventually reached East New Britain in German New Guinea in 1 90 1  and 
there he ushered in a period of Japanese migration. 
Japanese interest in the South Seas 
Until the late 1 9th century the Japanese government had no policies for the 
South Seas. The government was preoccupied with domestic affairs, while 
Germany, the United States, Australia, France, Spain, Netherlands, and 
Britain were involved in the acquisition and exchange of tropical islands. The 
Japanese government's primary concern was to centralise governance in order 
to build a strong empire which could not be colonised. External affairs were 
secondary concerns in which the government was mainly preoccupied with 
the removal of unequal treaties imposed by Western nations and the 
promotion of national prestige. Although Japan's expansionism was shown 
in the 1 870s in Saigo Takamori's claim to invade Korea, Okubo Toshimichi's 
decision to send a military expedition to Taiwan and the government's 
declaration that the Ryiikyii Islands and Sakhalin were parts of Japan, the 
1Margaret Willson et al., 'Asian Workers in the Pacific', in Margaret Willson et al. (eds), Labour 
in the South Pacific (Townsville 1990). 78. 
2Regina Ganter, 1he Pearl-Shellers of Torres Strait: resource use, development and decline, 
l 860s- l 960s (Melbourne 1994), 99-107. 
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expansion was limited to the adjacent region. The government's involvement 
in South Seas affairs was marginal and largely confmed to matters of national 
prestige and the rights of citizens abroad. 
Japan's first involvement in the South Seas was an embarrassing episode 
involving emigrants to Guam. In 1 868 about 40 Japanese emigrated as 
contract labourers to work on a plantation, where a Spanish employer treated 
them harshly.3 The Japanese were treated no differently from locals and the 
employer did not pay their promised wages in full. Their complaint to a 
Spanish administrator was ignored. In 1 87 1 ,  after some had died due to 
harsh work conditions, three managed to return to Ja pan to report their 
plight. The government was astonished and the matter was discussed, but it 
is unknown whether it took any action to save these migrants or protested to 
the Spanish administration. In 1 868, 1 53 contract labourers in Hawaii 
suffered a similar fate. These incidents embarrassed the Japanese 
government which was acutely sensitive about its national dignity, but 
probably the government, which was just managing to survive by pacifying 
rebels, chose not to protest in order to avoid conflicts that it could not handle 
confidently. The government could only ban emigration by enforcing tight 
regulations to avoid further national disgrace. 
However. the issue of sovereignty over the Ogasawara (also known as 
Bonin) Islands provided an opportunity to stimulate Japanese interest in the 
South Seas. Although the Tokugawa government hardly resisted when 
Commodore Perry demanded the opening of Ja pan and proclaimed US 
possession of the Ogasawara Islands in 1 853, some vocal Meiji officials in 
1 875 'emphasised the urgency of return of the islands that could connect 
Japanese interests to the South Seas'.4 The report of the Foreign Ministry to 
the Prime Minister explained that 'the islands were a strategic point in the 
Pacific sea route, which was extremely important in Japan's advancement in 
the South Sea'. 5 Then negotiations began and the US compromised. The issue 
signalled the beginning of the government's awareness of its interests in the 
South Seas. It was also significant in that the government promoted national 
dignity by recovering territory. 
As the incidents in Guam and Hawaii showed, the government was aware 
of its weak international position and tried not to provoke other Western 
nations in the South Seas until the 1 880s. Such a naive posture was 
exemplified when a Japanese sailor was murdered by local people on Lae 
Island in the Marshalls in 1 884. The government sent Suzuki Tsunenori and 
Goto Taketaro (both prominent nanshin-ron advocates) to investigate. They 
3lrte Toraji, Mefji nanshin shi ko [A short history of southward expansion in the Meiji Era] 
(Tokyo 1943), 10-16. 
41bid., 32. 
51bid., 34. 
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found the murderers and reached a settlement with a local chieftain on 
condition that the chieftain apologise and allow a Japanese flag to be raised 
on the island. However, Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru rebuked Suzuki and 
Goto, explaining that raising a flag on the island would provoke the 
displeasure of other Western powers. Suzuki was sent back to the island to 
lower the flag. 6 
The government's prudent attitude began to change when Enomoto Buyo, 
a diplomat posted in Russia, advocated Japanese involvement in the South 
Seas. He was the first government official to draft a blueprint for Japan's 
territorial expansion and in 1 877 proposed to colonise New Guinea. During 
his posting in Russia, he observed Western powers competing for colonies all 
over the world and proposed to the Prtrne Minister, Iwakura Tomomi, that the 
government purchase the Mariana and Caroline Islands from Spain. The 
Japanese government would send officials to those islands from an office at 
Guam which would be a branch office of an administration centre in the Izu 
Islands (about 100 kilometres south of Tokyo) . The colonists would plant kina 
(for quinine) , tobacco and coffee, using convict labour. He then proposed to 
colonise Papua, New Guinea and the Solomons as a second step, and to 
acquire all small islands in the South Seas to make them bases for Japan's 
maritime enterprise that, he expected, would extend as far as India and 
Australia. 7 He also proposed to purchase Borneo.8 However, his proposals 
were not accepted. The government could not address external affairs, being 
'burdened with rising domestic problems' .  9 The rebellions of peasants and 
anti-government former samurai were at their peak in the 1 870s. 
In 1 889 the centralisation of governance was achieved with the enactment 
of the Meiji Constitution. The government began to probe for opportunities to 
expand its territory. The major concern was East Asia where Japan had to 
fend off Russian expansion for its own security and where the acquisition of 
territories looked possible. The government also pursued interests in the 
South Seas under Enomoto's initiatives when he was appointed Foreign 
Minister from May 1 89 1  to August 1 892. During his term of office, he 
established the Emigration Section in order 'to send Japanese to the South 
Seas to expand maritime enterprise and commercial interests and to solve 
Japan's overpopulation problem' . 10 He also introduced the bill that enabled 
6¥ano Toru, Nilwn no nan'y6 shi kan [Japanese historical view of the South Seas) (Tokyo 1979), 
36. 
7Enomoto Buyo Monjo 6-13 shi 1877, Kensei-shiryo-shitsu, National Diet Library (Tokyo). 
8Ueno Hisashi, ''Enomoto shokurnin-chi' no hikari to kage [1be light and darkness of 'Enomoto 
Colony)', in Nakayama, Yukio (ed.), Gendai shiten sengoku bakumatsu no gunz6 Enomoto Buy6 
[Contemporary view, protagonists in at the Civil Wars era and the end of Edo era) (Tokyo 1983), 
129. 
9lrie., op.cit., 37. 
1°Ueno, op.cit. 
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the government to send teams to investigate destinations for emigration. 1 1  
From 1 89 1  to 1 894 teams visited New Caledonia, New Hebrides, Fiji, the 
Philippines, Australia, Malaya and Thailand. 12 At the same time Enomoto 
played a pioneering role in stimulating intellectuals. He established the Tokyo 
Geographic Society (Tokyo Chigaku Kyokai) in 1 879 and Colonisation Society 
(Shokumin Kyokai) in 1 893. Both Societies published journals and urged 
Japanese to take an interest in the region. The members of the Societies 
included leading nanshin-ron advocates such as Inagaki Manjiro, Taguchi 
Ukichi and Shiga Shigetaka. 13 However, victory in the Sino-Japanese War 
distracted the government's attention from the South Seas, and Enomoto's 
initiatives did not develop into consistent policies. 
Trade 
Japanese trade with the South Seas was of course small compared with that 
with other areas such as China or North America. The trade figures for 
Micronesia were so minuscule that they did not appear in Japanese statistics. 
Those of Southeast Asia and Australia were similarly small, although they 
increased rapidly. Exports to Australia increased from 0. 1 million yen in 1 880 
to 2.5 million in 1900 and imports from 0.03 million yen to 2.4 million. 
Although sufficient data on Southeast Asia are not available, exports to India 
and Thailand were 0. 1 million yen in 1 880 and imports were 1. 7 million, while 
in 1 900 exports to French Indochina, Thailand, the Philippines, and Dutch 
East Indies were 1 6.3 million yen and imports were 1 0 .9 million. The 
proportion of trade with Southeast Asia and Australia in overall Japanese 
trade increased from 0.2 per cent in 1 880 to 3.5 per cent in 1 900. 14 
The development of the South Seas trade owed much to individual traders, 
and little to government. Taguchi, a practical nanshin-ron advocate, initiated 
the trade with Micronesia. He established the Nanto Shokai (South Islands 
Company) in 1 890 and asserted that 'There are many people who insist on 
profits from trading with the South Seas. However, none of their opinions are 
convincing. The reason I established the Nanto Shokai is that advocates of 
South Seas trade lack practice.' 15 Taguchi's company was short-lived; it was 
11Tsunoyama Yukihiro, Enorrwto Buyo to Mekishiko yii [Enomoto Buyo and immigration to 
Mexico] (Tokyo 1986), 59-60. 
12Irie, op.cit., 113. 
13Gaimu sho gaiko shiryo kan nihon gaiko shi jiten hensan iinkai [The editing committee of the 
encyclopedia of Japanese diplomatic history, diplomatic record office of the Foreign Ministry], 
Nihon gaiko shijiten [Encyclopedia of Japanese diplomatic history] (Tokyo 1992), 412-22. 
14Tokei-in [the Statistical Bureau] (ed.), Nihon teikoku tokei nenkan [Statistical yearbook of 
Japan Empire], Vol.l (Tokyo 1882), 193-295; Vol.33 (1914), 216. 
15Taguchi Ukichi, 'Nan'yo boeki jimu hokoku [Business report on South Seas trade]', Inoue, 
Hikosaburo and Suzuki, Tsunenort, Nantojunko ki [Record of a cruise in the southern islands] 
(Tokyo 1893), 24 7.  
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liquidated in 1 892 upon his return from the first trip to Micronesia. 16 But its 
impact was considerable. It initiated a rush to establish small trading 
companies by other nanshin-ron advocates in the 1 890s. 
Larger-scale trade relations developed with Southeast Asia and Australia. 
As in Micronesia, the development of the trade owed much to individuals. 
However, in contrast to the Japan-Micronesia trade, most traders in 
Southeast Asia were not nanshin-ron advocates but petty traders who worked 
in partnership with karayuki-san (Japanese prostitutes overseas) . 17 Their 
main business activity was to sell Japanese-made miscellaneous goods to 
karayuki-san who spearheaded the Japanese presence mainly at Singapore. 
Similarly, Japan-Australia trade was not developed by nanshin-ron advocates. 
A trader of resolute will, Kanematsu Fusajiro, pioneered the Australian trade, 
foreseeing the potential in importing wool. 
Emigration 
Like trade,  Japanese migration to the South Seas was small in scale. The 
number of migrants to South Pacific Islands, Australia and Southeast Asia, 
mainly as labourers, was much smaller than to Hawaii, Peru, Brazil and 
Mexico in the same period. The number going to the South Seas can be 
counted in hundreds whereas the numbers to other areas exceeded 1 0,000. 18 
The small scale can be attributed to the limited land size and economic 
activities in the South Pacific Islands, migration restriction in Australia, and 
the availability of a cheap local work force in Southeast Asia. Much migration 
was also short term due to unexpected harsh work conditions and the hostile 
tropical environment to which the migrants were not accustomed . 
Systematic migration to the South Pacific and Australia started from the 
1 880s. The Japanese migrated to Thursday Island, sugar-cane fields in 
Queensland and Fiji ,  and to a mine in New Caledonia. Most migrants were 
keiyaku imin (contract emigrants) who were recruited by European brokers or 
by Japanese emigration companies to work for European employers. The only 
exceptions were the majority of Japanese on Thursday Island, who werejiyu 
imin (free emigrants) and engaged in shell-fishing. 
Migration to Thursday Island began when an Englishman, John Miller, 
recruited 37 Japanese in 1 883 . They were the first migrants with 
endorsement from the Japanese Foreign Ministry. 19 Meanwhile, in 1 888, 1 00 
16His company was liquidated in 1892 upon his return from the first trip to Micronesia. 
17Yano Torn, 'Nanshin' no keifu [The Genealogy of 'southward advance') (Tokyo 1975), 81. 
18lshikawa Tomonort, 'Nihon shutsu-imin shi ni okeru imin kaisha to keiyaku imin ni tsuite 
[Emigration Company and contract emigrants in the history of Japanese emigration]', Ryiikyii 
daigaku ha-bun gaku bu kiy6 [Bulletin of Law and Literature Department of Ryfikyii University], 
shakai 14 (Naha 1970), 32-3. 
19lmano Toshihiko and Fujisaki Yasuo, Imin shi II: qjia oceania hen (History of emigration II: 
Asia and Oceania) (Tokyo 1985), 239. 
20 JAPANESE SETTLERS IN PAPUA AND NEW GUINEA 
Japanese peasants were recruited as labourers for work on a sugar-cane 
plantation in Queensland . In 1 89 1 ,  the first Japanese emigration company, 
the Yoshisa Imin Kaisha (Yoshisa Emigration Company) , was established. The 
company played a central role in sending Japanese to the South Pacific 
Islands and Australia, but it neglected to investigate the work conditions 
adequately and this was one of the reasons for the discontinuance of South 
Seas migration. In 1 892, the company sent 600 migrants to New Caledonia 
as labourers in a nickel mine. 20 The migrants complained to the company that 
their work conditions were too harsh and their wages were lower than those 
of local labourers. 2 1 A disaster occurred when the company sent 305 migrants 
to Fiji on the request of Burns, Philp in 1 894. One hundred and eleven 
migrants died of beriberi, dysentery and tropical fever. 22 
The end of migration was also attributable to restriction by the Queensland 
government in the late 1 890s. By that time, the Japanese population on 
Thursday Island had grown rapidly. In 1 89 1  only 1 2  arrived ,  but 1 00 arrived 
in 1 892 and 264 in 1 893, and the population reached 376 by the end of 1 893 
and increased to 1 , 500 by 1 897.23 The Japanese worked diligently and 
dominated the shell-fishing industry. Inevitably, they threatened their 
European counterparts in the industry and this eventually led the 
Queensland government to legislate to restrict Japanese migration.24 
In response, the Japanese government protested but proved to be 
compliant; it spontaneously stopped emigration to Queensland in 1 897. What 
the Japanese government was concerned about was national prestige; 
migration should not be restricted by race but by number. In the Japanese 
view, the spontaneous restriction meant a gentlemanly action-an admirable 
deed characteristic of an honourable nation. Nevertheless the Queensland 
government continued to tighten restrictions. In 1 898 it banned Japanese 
ownership of fishing boats for pearl and beche-de-mer fishing. Finally, the 
enforcement of the Immigration Restriction Act of 1 902 by the Commonwealth 
of Australia virtually shut the door on further Japanese migration. It was the 
entrenchment of the White Australia Policy by which Australians aimed to 
establish their nation free from coloured races. The Act included a notorious 
dictation test which was devised to refuse entry to non-English speaking 
people, mainly Asians. 
Meanwhile, sporadic migration proceeded to Southeast Asia but largely 
failed . Nanshin-ron advocates, Iwamoto Chitsuna and Ishibashi Usaburo, 
20Irte, op.cit. ( 1 943) . 127. 
211bid . .  1 30. 
221bid. , 135. 
231bid. . 399; Hattori Toru, Nankyil no shin shokumin [A new colony in the southern 
hemisphere) (Tokyo 1 894) . 18- 19 .  
24David Sissons, 'The Early Japanese Influence on the Northern Territory', Northern Territory 
Newsletter, November (Darwin 1977) . 19.  
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established the Shamu Shokumin Kaisha (Thailand Colonisation Company) 
and sent about 50 peasants there as agricultural labourers in 1 895. Their 
venture failed because the company did not pay the promised wages and the 
migrants cancelled their contracts. Many of them went to work in a nearby 
mine, but most got sick and died there.25 In 1 896, Ishihara Tetsunosuke, a 
wealthy landlord from Aichi, sent about 30 peasants to British Malaya as 
agricultural migrants, after reading promising reports about migration to the 
western coast of Malaya in Shokumin Ky6kai H6koku (Colonisation Society 
Report) . 26 This migration also failed due to harsh working conditions and a 
series of heavy floods. 27 
The migration of karayuki-san shows a striking contrast. It is estimated 
that nearly 1 ,000 karayuki-san were engaged in prostitution in Singapore 
alone by 1 900 and Japanese and Chinese entrepreneurs exploited them. 28 
Ideology 
Some intellectuals began to show an interest in the South Seas from the late 
1 880s, although the concept of nanshin was not new and goes back to 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi's plan to invade southern China in the 1 6th century. The 
major characteristic of modem nanshin was its non-militarist approach and 
the assertion of free trade, reflecting Japan's vulnerable international 
position. Japan wanted to remove unequal treaties, avoiding direct conflict 
with Western nations because it lacked economic and military strength. 
Enomoto's plan to develop colonies in the South Seas was a typical 
example. Kama argues that 'Enomoto's attempt to purchase South Seas 
islands from Spain did not come from imperialistic intention, but from the 
situation that Japan had to develop its international trade and maritime 
enterprise (in order to develop its economy] ' .  29 Similarly, Tsunoyama claims 
that Enomoto thought that territorial problems among colonial powers should 
be solved peacefully; Ja pan should seek colonies where there were few 
problems, and should assist the economic development of the colonies 
through development of natural resources and trade links with Japan. 
Territorial expansion in Enomoto's view did not mean colonisation by invading 
other countries but the purchase of undeveloped areas and the investment of 
capital for development. 30 
251rie, op.cit. ( 1 943), 137-56. 
26A joumal of Enomoto's Colonisation Society. 
27Hara Fujio, Wasurerareta nWl'yo imin: Malaya toko nilwnjin n6 min no kiseki [Forgotten 
South Seas migrants: the footprint of the migration of Japanese farmers to Malaya] (Tokyo 1 987), 
64-87. 
28James Warren. Ah Ku Wld Karayuki-sWl: prostitution in Singapore 1 870-1 940 (Singapore 
1993), 59 and 86. 
29Kamo Giichi, Enomoto Buyo (Tokyo 1988), 494-5. 
3°Tsunoyama, op.cit. , 9. 
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Enomoto's idea of peaceful maritime-oriented colonisation was articulated 
in the prospectus of the Colonisation Society in 1 893 : 
1 .  The way to prevent over-population in our nation is to promote emigration and 
colonisation today. 
2. Japanese topography, which is surrounded by the sea on its four sides, makes 
sea transport so useful and it also helps to promote emigration and colonisation. 
3. In order to gain our nation's maritime right. we have to expand our sea routes. 
4. If colonisation proceeds, the demand for our goods will increase from colonists 
as well as foreigners and thereby it will greatly promote our commerce. 
5. The heart of our people has been dispirited because of the seclusion policy for 
many years . . . Colonisation will greatly uplift our spirits against the outside 
world, widen our view, and help import new knowledge, and thereby it is an urgent 
task for pursuing our open policy that should change the minds of our people. 31 
Largely coinciding with Enomoto's term in the Foreign Ministry and the 
return of his investigation teams, other intellectuals also began to express an 
interest. The publications by leading nanshin-ron advocates were concentrated 
from the late 1 880s to the early 1 890s. Some were written by those who 
participated in the Imperial Navy's training voyages which started in 1 875. 
The voyages carried civilians, some of whom became nanshin-ron advocates 
such as Shiga and Yokoo.32 
Like Enomoto, most nanshin-ron advocates asserted the need to promote 
Japanese mercantile activities in the South Seas. For example, Shiga, in 
Nan'yo jyi (Current Affairs in the South Seas) , emphasised the promotion of 
trade, introducing Australia as a favourable trading partner and writing five 
chapters out of 1 8  about Japan-Australia trade and Australia.33 Similarly, 
Hattori Tom concluded in Nilwn no nan'yo (Japan's South Seas) that 'Japan 
can enjoy great benefit from the South Seas through developing an economic 
relationship' . 34 Suzuki was more idealistic, stating that the purposes of 
Japan's expansion were to assist the independence of the islands and to raise 
the national prestige of Japan.35 Taguchi, a prominent liberal economist, 
pointed out the benefits derived from Japanese migrants in Hawaii, and 
emphasised that the development of a mercantile fleet was a key to promoting 
trade and emigration. 36 Suganuma Teifii was one of few advocates who 
introduced a militaristic aspect. In Shin nihon no tonan no yume (Dream of 
31Shokumin kyokai [Colonisation Society] , Shokuminjiho [Colonisation Times] , Vol.85 (Tokyo 
190 1 ) ,  1 -2 .  
32Yano, op.cit. ( 1979) , 14 .  
33Shiga Shigetaka, 'Nan'yo jiji' [Current Affairs in the South Seas], in 1927, Shiga Shigetaka 
zenshu [the complete works of Shigetaka Shiga] , Vol.3 (Tokyo 1 887) , 1 - 1 1 1 . 
34Hattori Toru, Nihon no Nan'yo [Japan's South Sea] (Tokyo 1 888) , 1 58 .  
35lnoue Hikosaburo and Suzuki Tsunenori, Nanto Junko ki  [Record of a cruise in the southern 
islands] (Tokyo 1893) , 253. 
36Taguchi Ukichi, 'Nan'yo keiryaku ron' [How to expand into the South Seas] , Tokyo keizai 
zasshi [Tokyo economic journal] , 2 1 (5 1 3) (Tokyo 1890) , 35 1 -3. 
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new Japan's expansion to southern lands) Wiitten in 1 888 but published in 
1940, he predicted an easy victory over Western colonial powers in the South 
Seas, compartng Japanese military strength with that of Western powers. He 
also argued that the seizure of the islands would demonstrate Japan's 
superior naval power. 37 
However, nanshin-ron in the late 1 9th century was never an influential 
ideology. None of the advocates were graduates of the Tokyo or Kyoto Imperial 
University and were hardly recognised in academic circles.38 Nor did they 
(except for Enomoto) hold positions in the government. The number of 
publications about the South Seas was small: only 1 7  books and articles were 
published from 1 868 to 1 90 1 ,  compared to hundreds about East Asia. 39 
Moreover, the publications of the leading nanshin-ron advocates were mostly 
personal recollections like Shiga's short accounts, Taguchi's brief essay, 
Suzuki's three books on his trips, and Suganuma's draft which nobody 
heeded at the time of Wiiting. These works were unjustly overvalued by 
nanshin-ron advocates of a later period, particularly from the late 1930s to the 
early 1 940s, to justify Japanese aggression in the South Seas.40 
Japanese perceptions of New Guinea 
From the 1 880s, intellectuals intermittently introduced Japanese readers to 
both German and British New Guinea and contributed to creating 
perceptions. Japanese ideas of New Guinea developed with a territorial desire 
in the 1 880s and with practical assessments of commercial potential in the 
1 890s. However, New Guinea was always an appendix to their central interest 
in other places such as Micronesia and Australia. Descriptions of New Guinea 
were mostly brief and some were simply translated from Western sources. 
Probably few people except nanshin-ron advocates, the South Seas traders and 
agents of emigration companies could find it on a map. In general, New 
Guinea was described as a tropical land of cannibals colonised by Western 
nations. 
In the 1 880s nanshin-ron advocates described the nature and the people 
of New Guinea mainly to suggest Japanese colonisation. That indicates that 
New Guinea was already embraced in an overall framework of nanshin. For 
37Suganuma Teifii, 'Shin nihon no tonan to yume' [Dream of new Japan's expansion to 
southern lands] , Dai nilwn sh0gy6 shi [Commercial history of Great Japan] (Tokyo 1940). 657-9. 
38¥ano, op.cit. (1979). 65. 
�ihon takushoku kyokai (ed.), Z61w nanp6 btmken mokwuku [Bibliography of the South Seas 
Literature, revised edition] (Tokyo 1944); Nihon tosho senta [Japan library centre], Nihon slwseki 
bunrui so mokwuku meyi-hen [Catalogue of Japanese publications, Meiji period] , Vols 1-3 (Tokyo 
1992). 
4<>y°ano, op.cit. (1979). 57-8. 
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example, Sasaki Taketsuna, a member of Enomoto's Tokyo Geographic 
Society, emphasised the necessity of acquiring New Guinea: 
Life [in New Guinea] is not so difficult, as the climate is of the best kind and there 
is a sufficient supply of food. The only problem is sometimes we have attacks from 
natives. The islands [of New Guinea] are located at a distance of only a 1 0  
day-voyage from Japan. It is to our advantage to gain these islands both from a 
strategic and a commercial point of view. Today is the opportunity to acquire these 
islands.4 1  
Yokoo also urged Japanese colonisation of South Seas islands. After an 
exploration voyage on the Mejji Maru, he reported in 1 887 that Germany and 
Spain had shrewdly acquired New Guinea and the Philippines respectively, 
and suggested that Ja pan should acquire other islands urgently. 42 
In the same year, Shiga mentioned German New Guinea, briefly describing 
the 'extremely hot climate and violent natives in the Admiralty Islands, New 
Britain, New Ireland, and the Solomons' . 43 Although Shiga did not refer to 
colonisation, he might have aroused public awareness of German New 
Guinea, as his description was in his best-selling book Nan'yo jjji, which 
sparked a boom in public interest in the South Seas. 
The statement of Tsuneya Seifuku, a prominent economist and advocate 
of emigration, is a typical example showing a stereotyped image of New 
Guineans. Although he never visited New Guinea, he wrote in Kaigai 
Shokumin-ron (Overseas colonisation theory) in 1 89 1 :  'Natives do not know 
the way to establish trade relationships and they have a ferocious nature. 
They like fighting and find the greatest pleasure in killing enemies and eating 
the enemy's flesh. '44 In the 1 890s, the nanshin-ron advocates' resentment that 
Japan had missed out on acquiring territories subsided, but a realistic 
assessment of the German monopoly of commerce emerged. Tomiyama 
Komakichi brought first-hand information about German rule in New Guinea. 
As a member of the Colonisation Society and of the investigation team to New 
Caledonia, he was on board a navy training ship, Hiei, that visited Kokopo in 
New Britain for a week in 1 89 1  on the way to New Caledonia, and in 1 892 on 
the way back. 45 He reported on the colonial administration, the population, 
and how the New Guinea Company dominated commerce and sold coal to his 
ship for an extortionate price. He also reported that a German administrator 
had expressed his concern about the Japanese intention of colonising the 
41Sasaki Taketsuna, 'Honp6 oyobi nyiiginia no kankei [The relation between Japan and New 
Guinea) ' ,  Tokyo chigaku ky6kai h6koku [The Report of Tokyo Geographic Society] . Vol .2 ,  No. 8  
(Tokyo 1 88 1 ) .  402. 
42Asano shimbun [Asano Newspaper) . 23 Nov. 1887. 
43Shiga, op.cit. , 7 1 .  
44Tsuneya Seifuku, Kaigai shokumin ron [Overseas colonisation theory) (Tokyo 1 89 1) .  254. 
451rie, op.cit. ( 1 943) . 1 1 3; Tomiyama Komakichi, 'Konan Nikki [The diary of the voyage to the 
South) ' ,  Shokumin kyokai h6koku [The report of the Colonisation Society) . No.3 (Tokyo 1893) . 1 10.  
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South Seas.46 Interestingly, he also alluded to the possibility of Japanese 
migration to New Guinea in ancient days: 
According to a scholar who wrote a book about the South Seas, he dug out 
Japanese swords, bows and arrows in some place in New Guinea and he suggested 
that the Japanese might have migrated there in ancient days. He also found native 
behaviour similar to that of Japanese. 47 
The Japanese saw British New Guinea as more accessible than German 
New Guinea because of its proximity to a thriving Japanese community on 
Thursday Island. They assessed the possibility of migration and mounting a 
shell-fishing operation from Thursday Island. Nakayama Katsuki, a member 
of Enomoto's Tokyo Geographic Society, was the first writer to introduce Port 
Moresby and neighbouring areas in Ny ii ginia no moresubi ko oyobi kinbo no 
chisei oyobi dojin ni kansuru kfji (Report on topography and natives of Port 
Moresby and neighbouring areas in New Guinea) . 48 Although it was simply a 
translation into Japanese of Octavius Stone's A few months in New Guinea 
( 1 880) , it was published in the Society's journal. Three years later, Hattori, a 
leading nanshin-ron advocate, wrote about the possibility of Japanese 
migration from Queensland to Papua, pointing out the convenience of the 
established sea route from Australia to Port Moresby and New Guinea.49 
Tsuji Ken'nosuke, an agent of the Yoshisa Emigration Company on 
Thursday Island and also a member of the Colonisation Society, brought up 
the economy of British New Guinea in Toresu kaikyo tanken nikki (Diary of 
exploration in Torres Strait) , which was published in the Society's journal in 
1 895. 50 Tsuji reported the promising shell-fishing in British New Guinea 
waters but warned of the danger of the operation due to rugged sea-beds 
which had already caused the deaths of some Japanese divers. He also 
pointed to the abundant bamboo and emphasised the potential for making 
huge profits in cane work. 5 1  
46Tomiyama, ibid. ,  1 0 7  - 8 ;  Tomiyama, 'Kanan Nikki [The diary o f  the voyage to the South] ' .  
Shokumin kyo kai h o  koku [The Colonisation Society Report] . No.6 (Tokyo 1893) , 90. 
47Tomiyama, op.cit. ( 1 893) . l lO. However, this statement has not been proved by any 
contemporary archaeologists. 
48Nakayama Katsuki, 'Ny\i. giniya no moresubi k6 oyobi kinb6 no chisei oyobi dojin ni kansuru 
kiji [the article about Port Moresby in New Guinea and the geography and natives nearby] , 
translation from Afew Months in New Guinea by Octavius C. Stone, 1 880, Tokyo chigaku kyokai 
h6koku [The Report of Tokyo Geographic Society] , Vol.3 ,  No.7  (Tokyo 1 88 1 ) ,  4 1 -69. 
49Hattort, op.cit . .  47. 
5°Tsuji Ken'nosuke, 'Toresu kaiky6 tanken nikki [Diary of exploration in Torres Strait] ' .  
Shokumin kyokai h6koku [The Colonisation Society Report) . No.30 (Tokyo 1 895) .  1 5-24. 
51Ibid . ,  18- 19.  
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Australian and Gennan perceptions of Japanese 
Australians perceived Japanese with fear and racial prejudice. That was 
manifested in the eruption of strident statements about the 'Yellow Peril' in 
the late 1 9th century. Although the 'Yellow Peril' had originally referred to 
Chinese migration in the mid- 1 9th century, it was extended to the Japanese 
after the Sino-Japanese War ( 1 894-95) .  The Japanese victory proved that 
Japan now possessed sufficient military strength to expand in Asia. But the 
victory 'did not greatly influence Australian thought-Japan was added by 
some sections of thought to the list of possible threats and excluded by others 
. . .  [and] all Governments cut down the defence expenditures and the press 
in general concurred. '52 However, alarm about the 'Yellow Peril' was intensified 
in the 1 890s when the trade union movement 'adopted economic racism' to 
defend the interests of white labourers from the competition of non-whites.  53 
In Queensland particularly, anti-Japanese feeling was predominant in public 
opinion. A local newspaper, The Settler and South Queensland Pioneer, 
reported : 'The Japanese are a menace to this colony . . .  The Japanese is so 
patriotic that there is no room for European labourers, mechanics, or 
merchants; he ousts them all . . .  The British Empire is not China; Thursday 
Island is not Port Arthur. '54 
There were some sympathetic and realistic views of the Japanese migrants, 
such as that of Noel Burton, an official of the South Australian government, 
who denied that the Japanese were a threat to Australian labourers in north 
Queensland . He insisted: 
There is needless alarm about the Japanese flooding the country. Their numbers 
are greatly over-estimated. Only about 1 1 00 workers are on the sugar plantations 
and the Thursday Island Government Resident says that they do not increase . .  
. Most of them are doing work which Europeans would not do. Whether in 
pearl-fishing or sugar work, they are competing with other coloured labour.ss 
But his view was overwhelmed by the opponents. 
The fierce competition in the pearl industry due to the increased tempo of 
Japanese arrivals at Thursday Island and the exhaustion of sea beds 
provoked the Queensland government to pass laws which tightly restricted 
Japanese influence. The Pearl Shell and Beche-de-Mer Fishery Act ( 1 898) 
aimed at stopping Japanese domination of the industry by limiting licences 
to British subjects only. The Aborigines' Protection Act Amendment Act ( 1 899) 
virtually prohibited Japanese fishing operators from employing local 
52David Sissons, 'Attitudes to Japan and Defence 1 890- 1923' , MA thesis, Melbourne 
University, 1 956, 19-20. 
53Keith McConnochie et al . ,  Race and Racism in Australia (Wentworth Falls 1 988) . 69. 
54The Settler and South Queensland Pioneer, 15 May 1 897, in JDR, 3.8.2 .33. 
55Bulletin, 8 Oct. 1 896, ibid. 
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labourers. Moreover, the Sugar Works Guarantee Act Amendment Act ( 1 900) 
which guaranteed the government's preferential treatment of sugar mills 
which employed only white labourers prevented the industry from employing 
non-white workers. 56 
Those acts also reflected Australian attempts to set their 'white' boundary. 
North Queensland and Torres Strait was a melting pot of various 
races-Asians, Pacific Islanders, Torres Strait Islanders and Australian 
Aborigines-and was a periphery to the Australians who were attempting to 
establish a white nation in the Far South. As Denoon argues, the officials in 
Brisbane and Melbourne viewed this area 'in the light of the aspiration to 
achieve a "white Australia" , devising fresh techniques of social control for 
problems quite unlike those of the rest of the continent' . 57 Finally the 
Commonwealth of Australia enacted the Immigration Restriction Act of 1 90 1 ,  
and placed its northern periphery under the 'White Australia' .  
I n  contrast, i t  appears that German officials demonstrated little anxiety 
about Japanese as far as written materials can show. German accounts are 
mostly just statistics. The Annual Reports recorded frequent appearances of 
Japanese boats in New Guinea. In 1 893 seven Japanese sailing boats (three 
to Herbertshohe, one to Ma tu pi, and three to Nusa) were reported. 58 The 
Germans were also aware of the presence of some Japanese in New Guinea. 
In the 1 89 1 -93 period, although exact numbers are not known, 'twenty-six of 
Chinese, Japanese or unknown origin with three women and six children' 
were identified in Kaiser Wilhelmsland .59 This indifference (compared to the 
Australians) was probably due to the smaller number and the much smaller 
scale of economic activity of the Japanese than of their counterparts in 
Queensland and the absence of a white working class. The Japanese presence 
in German territory was too inconspicuous for the Germans to form any 
perceptions. 
From Thursday Island to New Guinea 
From the mid- 1 890s, over-exploitation of shell-fishing became a serious 
problem to Japanese operators on Thursday Island. A Japanese consul at 
Townsville reported pessimistically: 
The pearl industry-the only industry to collect marine products on Thursday 
island-has so far lasted for twenty years. As a result, most beds around the 
56A. T. Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia: the background to exclusion 1 896-1 923 (London 
1964) . 18 .  
57Donald Denoon, 'The Boundaries of Australian Cultural Studies' , unpublished (Canberra, 
date unknown) , 1 .  
58Peter Sack and Dymphna Clark (eds and trans.) ,  Gennan New Guinea: The Annual Reports 
(Canberra 1979) , 84. 
59Ibid. '  83. 
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Island were fished out and these days divers have to dive in difficult spots as deep 
as thirty to thirty five fathoms.60 
Some enterprising Japanese began to search for an alternative location for 
shell-fishing and settlement in New Guinea. Among them was Komine 
lsokichi. Komine was born in Shimabara in Kyiishii in 1 866, the ninth child 
of a peasant, Komine Hisazaemon.61 At the age of 1 6 ,  Komine went to Korea 
to be employed by a trade company, Fukushima-ya (Fukushima Company) , 
which sold goods to the Japanese navy stationed there. According to Captain 
Kamijo Fukashi, during his employment in Korea Komine revealed his stout 
hearted character and was liked by the navy officers. 62 It is likely that Komine 
learned about the South Seas and the high wages of divers on Thursday 
Island from navy officers. 
In September 1 890, he arrived at Thursday Island. Initially he was 
employed by an Englishman and spent two years on his boat. During this 
period, he went fishing as far as German New Guinea and made a very good 
catch of shell. Probably the good catch brought him sufficient capital to 
stimulate his spirit of enterprise. In 1 892, he discussed with other Japanese 
on the islands, Matsuoka Koichi and Okamura Hyakutsuchi, a plan to 
establish a trading company to export marine products to Japan. They 
quickly agreed, and Matsuoka and Okamura returned to Japan to find 
associates in their venture-but in vain. The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese 
War also caused them to give up the plan. According to Irie, although the plan 
was aborted, Komine's spirit did not subside: he learnt how to build a boat 
and built two shell-fishing boats with Taguchi Tastuzo. 63 Then his search for 
a new paradise continued. 
From 1 890 to 1 894 he was intermittently exploring the waters of New 
Guinea, occasionally returning to Thursday Island. Later he reported his 
explorations in Shokumin Kyokai Hokoku. 64 In November 1 894 he went 
exploring again: he sailed 50 miles up the Fly River.65 Also this time he was 
with Tsuji, a member of the Colonisation Society and an agent of the Yoshisa 
60Shokumin kyokai [Colonisation Society). 'GOshii mokuyo to oyobi poto dawin ko ni okeru 
honpojin no jikkyo [The actual conditions of the Japanese on Thursday Island and Port Darwin 
in Australia)', Shokwnin ky6kai hi5koku [The Colonisation Society Report). No.63 (Tokyo 1 898), 9. 
6Tue author's interview with Sato Yachiyo (daughter of a nephew of Komine Isokichi). 1 July 
1993, Nagasaki, Japan. 
62Kamijo Fukashi, Sensen ichi man kairi: Zen sekai taisenji nan'yo no sen-shi [War front in a 
thousand miles away: war history in the South Seas in the previous war) (Tokyo 194 1) .  1 82.  
Kamijo's statement should be treated with caution, as his book has a strong tone of nW1Shin 
propaganda and was written just before the outbreak of the Pacific War. In his book, Kamijo 
clearly attempted to portray Komine as a nW1Shin pioneer. 
63lrie, op.cit. ( 1943). 1 82. Irie is partly wrong. Komine did not build the boats but purchased 
them. 
64Komine Isokichi, 'Nan'yo tanken jikkyo hokoku [The report on the exploration in the South 
Seas)', Shokumin kyokai hi5koku [The Colonisation Society Report). No.40 (Tokyo 1 896) , 83-7. 
651bid., 87. 
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Emigration Company on Thursday Island. 66 Interestingly, Tsuji joined the 
Colonisation Society in 1 894 with the introduction of Tsuneya who 
commented on New Guineans in his book (see p. 24) .67 Even more 
interestingly, just before he came to Thursday island he had met Matsuoka, 
who was in Ja pan to find associates for the company that Komine planned to 
establish. At his encounter with Matsuoka, Tsuji suggested that they 
establish a deep-sea fishery company together, but the plan was aborted due 
to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. Then Tsuji came to Thursday 
Island.68 
Tsuji met Komine on the island on 9 November 1 894. Only six days later, 
they went exploring. They sailed first to Lebrun, a small island in the 
Engineer Group in British New Guinea, and camped there for a week, then 
returned to Thursday Island.69 The following year, they made another 
expedition to Torres Strait and British New Guinea. 70 Tsuji was excited by 
these explorations and reported them in the journal of the Colonisation 
Society. 
Komine's encounter with Tsuji was significant because it acquainted 
Komine with nanshin-ron advocates. After the voyage, he joined the 
Association on Tsuji's introduction in 1 895. More significantly, he was 
introduced to Enomoto. Tsuji wrote to Enomoto about Komine. 
The owner of the shell-fishing boat Shishi that I got on is from Nagasaki and one 
of the most competent divers. His name is Komine Isokichi. This person has a 
nationalistic ideology with a strong interest in fishery and agriculture. He is a 
promising person for the future. 7 1  
It was an unexpected but lucky turning point in Komine's life. A mere pearl 
diver from the poor countryside had the chance to be acquainted with Tokyo 
intellectuals and even with the Foreign Minister. Probably Komine was thrilled 
to realise that he was practising the ideas of the nanshin-ron advocates. 
Although his piece in the journal was merely an account of the conditions of 
shell-fishing and his explorations (and had no nanshin-ron-like statements 
such as Japan's need to develop economic links with the South Seas) , most 
probably Komine became aware that his desire to make a fortune in the South 
Seas was compatible with the ideology of Tokyo intellectuals. 
�hokumin kyokai, Shokumin ky6kai h6koku [1be Colonisation Society Report], No. I 7 (Tokyo 
1894), 69. 
67Shokumin kyokai, Shokumin ky6kai ho1coku [1be Colonisation Society Report), No.14 (Tokyo 
1894), 89. 
681bid., 69. 
69Kom1ne, op.cit., 86. 
7°Tsuji, op.cit., 15. 
711rte, op.cit. (1943), 182-3. 
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After the exploration with Komine, Tsuji  showed a strong interest in New 
Guinea as a possible migration destination and the two decided to establish 
the Nichi-go Boeki Kaisha (Japan-Australia Trade Company) to promote 
Japanese migration to British New Guinea. They planned to purchase land 
and to develop trade between Ja pan and Australia specialising in marine 
products from the Torres Strait. 72 Tsuj i  approached the British New Guinea 
administration over the purchase of land. In December 1 895 he managed a 
half day talk with Governor Sir William MacGregor on the possibility of 
transferring land to Japanese settlers. However, Tsuji's request did not get a 
favourable response. MacGregor's major concern in land policy was to protect 
the interests of Papuans from aliens and he adopted the same migration 
policy as in Queensland .73 Selling land to non-white aliens was out of the 
question. Consequently the company did not get off the ground, although 
Tsuji and Komine won Japanese investors. 74 
There was another Japanese who planned a similar venture. Ogirima 
Gonzaemon, a general manager of the Kasei Emigration Company, attempted 
to send Japanese to British New Guinea but also failed. On 1 1  May 1 900, 
Ogirima asked the Japanese Foreign Ministry for permission to expand 
emigration to New Guinea, saying that the Company's agent, Sato Torajiro, 
who was a leader of the Japanese community on Thursday Island, had 
discussed the possibility of a shell-fishing venture with a manager of Burns, 
Philp and got an encouraging impression. Sato also said that he met 
Lieutenant-Governor George Le Hunt of British New Guinea and elicited a 
favourable comment on Japanese emigration.75 
The matter was discussed between Iijima Kametaro, the consul at 
Townsville, and Eitaki Hisakichi, the consul-general at Sydney. Eitaki wrote 
to Iijima after some investigation that he found that Le Hunt opposed 
migration and Burns, Philp denied any possibility of involvement, although 
the premier of Queensland, Robert Philp, gave a rather favourable answer, 
saying that he was considering Japanese migration to British New Guinea but 
faced opposition from the Labor Party. According to Eitaki, Philp suggested 
that about 450 Japanese could be sent to Samarai. 76 Nevertheless, Iijima 
supported Ogirima's request and wrote a recommendation to Foreign Minister 
Aoki Shlizo. 77 But at the same time lijima was concerned about unfavourable 
aspects . He also wrote to Sugimura Fukashi, the director of the Commerce 
72Shokumin kyokai, Shokumin kyokai h6koku [The Colonisation Society Report] , No.40 (Tokyo 
1 896) , 83. 
73R. B .  Joyce, 'Australian Interests in New Guinea before 1906' , in W. J .  Hudson (ed.) , 
Australia and Papua New Guinea (Sydney 197 1 ) ,  20. 
741ijima to Aoki, 5 May 1900, JDR, 6. 1 . 5.6-32. 
750girima to Aoki, 1 1  May 1900, JDR 3.8.2.67.  
76Eitaki to lijima, 30 Aug. 1900, ibid. 
771ijima to Aoki, 3 Sept. 1 900, ibid. 
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Bureau, that the company's proposal was promoted mainly by Sato who was 
trying to retrieve his failure to introduce a batch of settlers to Thursday 
Island; that if emigration became possible the Japanese government should 
advise the company to warn migrants of the high cost of living in New Guinea; 
and that the government should be aware of a situation where migration 
would be prohibited due to European jealousy aroused by speculative 
Japanese migrants.78 
In the event, lijima's concerns soon became unnecessary as he found that 
Sato had made false statements about the responses from Le Hunt and 
Bums, Philp and that the Queensland government's refusal was based on the 
judgement that shell-fishing in New Guinea waters was too dangerous even 
for Japanese divers.79 The Japanese government did not approve the 
emigration. Thus, the Japanese who were being squeezed out of Queensland 
found no back-door to British New Guinea. In addition, Komine's application 
for naturalisation in Queensland was refused in 1 898.80 Possibly those events 
led Komine to knock on the door of German New Guinea in 1 90 1 .  
Relevance to Japanese social history 
The modernisation of Ja pan started with the Meiji Restoration of 1 868 under 
the banner of fukoku ky6hei (enrich the nation, strengthen the army) and the 
introduction of Western capitalism and ideas. It coincided with rapid 
population growth, from approximately 33 million people in 1 872 to 45 million 
in 1 900 at an average five-yearly rate of nearly 1 0  per cent.81 However, the 
government's economic policy impoverished the majority of the growing rural 
population. In 1 873, the government executed the land tax reform (chiso 
kaisei) in order to remove feudalistic restrictions on the development of 
capitalism. Matsukata Masayoshi, who took the Finance Minister's office in 
1 88 1 ,  rigorously carried out a deflation policy to counter the inflation that 
was caused by the over-supply of nonconvertible notes and public bonds 
issued to meet the expenses of the Seinan War of 1 877. Those policies 
replaced the payment of taxation in kind with payment in cash, and 
substantially increased the tax burden on tenant farmers. Many small 
farmers sold their land to pay their tax. Combined with poor harvests caused 
by floods and droughts, the economic conditions of the farmers deteriorated 
and forced them to make further sales of their land. As a result, impoverished 
farmers, with ex-samurai who did not receive benefits from the new 
7811jtma to Sugtmura, 4 Sept. 1900, ibid. 
7911jtma to Kato, 29 Oct. 1900, ibid. 
80Queensland State Archives, Home Secretary's Department, Inwards Correspondence, 
1898/11159. 
81Toyo keizai shinp5 sha, Megi taish.6 kokusei s6ran [Comprehensive bibliography of the state 
of Japan in Meiji and TaishO periods] (Tokyo 1929), 634. 
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government, revolted and initiated a period of social instability from the 1 870s 
to the end of the 1 880s. The revolts were strong in rural areas which were 
largely excluded from the benefits of rapid modernisation enjoyed by urban 
elites in Tokyo and some other major urban centres, and by landlords in rural 
areas. 
In addition to this social instability, the economy was one of the major 
'push' factors to encouraging many rural people to migrate to urban centres 
in Japan and even overseas.82 The birth places of the Japanese on Thursday 
Island confirm this pattern. In 1 894, out of 346 Japanese, 254 came from 
Wakayama, 22 from Nagasaki and 1 5  from Hiroshima.83 Both Wakayama and 
Nagasaki lack flat land for rice cultivation, further limiting the opportunities 
of farmers to earn an income . A case study on Wakayama's emigration also 
shows that the rapid population increase, lack of arable land and low income 
from fishing were main causes of overseas emigration. 84 Another but older 
case study based on intensive interviews with returned migrants reinforces 
the importance of the economic motivation: Iwasaki Kenkichi concludes the 
main motivations for emigration were stimulation by neighbours who made 
fortunes overseas and the tradition of emigration. 85 The emigrants sought 
economic opportunities which would never have been attainable in their 
impoverished home villages. 
Relevance to Australian colonial history 
The development of a Japanese settlement on Thursday Island and the 
attempts of some Japanese to move to New Guinea illuminate the beginning 
of Japanese colonisation in the South Seas. The Japanese on Thursday Island 
in the 1 890s essentially differed from those who worked for European 
entrepreneurs as labourers in sugar-cane fields or mines in Queensland and 
on South Seas Islands. Nor were they like traders who were scattered on the 
islands in Micronesia and Southeast Asia. Within limits they were allowed to 
have independent businesses. Some owned their own schooners and boats, 
employed local crews and remitted their profits to Japan. Some Japanese 
traders purchased marine products (pearl shell, trochus shell and sea 
cucumber) and exported them. A typically colonial relationship thus 
developed: the Japanese exploited the resources using cheap local labour. 
82Matsunaga Sh6z6, 'Shakai mondai no hassei' [The occurrence of social problems) . Asao 
Naohiro, et al. (eds}, Nihon rekishi 1 6  kindai 3 [Japanese history 1 6  modern era 3] (Tokyo 1 976) , 
246. 
83Hattori, op.cit . . 20- 1 .  
&\vakayama ken [Wakayama prefecture] ,  Wakayama ken imin shi [History of emigrants from 
Wakayama prefecture] (Wakayama 1957) , 93. 
85lwasaki Kenkichi, 'Kii hant6 nangan ni okeru kaigai dekasegi imin no kenkyii, dai 2 ho [Study 
on overseas emigrants from southern coastal areas of Kii peninsula, II] ' ,  Chirigaku hyoron 
[Geographic review], 13(3) (Tokyo 1938) . 1 83-200. 
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Such a Japanese presence provoked Australia's firm opposition. 
Australians could not allow Japanese masters to prosper in their territory. 
Racism based on ideas of Anglo-Saxon supremacy was one reason, and the 
rising union movement was another. Northern Australia had to be under 
strict white control, and Australians devised a mechanism of control by 
legislating. However, despite this Australian mechanism, the Japanese 
settlement continued to function as a Japanese colony, partly because the 
Japanese were successful in recruiting local crews by offering generous work 
conditions and partly because Australians needed Japanese expertise in 
developing marine resources. Australians could only limit the scale of the 
Japanese operation so that white operators could always make larger profits 
than the Japanese. Thus a unique dual colonial apparatus existed on 
Thursday Island. The Japanese masters prospered in the white masters' 
territory. This was, of course, acceptable under the strict racial hierarchy that 
Japanese masters were always subordinate to their white counterparts and 
that the white masters were richer than their Japanese counterparts. 
Chapter 2 
Golden age, 1 90 1 - 1 9 1 4 
IN 1 90 1  KO MINE, AFfER BEING SQUEEZED our of Thursday Island and rej ected by 
the Brttish New Guinea administration, knocked on the door of German New 
Guinea. The door was ajar. He found employment with the German 
administration and some years later established an independent business for 
which he recruited about a hundred workers from Japan. Consequently a 
sizeable Japanese community emerged and enjoyed a brief golden age in the 
last years of German rule. Meanwhile, in British New Guinea (later Papua) . 
some Japanese traders and divers marrted Papuan women and settled down. 
Because of the small scale of their migration and businesses, the Japanese 
settlements in both Brttish and German New Guinea attracted little attention 
from the Japanese government. The settlements show the unique pattern of 
Japanese involvement in the South Seas in the way that their presence was 
entrenched in European colonies. 
Japanese interest in the South Seas 
In the 1 90 1 - 1 9 1 4  period, the Japanese government's attention was directed 
primartly to East Asia where Japan's immediate security was at risk and the 
region's economic potential-markets and sources of raw materials-was 
recognised. It was also in this pertod that Japan emerged as a colonial power. 
Following the Sino-Japanese War, Japan acquired Taiwan and established 
there a Governor-General's Office in June 1 895. After the Russo-Japanese 
War, Japan gained southern Sakhalin and the Kwantung Leased Terrttory in 
1 905. Western nations also acknowledged Japan as a colonial power in East 
Asia, recognising a Japanese protectorate over Korea in 1 9 1 0 .  In the same 
year, the Japanese government established the Colonisation Bureau under 
the direct control of the Prime Minister and constructed the administration 
to function as a colonial nation. 1 
Meanwhile, Japanese attention was distracted from the South Seas. This 
was made all the easier by Enomoto's retirement from politics when he 
resigned the post of Minister of Agriculture and Commerce due to the Ashio 
1Gaimu sh6 ryoji ijii bu [immigration section of the Consul of the Foreign Ministry] , Wagakuni 
no kaigai hatten yii hyakunen no ayumi (honpen) [Overseas development of Japan, the footprint 
of one hundred-year immigration] , Vol. I (Tokyo 1 97 1) ,  272. 
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Copper Mine incident in 1 897. 2 His enthusiasm for emigration also 
diminished when his private venture to promote emigration to Mexico failed 
in 1 898. Thus the government lost one of those most concerned with directing 
Japan towards the South Seas. 3 The government took no initiatives to 
promote South Seas involvement until the outbreak of World War I .  
Trade 
Despite the lack of government initiatives, Japanese trade with the South 
Seas expanded rapidly, particularly with Southeast Asia and Australia. 
Although complete data are not available, in 1 900 exports to French 
Indochina, Thailand, the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies were 1 6.3 
million yen and imports were 1 0 .9 million, then in 1 9 1 3, exports to those 
countries plus British Malaya increased to 23.4 million yen and imports to 
80.9 million. Similarly, exports to Australia and New Zealand increased from 
2 . 5  million yen in 1 900 to 8.6 million in 1 9 1 3  and imports from 2.4 million 
yen to 1 4. 9  million.4 The trade figures for Micronesia were still too small to 
appear in statistics.  But the proportion of the trade with Southeast Asia, 
Australia and New Zealand in the total Japanese external trade dramatically 
increased from 3 . 1 per cent in 1 900 to 9.3 per cent in 1 9 1 3 . 
Although minuscule, Japanese trade with Micronesia, pioneered by small 
traders, expanded during the Spanish period . By 1 906, Japanese controlled 
more than 80 per cent of the total trade of Micronesia. 5 Japanese commerce 
was so strong in the Western Carolines that their German counterpart, the 
Western Caroline Company, had to close its Koror branch.6 The only place 
where Japanese traders could not dominate was the Marshall Islands where 
the German administration firmly refused the establishment of branches of 
Japanese companies . As Peattie explains, 'the Japanese activities to expand 
their commercial presence in the South Seas and the German efforts to limit 
it became an episodic struggle of prohibitions and confiscations by local 
2The incident was one of the best known of modern Japan's environmental disasters. The 
Ashio Copper Mine in Tochigi prefecture discharged acidic pollutants into rivers and contaminated 
wide agricultural areas in the north of Tokyo. Local farmers, politicians, journalists, socialists and 
Christian humanists began large-scale protests and petitions. The dispute lasted almost a 
century. Enomoto, then the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, took responsibility and 
resi§ned. 
Enomoto died in 1908. 
4Tokei-in (the Statistical Bureau) (ed . ) ,  Nihon teikoku tokei nenkan [Statistical yearbook of 
Japan Empire] ,  Vol.20 (Tokyo 190 1) ,  533-536; Naikaku tokei-kyoku [the Statistical Bureau of the 
Cabinet) (ed. ) ,  Nilwn teikoku tokei nenkan (Statistical yearbook of Japan Empire] ,  Vol. 33 (Tokyo 
19 14) ,  2 16 .  
5Mark R.  Peattle, Nan'yo : The rise and fall of the Japanese in Micronesia 1 885-1 945 (Honolulu 
1988) , 24. 
60gim1 Asanori, Nanto gunto an'nai [Guide to the South Seas Islands] , Kaigai kenkyii sho 
(Tokyo 1937) , 9 .  
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German colonial authorities and evasions by Japanese traders' . 7  The German 
administration strictly controlled Japanese trade.  For example, Japanese 
traders were accused of supplying firearms to local people to assist their 
fighting and the administration closed their business and deported the staff 
to Japan.8 Nevertheless Japanese trade expanded, with the establishment of 
a new company. In 1 906, the Hiki Company was amalgamated with the 
Murayama Shokai (Murayama Company) to establish the Nan'yo Boeki Kaisha 
(South Seas Trade Company) , which soon dominated Japan-Micronesia trade. 
However, the lack of general interest in the business venture in Micronesia 
was reflected in the way the companies were established . They were initiated 
by small individual capitalists; none were related to leading industrial or 
financial capitalists. 9 
In the Japanese trade with Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand a 
significant change was seen in the rapid increase in imports of raw 
materials-rubber mainly from British Malaya and wool and wheat from 
Australia and New Zealand . Exports of silk and ceramics to Australia also 
increased rapidly. As in Micronesia, the expansion was promoted by private 
enterprise. 
Emigration 
Small-scale emigration to the South Seas continued. The number of Japanese 
in Southeast Asia, 10 Australia, New Zealand and other South Pacific Islands 
increased from 8, 1 40 in 1 904 to 20, 2 1 9  in 1 9 1 4, while the total number of 
Japanese residing overseas also rose from 1 38, 59 1 in 1 904 to 358, 7 1 1 in 
1 9 1 4  with a rapid increase mainly in North America and Manchuria. As a 
result, the proportion of Japanese in the South Seas in the total of Japanese 
abroad decreased slightly from 5.8 per cent to 5 .6  per cent. 1 1  
I n  the South Pacific private emigration companies kept on sending 
Japanese emigrants. The Toyo Imin Kaisha (East Seas Emigration Company, 
a new name for the Yoshisa Company) sent a few thousand labourers to New 
Caledonia. The company also sent 4 1 0  workers to Ocean Island (Banaba) from 
1 905 to 1 909 and 350 to Makatea in 1 9 1 0 . 12 Those labourers were employed 
7Peattie, op.cit. , 23. 
8Peter Sack and Dymphna Clark (eds and trans. ) .  Albert Hahl: Governor in New Guinea 
(Canberra 1980) . 79. 
9¥anaihara Tadao, Nan'yo gunt.6 no kenkyii [Study on the South Seas Islands] (Tokyo 1937) . 
14.  
1°it includes British Malaya and Borneo, Sarawak, India, Burma, Iriyan, Dutch East Indies, 
the Philippines and Guam. 
1 1Ishikawa Tomonori, 'Tokei yori mita shutsu-imin-shi 3' [Emigration history in the view from 
statistics] , Chiri kagaku [Geographic science] ,  Vol . 16 (Hiroshima 1972) , 25-3 1 .  
12Ishikawa Tomonori, 'Nihon shutsu-imin shi ni okeru imin kaisha to keiyaku imin ni tsuite 
[Emigration Company and contract emigrants in the history of Japanese emigration] ' ,  Ryiikyii 
daigaku ha-bun gaku bu kiyo [Bulletin of Law and Literature Department of RyiikyU University] ,  
shakai 14 (Naha 1970) .  19-46. 
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in European mines. The vice-president of the British Phosphate Company in 
Ocean Island visited Japan to recruit workers. Similarly the workers who 
went to Makatea were contracted to a French phosphate mining company. 
The emigrants to both islands were not labourers to dig phosphate but 
artisans such as carpenters, shipwrights, blacksmiths and cooks. 13 In 
Micronesia, tens of traders settled and had control of most trade in the 
islands. In 1 9 1 2 ,  '73 of 1 22 foreigners living in the Marianas and the West 
Carolines were Japanese, and approximately one-third of the foreign trade 
was with Japan' . 14 
Seventeen emigration companies sent 3, 233 skilled and unskilled 
labourers to Benguet in the Philippines where the US administration 
increased demands for cheap labour 'to build roads, to construct railways, to 
erect barracks for the garrison and to improve harbour facilities' .  15 They were 
soon followed by hundreds more Japanese workers sent to hemp plantations 
in Davao. Those workers were recruited by the Ota Kogyo Kaisha (Ota 
Development Company) , established by Ota Kyozaburo, a Manila-based 
Japanese entrepreneur. 16 In British Malaya, two enterprising Japanese began 
to operate a rubber plantation in 1 902 and initiated a rush of Japanese 
investment in rubber plantations. The number of Japanese plantations 
increased to 79 by 1 9 1 1 . 17 The plantation operators brought in Japanese 
labourers. That was followed by the opening of branches of banks and trade 
houses that also brought in Japanese staff. So the number of Japanese 
residents in Southeast Asia increased from 4,67 1 in 1 904 to 1 3, 558 in 1 9 14. 18 
By contrast, in Australia, due to the 'White Australia Policy' , the number 
declined slightly from 3, 554 in 1 90 1  to 3, 489 in 1 9 1 1 . 19 
Nanshin-ron 
After the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War, public attention was 
diverted from the South Seas and the nan'yo fever of the 1 890s cooled.20 
13Irie Toraji, Mefji nanshin shi ko [Short history of southward expansion in the Meiji Era] 
(Tokyo 1943) , 265-9. 
· 
14David C. Purcell, 'Japanese Entrepreneurs in the Mariana, Marshall, and Caroline Islands' , 
in Hilary Conroy and Scott T. Miyakawa (eds), Historical and Sociological Studies of Japanese 
!��ration a�As�imU�tion (Santa Barbara 1972) , 56-72. 
Gaimu-sho ryuji iju bu, op.cit. , 622; Ichihashi Yamato, 'International Migration of the 
Japanese' , Walter F. Willcox (ed.) , International Migration: Volume II Interpretations (New York 
193 1) ,  6 1 7-38. 
16¥ano Torn, Nihon no Nan'yo shi kan [Japanese historical view of the South Seas) (Tokyo 
1979) , 1 40- 1 .  
17Imano Toshihiko and Fujisaki Yasuo, Imin shi II: qjia oceania hen [History of emigration II: 
Asia and Oceania) (Tokyo 1 985) , 244-5. 
18Ishikawa, op.cit. ( 1972) , 27. 
19A. T. Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia: the background to exclusion 1 896-1 923 (London 
1964), 163. 
2°¥ano Torn, 'Nanshin' no keifu [The Genealogy of 'southward advance') (Tokyo 1975) ,  68. 
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Nevertheless, the idea of nanshin was implanted in the minds of a few 
prominent scholars and politicians such as Inukai Tsuyoshi (who became the 
Prime Minister in 1 93 1)  and Nitobe Inazo (a scholar who took office as 
Vice-Director of the General Affairs Bureau of the League of Nations from 
1 920 to 1 927) . After the Russo-Japanese War, Inukai argued that 'there 
should be no further advance north . . .  Japan should now shift her attention 
to the region of South China and Southeast Asia . . .  [and Nitobe] showed a 
marked interest in the South' .2 1 However, the Russo-Japanese War was a 
major drawback to nanshin-ron, for the army then took the initiative in 
deciding defence policy. The army's tairiku seisaku (continental policy) , which 
was often opposed to the navy's kaiyo kokka ran (maritime nation theory) , 
began to dominate Japan's external policy.22 Nanshin-ron declined, being 
supplanted by the army's hokushin-ron (northward advance theory) . 
Japanese perceptions of Papua and New Guinea 
Reflecting the decline of nanshin-ron, less public information about Papua and 
New Guinea was disseminated in the 1 90 1 - 1 4 period than in the late l 9th 
century. Japanese perceptions of Papuans and New Guineans did not change, 
but a more realistic interest such as the establishment of a trade-link was 
emphasised, while the reference to territorial ambition disappeared. Kawasaki 
Ryozo and Mamba Shigeru, who travelled to Kaiser Wilhelmsland and the 
Bismarck Archipelago just before the outbreak of World War I, wrote Taiheiyo 
no hoko, Doku ryo nan'yo shoto (The treasury of the Pacific: German South 
Seas islands) . 23 In the first section of the book, they described in diary-style 
the multi-ethnic milieu of Rabaul and the popularity of a Chinese hotel as a 
drinking spot. Like other early writers, their description maintained a 
stereotype of New Guineans: 'Although these natives have ugly and vicious 
appearances, they are very obedient, easy to get angry and easy to grieve. 
Their thinking is very simple as if they were eight to nine year-old Japanese 
children. '24 They also reported on Komine's boatbuilding and copra planting, 
and the presence of over 1 0  Japanese migrants as well as a few Japanese 
2 1Heruy Frei, Japan's Southward Advance and Australia (Melbourne 199 1) ,  68. 
22Kitaoka Shin'ichi, Nihon rikugun to tairiku seisaku [Japanese army and continental policy] 
(Tokyo 1985) , 1 -9; Hatano Sumio, 'Nihon kaigun to 'Nanshin' : sono seisaku to riron no shiteki 
tenkai' [Japanese navy and southward advance: historical evolution of its policy and theory] , in 
Shimizu Hajime (ed. ) ,  Nihon to nan qjia kankei shi: ryo taisen kan ki nihon tonan qjia kankei no 
shoso [History of Japan-Southeast Asia relations: various aspects of Japan-Southeast Asia 
relations between the two wars] (Tokyo 1986) , 207-36. 
23Neither Kawasaki or Maruba were well-known writers, but the contents of the book and the 
name of the publisher 'Nan'y6 doshi kai' (The Society of South Seas Comrades) made them look 
nanshin-ron advocates. Kawasaki Ry6z6 and Maruba Shigeru, Taiheiyo no hoko, doku-ryo nan'yo 
shoto [The treasury of the Pacific: German South Seas islands] (Tokyo 1 9 1 3) .  
241bid. ,  1 2 .  
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prostitutes, commenting 'we were surprised by the intensity of the 
development of the Japanese prostitute population overseas' . 25 The rest of 
their book covers a wide range of topics in German New Guinea and 
Micronesia including geography, climate, population, race, commerce, trade, 
imports and exports, transport, industry and politics. Characteristically, in 
the sections on German New Guinea most space is devoted to the economy. 
They pointed out that trading copra would bring huge profits and that turtle 
shell, trochus shell and pearl shell would also be important imports. They 
claimed that Kaiser Wilhelmsland and the Bismarck Archipelago had 
treasures of undeveloped natural resources such as fertile soil, thick forest 
with red sandalwood, ebony, parrots, birds of paradise, gold, silver and 
nickel. 26 They also predicted conflict between Ja pan and Germany in the 
Pacific over their competing national interests, warning Japan that Germany 
was trying to achieve 'Pan-Germanism' in the Pacific. 27 
At the official level, the Japanese government kept few records. Official 
indifference was seen in the ad hoe arrangements for jurisdiction over 
German New Guinea. In 1 906 the Foreign Ministry let the Japanese 
Consulate at Townsville take charge of the affairs of German territories in the 
South Pacific.28 Then in 1 909 the Consulate-General at Sydney took 
responsibility for German New Guinea affairs, probably because of the 
incident in which Komine was attacked by the people on Manus. 29 Indifference 
was shown in the response to the attack. The report of the incident was 
pre-empted by a non-official source. The Kobe Herald reported wrongly that 
Komine was killed, 30 prompting the Foreign Ministry at Tokyo to request all 
consuls in Southeast Asia and Australia to investigate the incident. Quick 
replies came from the consulates in Hong Kong, Singapore, Sydney and 
Batavia, who all confirmed that Komine had been attacked but had escaped 
and was alive.3 1 
Similarly, Japanese officials paid little attention to Papua. This was 
demonstrated well by the brevity of the report by Iwasaki Mitsuo, the 
Consul-General at Sydney, which was only four pages long. It was submitted 
to the Foreign Ministry, and gave directory-like information such as 
administrative divisions, the acreage of land, population, native languages, 
25Ibid. , 3. 
261bid. ,  7 1-99. 
271bid. ,  1 57-9. 
28Appointment of Consul Nartta, 2 Mar. 1906, JDR 6. 1 .5.6.-32. 
29Kakkoku chiizai ryoji ninmen zakken shidonI no bu [Miscellaneous matters on the 
appointment and resignation of consuls in overseas countries, the section of Sydney] ( 1909) , JDR 
6. 1 .5.6-38. 
3°Kobe Herald, 28 April 1909. 
3 1Komine Isokichi doku-ryo nyii giniya adomiraruchI to ni oite s6nan no ken [Report about the 
accident of Komine lsokichi on the Admiralty Islands in German New Guinea] ( 1 909) . JDR 
4.2.5-240. 
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Papuan life-style, relations between Papuans and whites, agriculture, forestry 
and mining. 32 
Japanese in British New Guinea 
Australian attitudes towards Japanese 
Some Japanese seamen on Thursday Island found no door closed to them in 
British New Guinea, despite the fact that the administration prohibited 
Japanese migration. Some traders and shellers were operating in the Milne 
Bay area and adjoining islands even before 1 900. We can only speculate 
whether officials granted them permission, but it seems that the 
administration was not as concerned about Japanese as its Queensland 
counterpart. Although the Resident Magistrates of the Eastern Division and 
the South-Eastern Division occasionally presented reports about Japanese 
activities, they were about the conditions of local labourers employed by the 
Japanese for shell-fishing rather than the Japanese themselves. Probably the 
administration just acquiesced in the small-scale Japanese presence which 
never exceeded 1 0  in number. 
The first record of Japanese activities appeared in a simple form in the 
correspondence of the Lands Department of 1 902-it listed all trade stations 
in the South-Eastern and the Eastern Divisions. Five Japanese traders were 
named among other non-indigenous coloured traders (e.g. Manila men, 
Malays, South Sea Islanders and Chinese) . The names and locations of their 
stations are shown in Table 2- 1 .  Probably Australian officials wrote the names 
phonetically. 33 The names in Table 2- 1 may be corrected: Tanati to Tanaka, 
Kimostha to Kinoshita, Mirioka to Migioka, Nekshy to Negishi, and Siganiatu 
to Shigematsu. Among those traders, only Tanaka and Shigematsu can be 
identified as residents in Papua from Japanese archives and oral evidence. 
Probably other Japanese were trading there only temporarily. They probably 
came from Thursday Island, because such a movement is noted in the records 
of the Department of External Affairs which gave permission to 1 2  Japanese 
to land in British New Guinea from Queensland in 1 902.34 
32Iwasaki Mitsuo, 'Eiryo nyii gini jij6 hokoku' [Report on conditions in British New Guinea] , 
Imin chO sa hOkoku [Report on investigation on emigration] , Gaimu-sho tsiish6 kyoku [the Foreign 
Ministry, the Commerce Bureau] (Tokyo 1909) . 
33 Also the Japanese may not have known the English spellings. 
34Department of External Affairs to the Collector of Customs at Brisbane, 13 May 1902, AA 
A8/ 1 -02/ 1 16/ 194. 
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TABLE 2- 1 .  Japanese trading stations in the South-eastern Division and the Eastern 
Division in 1 902 
name 
Tanati 
Kimostha 
Mirioka 
Nekshy 
Siganiatu 
location 
Hemenahei island near Joannet (South-Eastern Division) 
Konaware, Basilaki island (Eastern Division) 
Ritai island (Eastern Division) 
Boiadi island (Eastern Division) 
Wart, Sanaroa (Eastern Division) 
Source: AA Territory, C.P.T.(T.) .  Set.38 General Correspondence of Lands Department 1 889- 1942 
The administration's official record of the Japanese population was not 
available until 1 905. As Table 2-2 shows, they never numbered above 1 0  and 
most lived in the Eastern Division which included Milne Bay, Samarai, 
Normanby Island, Fergusson Island, Goodenough Island and other small 
islands. The Japanese were a very small ethnic group among other 
non-indigenous coloured people; they hardly reached 1 0  per cent. In contrast 
to the European population, which increased gradually, the Japanese 
population remained static , like that of other non-·European aliens (except a 
large inflow of Samoan mission workers in 1 9 1 2) before World War I .  
TABLE 2 - 2 .  Non-indigenous populations i n  British New Guinea (later Papua) 
year Japanese European Other coloured* 
Eastern East Central South-Eastern total 
1905** 7 n.a n.a. 7 1 70 67 
1906** 7 n.a. n.a. 7 19 1 162 
1907** 7 n.a. n.a. 7 202 1 59 
1908 7 0 2 9 5 14 1 72 
1909 7 0 0 7 492 1 36 
19 10 6 0 0 6 665 162 
19 1 1  7 0 8 775 1 12 
1 9 1 2  7 0 0 7 763 327 
1 9 1 3  7 0 2 9 902 127 
• includes Malays, Chinese, Filipinos, Solomon Islanders, Samoans, Fijians, West Indians, 
Javanese. South Sea Islanders, Rarotongans, and others 
•• Eastern Division only 
n.a. : no data available 
Source: (for 1905) British New Guinea Annual Report (Melbourne 1906), 30; (for 1906) British New 
Guinea Annual Report ( 1907) . 30; (for 1907) Papua Annual Report ( 1 908) . 49; (for 1908) Papua 
Annual Report ( 1909), 25-6; (for 1909) Papua Annual Report ( 1 9 1 0) ,  25-6; (for 1910) Papua Annual 
Report ( l 9 1 1) ,  40- 1 ;  (for 1 9 1 1) Papua Annual Report ( l9 12) .  49-50; (for 19 12) Papua Annual Report 
( 1 9 1 3) .  56- 7; (for 1 9 1 3) Papua Annual Report ( 19 14) .  60- 1 . 
The administration included six brief reports on the Japanese in the 
Annual Report. Three were medical reports and the other three were related 
to conditions of native labourers. In 1 907, Chief Medical Officer Noel 
Beaumont reported an insane Japanese, who 'was ultimately removed to 
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Thursday Island' ,  in the section on 'The Native Population' . 35 In 1 9 1 0  the 
Resident Magistrate of the Western Division, Charles Higginson, reported that 
a Japanese suffered. from dysentery, in the section on 'Native Labour' .36 
A medical officer, Charles Garrioch, happened to encounter a Japanese 
trader called 'Jimmy' during his visit to Sudest Island on 1 6  May 1 909 and 
wrote a report about him: 
When we cruised round the islands, Mrs . Mahoney kindly allowed one of her 
employees , a Japanese, to accompany us, as he knew the coast thoroughly and 
spoke the native language as well. He was also personally acquainted with most 
of the natives we met. His services were consequently invaluable , as his presence 
gave the natives more confidence in giving information and coming forward for 
treatment. I respectfully recommend some remuneration be allowed him in 
consequence. 37 
As Garrioch was making a medical report he did not include much detail 
about Jimmy, but his knowledge of the waters and local languages show that 
he had lived there for a long period. His role as agent of Mrs Mahoney, a 
well-known trader and planter, also suggests an amicable relationship with 
Australians. 
The administration's other accounts were in reports on the conditions of 
indigenous labourers. Lieutenant-Governor Hubert Murray was concerned 
about the condition of labourers employed by the Japanese from Thursday 
Island : 
Since the appointment of a Protector, the condition of these natives has no doubt 
improved, but as Japanese are in charge of the boats in which Papuans are 
employed, it is impossible either for the white employer or for the Papuan 
Government to know exactly what takes place in these boats when they are at sea. 
For instance, the most ample and varied ration may be, and in fact, is supplied by 
the European employer, but the share which the Papuan gets of it depends upon 
the goodwill of the Japanese skipper.38 
Murray's concerns were repeated two years later, when he suggested 
preventing Japanese from employing local labourers, although he was 
informed that their conditions were satisfactory.39 As a result of these 
speculations, the employment of Papuans by Japanese was stopped. The 
Japanese vice-consul at Townsville, Miho Gornothingo, also reported to 
Foreign Minister Komura Jutaro that about 200 Papuans had been employed 
by the Japanese but such employment would discontinue due to the 
35 Papua Annual Report (Melbourne 1907) . 1 04. 
36Papua Annual Report (Melbourne 1 9 1 0) .  56. 
37 Papua Annual Report (Melbourne 1909) , 92. 
38Ibid . ,  13.  
39Papua Annual Report (Melbourne 1 9 1 1 ) ,  7-8.  
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prohibition. 40 Those reports reflect the thoroughness of Murray's policy toward 
Papuans which extended to monitoring those employed by the Japanese. 
As for the shell-fishing industry, the Papua administration's attitude 
towards the Japanese contrasts with that of their Australian counterparts in 
Queensland. Unlike the Queensland government, the Papua administration 
took hardly any notice of Japanese shell-fishing, probably because the 
Japanese operation was too small to pose a threat to Europeans. In Papua, 
the Japanese were an insignificant and marginal group . 
Japanese Settlers 
Five Japanese settled in Papua before World War I and led humble, quiet lives 
with Papuan wives, being almost unnoticed by either Australian or Japanese 
officials. Although the number is small, memories of these Japanese are still 
alive among their descendants and elders of villages and islands. At present 
there are at least 28 mixed-race people in Milne Bay Province who are 
descended from Japanese fathers-Jimmy Koto, Tamiya Mabe, Murakami 
Heijiro, Tanaka Shigematsu and Tanaka Taichiro, who all married Papuan 
women. Whether their marriages were official (registered by European 
authority) or de facto relationships is unknown, but oral evidence suggests 
that the villagers recognised them as marriages. 
The intermarriages had significant implications, for the Japanese 
effectively evaded the administration's restrictions on migration and land 
sales. They were able to fulfil a dream which Tsuji and Komine had pursued 
unsuccessfully-finding a land to settle in. We can only speculate whether 
these Japanese married only to achieve such a dream, or formed romantic 
attachments, or both. But the effects of their marriages were that the local 
communities allowed them to live there; and they were able to own land in 
cases where the wife's clan followed a matrilineal tradition-common practice 
in the Eastern Division. Consequently, they did not have to go through formal 
procedures with the administration on land acquisition and they were able to 
evade controls over the sale of native land. 
Another important factor for their successful settlement was their ability 
to adapt to local environments. They all learnt local languages, followed local 
customs and did not force any Japanese traditions or religions on their 
families .  They kept their Japanese identity only in their names, but showed 
no interest in converting to Christianity. They all successfully engaged in 
trading, copra planting and boatbuilding. Probably their zeal to improve their 
life, most coming from poor rural areas in Ja pan, was the most fundamental 
factor in their successful adaptation. Moreover, oral evidence, which confirms 
their happy marriages and friendly relationships with Papuans, suggests that 
40Miho to Komura, 2 March 19 13,  JDR 3.8.2.33. 
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the Japanese simply loved the people and the place, and thereby were 
accepted comfortably in their adoptive communities. 
Jimmy Koto was the oldest Japanese resident. His first name in Japanese 
is unknown, and there is no Japanese record of him. According to Roe, his 
arrival dates to 1 889: he came to the Louisiades as a diver employed on a 
pearl lugger, and later chose to be a trader.41 In 1 9 1 3  he applied for 
naturalisation in Australia with no success. Presumably before 1 900 Koto 
married a local woman called Maegar from Sabari Island, about 20 kilometres 
northwest of Sudest Island, and had two children named George and 
Florence .42 He became familiar with the local waters and some local 
languages, developed a relationship with islanders to 'a much more intimate 
level than did his European counterparts' .  43 He traded from his base at 
Sudest Island and frequently stopped at Samarai. He spoke English well and 
used to come to the hotel at Samarai for a drink. At the hotel he once had a 
fight with an Australian after an argument over the Russo-Japanese War.44 
He established good relations with Australians, 45 especially with Elizabeth 
Mahoney, wife of John Mahoney (a successful businessman in gold mining 
and copra planting) , and the employer of the 'Jimmy' reported on by Garrioch, 
although the development of the relationship might have owed much to Mrs 
Mahoney's character as 'a modem Lady Bountiful' . 46 According to Nelson, 
some Japanese worked on Mahoney's plantation on Sudest or served in the 
Cosmopolitan Hotel which Mrs Mahoney opened on Samarai about the end 
of 1 900.47 Probably Koto was one of the Japanese in Mahoney's employ. 
Tamiya Mabe was probably the second Japanese to arrive. Although his 
descendants think Mabe is a family name, judging from the normal Japanese 
usage, Tamiya was most likely his family name, and Mabe (or Mabei) his first 
name. His grandchildren were told that Tamiya was from Tokyo or a part of 
Tokyo. He probably came from one of the Izu islands which are included in 
the Tokyo prefecture, as sporadic Japanese migration (mostly fishermen) took 
place from these islands to New Guinea. Before 1 9 1 0  he came to Basilaki 
Island, near Samarai, and married a Basilaki woman, Kalele. His appearance 
4 1Margaret Roe, 'A History of South-East Papua to 1930' , doctoral thesis, Australian National 
University (Canberra 196 1) ,  488. 
42Interview by the author with Jessie Koto (granddaughter of Jimmy Koto) , 4 Jan. 1994, 
Misima Island, Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea (PNG). 
43Roe, op.cit. 
441nterview by the author with Murakami Kalo (son of Murakami Heijiro) . 4 Jan. 1994, Misima 
Island, Milne Bay, PNG. 
45Interview with Koto, op.cit. 
46Roe, op.cit. , 486. 
47Hank Nelson, Black White & Gold: goldmining in Papua New Guinea 1 878-1 938 (Canberra 
1976) , 25. 
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impressed locals, as he had one short arm. 48 He was a trader and a 
boatbuilder. According to Billy Tetu, his grandson: 
Tamiya was a trader operating both in Papua and New Guinea. He was not a boat 
builder initially, but Tom Tanaka [another Japanese who came to Milne Bay] 
taught him how to build a boat. He built luggers. He had 3 boats. First boat was 
named Maru. He taught local people how to build boats and he employed local 
people. He was based at Gogolabia and operated trade business, buying shell and 
copra to sell them to other Japanese traders. He had no business partner.49 
Another grandson, Joseph Tetu, says Tamiya's shell-fishing operation was on 
a small scale. 50 He did not operate like those on Thursday Island who had 
large crews and sophisticated equipment. Joseph explained that the marriage 
was the most important element that made Tamiya settle on Basilaki, because 
through it he was able to own land. All his descendants confirmed that 
Tamiya followed local customs and did not enforce any Japanese customs on 
his family. 51 Some of his descendants followed his boatbuilding trade; Billy 
Tetu is a busy boatbuilder taking orders from all around Milne Bay. 
Murakami Heijiro was one of the few Japanese migrants in Papua whose 
personal file is kept in the Australian Archives, as he was interned in 
Australia during the Pacific War. According to Murakami's dossier and the 
interview by the internment officer, he was born in Wakayama on 1 January 
1 874. 52 He went to Thursday Island around 1 894 and worked as a pump 
tender, then around 1 900 came to Milne Bay.53 The curious internment officer 
observed that both his arms and chest were heavily tattooed. 54 Murakami 
married a Papuan woman from Naiwara village (at the end of Milne Bay) and 
led a humble life with her, operating a small trading business in the Milne 
Bay area.55 
Tanaka Taichiro was known as Tom Tanaka among the locals. According 
to his nephew in Japan, Tanaka Noboru, he was born in a small fishing 
village, Obama, in Minami-takaki-gun in Nagasaki on 1 7  October 1 875. His 
family had been merchants for generations. Around 1 902 he went to New 
Guinea with Komine and Nagahama Taichi. He boarded a steamer from 
48Interview by the author with Joseph Tetu (grandson of Mabe Tamiya) , 24 Dec. 1993, 
Kanadamada Village. Basilaki Island, Milne Bay, PNG. 
491nterview by the author with Billy Tetu (grandson of Mabe Tamiya) . 25 Dec. 1993, Gogolabia 
Villa3e.  Basilaki Island, Milne Bay, PNG. 
5 Interview with Joseph Tetu, op.cit. 
511bid. 
52'Dossier for MJ 18500, internee, MURAKAMI. Heijiro' and 'Interview with Japanese internees 
at Camp No.4,  Taura, On 22.7.46, Case No.67, MURAKAMI Heijiro' ,  AA A367 C72588. 
531nterview with Murakami, op.cit. 
54He may have been an outlaw-type if he had been tattooed in Japan. as such a practice is 
common mainly among yakuza (Japanese gangs) . 
55Interview with Murakami, op.cit. 
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Nagasaki as a cook and took 80 days to arrive at New Guinea via Singapore. 56 
He probably separated from Komine and Nagahama in German New Guinea 
and came to Samarai, where he acted as a diver, boatbuilder and trader.57 A 
local Papuan elder recalls Tanaka as very friendly towards Papuans.58 Tanaka 
married a local woman, Didiloiloi, from Mohiwa (a village near East Cape on 
the Goodenough Bay side) , a daughter of an ordinary villager. In 1 906 the 
couple had a daughter, Mary. The family lived in Mohiwa which became 
Tanaka's base for business. According to Mary, he also had a good 
relationship with Europeans and was respected by the local people. 
Tanaka Shigematsu was called by his first name so that he could be 
distinguished from Tanaka Taichiro. The local pronunciation is 'Sigemata' . 
Both Tanakas were born in Minami-takaki-gun in Nagasaki. Shigematsu's 
daughter presumes they were related . 59 According to kaigai ryoken kafu hyo 
(list of overseas passport issues) of 1 90 1  of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, 
Shigematsu was the eldest son of Jukichi from a small coastal village, Ariie, 
in Minami-takaki-gun in Nagasaki, the same village where Komine was born. 
He was 33 years old when he came to Samarai on business.60 
Japanese in German New Guinea 
Population 
The Japanese population, which the German administration included in the 
European population, is shown in Table 2-3. Due to inconsistency in 
statistical computation by the administration (some statistics included the 
whole German territory including German Micronesia and New Guinea while 
some included only the Bismarck Archipelago, and some counted only 
non-officials) , the statistics give only an approximate idea to around 1 9 1 0 .  
Th e  Japanese population increased rapidly around 1 9 1 0, but its proportion 
in the total non-indigenous population remained small. Whereas there were 
578 Germans and 555 Chinese, there were only 20 Japanese in 1 9 1 0  (Table 
2-3) . 
The scanty information can be supplemented from Japanese sources. 
According to a naval officer who visited Rabaul in 1 9 1 9 ,  the number of 
Japanese in 1 9 1 4 was 1 09.61  The Japanese Foreign Ministry's records of 
56Interview by the author with Tanaka Noboru (nephew of Taichiro Tanaka) , 1 July 1993, 
Tomitsu-cho, Shimabara, Nagasaki, Japan. 
57Interview by the author with Mary and Arthur Tanaka (daughter and grandson of Tanaka 
Taichiro) . 22 Dec. 1993, Samarai, Milne Bay, PNG. 
�teIView by the author with Joseph Barn (elder) . 6 Jan. 1994, Walalaia Village, Milne Bay, 
PNG. 
59InteIView by the author with Honor and Fred lsikini (daughter and grandson of Tanaka 
Shitmatsu) , 2 1  Dec. 1993, Nigila Village, Milne Bay, PNG. 
Jan. to Mar. 190 1 ,  JDR 3.8.5.8.  
61Telegram to Vice-Admiral Takenaka, 8 July 19 19, JDR 7. 1 . 5- 10 .  
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passports issued for migrants bound for German New Guinea indicate that 
in 1 9 1 2  passports were issued to 50 Japanese, in 1 9 1 3  to 22, and in 1 9 1 4  to 
33.62 The sum of the passports coincides with the naval officer's report. Thus 
it can be estimated that the Japanese population had increased to about 1 00 
by 1 9 1 4. Comparison with the total population in Rabaul including Namanula 
and Matupi shows that the Japanese had grown to a recognisable group: the 
total was 3,27 1 in 1 9 1 4  (266 whites, 452 Chinese, 79 Malays, 27 
Micronesians and 2,447 Melanesians) .63 The Japanese population of German 
New Guinea overtook that of German Micronesia. The number of Japanese in 
all German territories reached 1 72, including about 1 00 in German New 
Guinea,64 thus Japanese in New Guinea exceeded those in Micronesia by 
about 30. 
TABLE 2-3. Non-indigenous populations of German New Guinea by nationality 
1 894- 1 9 1 3  
year Japanese Gennans 
1 894 2• n.a. 
1 895 2• n.a. 
1 897 l •  n.a. 
1906 2 4 1 7  
19 10 20 578 
19 14 2 1  •• n.a. 
•Bismarck Archipelago only 
••Admiralty district only 
n.a. : no· data available 
Chinese Other total 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
404 268 1 ,09 1 
555 357 1 , 5 1 0  
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source: (for 1 894) Annual Report (Kokopo 1895) , 4 1 ;  (for 1895) Annual Report ( 1 896) , 4 1 ;  (for 
1 897) Annual Report ( 1 898) . 5 1 ;  (for 1906) Peter Sack and Dymphna Clark (eds and trans.) ,  
Gennan New Guinea: The Annual Reports (Canberra 1979) . 267; (for 1 9 1 0) Sack and Clark, ibid . ,  
.323-4; (for 1914) Peter Sack and Dymphna Clark (eds and trans.) .  Gennan New Guinea, The Draft 
Annual Report for 1 9 1 3- 1 4, (Canberra 1980) . 62; David Y.H.  Wu, The Chinese in Papua New 
Guinea 1 880-1 980 (Hong Kong 1982) . 27. 
German attitudes towards Japanese 
Material related to Japanese in the German administration's Annual Reports 
shows that the administration's concern about them did not greatly differ 
from that of the Australians in Papua. German reports are also brief and do 
not extend beyond one paragraph. Judging from the amount and contents of 
those reports, the German administration was not greatly concerned. 
The main characteristics of German attitudes to Japanese were leniency 
regarding legal status and caution in granting land rights. The Germans 
granted the Japanese European status around 1 905 . Until then they had no 
62Kaigai ryoken kafu hyo, 19 12- 14,  JDR 3.8.5.8.  
63Peter Sack and Dymphna Clark (eds and trans. ) . Gennan New Guinea, The Draft Annual 
Reportfor 1 91 3- 1 4  (Canberra 1 980) , 16.  
641bid. 
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legal status.  65 Granting European status was not confined to the Germans, 
as the Dutch granted the same status in the East Indies in 1 899 .66 Threlfall 
argues that Komine's usefulness to the administration as well as the effect of 
the emergence of Japan in international politics after its victory in the 
Russo-Japanese War facilitated the granting of European status.  
Indeed the administration recognised Komine's usefulness when Albert 
Hahl, the Vice-Governor and Governor from 1 896 to 1 9 1 4, met him. According 
to Hahl's diaiy, in 1 902 Komine reached Herbertshohe from Torres Strait; 
around this time Hahl had been facing a serious shortage of government 
vessels to perform administrative tasks. The appearance of Komine solved this 
problem: 
A chance incident helped to solve my dilemma. One fine morning there was a 
small schooner flying the Japanese flag to be seen riding at anchor in the 
Herbertshohe Harbour. The skipper, Isokide [sic] Komine , told me that his water 
and provisions had run out on his voyage from Torres Strait, where he had been 
engaged in pearl-fishing. He had no money to purchase supplies and asked me to 
employ him. I inspected his little ship, found it suitable for my purpose, and 
chartered the vessel. 67 
Hahl used Komine's schooner for later trips around the Bismarck 
Archipelago. 68 
However, Komine gave a different account of the encounter. His stoiy 
appears in his petition for financial assistance to the Consul-General in 
Sydney in 1 9 1 6. According to Komine, he reached Rabaul in October 1 90 1  
and accidentally met Governor Hahl who had been under siege by 'little 
barbarians' : 
Nearly at the end of my exploration I anchored at Rabaul in October 1 90 1 .  At that 
time the place was German territory and the natives were strongly resisting 
German rule.  The punitive expeditions were suffering failures. When I arrived 
there, Governor Hahl and his staff had narrowly escaped the tight siege of the little 
barbarians and they were holding this small place. Their vessels, which were their 
only resort, were wrecked on the reef. They tried all measures unsuccessfully and 
were just waiting to be slaughtered. However, when they found my accidental 
arrival, they were overjoyed as if my arrival was God's will and begged me for the 
charter of my ship. My righteous heart was heating up, seeing their hopeless 
situation, and I willingly agreed to their request. At the same time I j oined their 
punitive forces. Sharing uncountable hardships with them and applying various 
tactics all successfully, we finally conquered and pacified the little barbarians.69 
65Nev1lle Tirrelfall, 'From Mangroves to Frangipani: the story of Rabaul and East New Britain' ,  
unpublished, Division o f  Pacific and Asian History, Australian National University (Canberra 
1988) . 1 1 8. 
66J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy (Cambridge 1967) , 240. 
67 Sack and Clark, German New Guinea, The Draft Annual Report for 1 91 3- 1 4, 9 1 .  
68Ibid. ,  92. 
69Komine to Shimizu, 19  May 19 16, JDR 3 .4.6.3. 
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Apparently Komine dramatised the encounter to his advantage. German 
records indicate no such incident either at Herbertoshohe or at Rabaul. 
Nonetheless Komine's description verifies two facts: the administration was 
suffering from a lack of seaworthy vessels; and he accompanied Hahl on his 
trips to other places. There were mutual benefits: Hahl needed a vessel and 
Komine needed provisions for his voyage. This circumstance contributed to 
the development of the two men's relationship and later led to the emergence 
of the Japanese community in German New Guinea. 
The men's characters may also have contributed to some extent. Komine's 
determined and adventurous nature which had been demonstrated on his 
arrival may have appealed to Hahl who was, Sack argues, 'by no means free 
of the racial prejudices of his time, but . . .  liked people, even if they were 
black or brown or yellow' . 70 Similarly, Firth claims that Hahl 'had broader and 
more humane obj ectives, though still primarily economic ones . . .  unlike 
many German governors in Africa' . 7 1  
The European status given to the Japanese, however, shows German 
subtlety. Hahl pursued strict policies to maintain a racial hierarchy with 
whites always at the top. He never allowed his personal friendship to 
undermine this hierarchy. When court cases involving Japanese arose, they 
were not heard in the European courts but in a separate court constituted 
only for the Japanese. 72 Similarly, the Germans were cautious about giving 
commercial advantage. The administration did not grant the right to purchase 
freehold to the Japanese. Indeed, the administration introduced a 
discriminatory law to restrict non-indigenous coloured people acquiring land: 
'land could not be purchased from the government by natives or by persons 
who had not equal rights with Europeans; and land could neither be bought 
nor leased by persons unable to read and write a European language' .  73 In 
addition, the Germans limited the land rights of the Japanese, and of the 
Chinese, to leases only for a term not exceeding 30 years. 
This reluctance to concede equal land rights to Japanese was manifested 
in the timing and location of a lease granted to Komine. Not until 1 9 1 0  did 
Komine acquire a 1 , 000 hectare lease on Pityilu Island, Papitelai, Sou, Kali 
Bay and Rambutyo Island in the Admiralty Islands. 74 Eight years had passed 
since his arrival. It was a late acquisition, considering that the Japanese had 
enjoyed European status since 1 905. 
7°i>eter Sack, 'Law, Politics and Native "Crunes" in German New Guinea'. in John A. Moses and 
Paul M. Kennedy (eds. ) .  Gennany in the Pacific and Far East, 1870- 1 9 1 4  (Brisbane 1977) . 275. 
71Stewart Firth, New Guinea under the Germans (Melbourne 1982) . 1 66. 
7Tuelfall, op.cit. , 1 18. 
73Report on Territory of New Guinea (Canberra 1922) , 1 5. 
74Komine to Shimizu, 19 May 19 16, JDR 3.4.6.3.  
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The location of the lease also suggests the administration's unwillingness 
to transfer safe and profitable land. The Admiralty Islands were a frontier 
about 600 kilometres from Rabaul, where resistance to German rule was still 
strong and where few Germans were keen to settle. Indeed, Komine was 
attacked by islanders one year before he acquired the lease at Kali Bay, at the 
western end of Manus Island. The 1 9 1 0- 1 1  Annual Report reported the attack 
and unsuccessful punitive expeditions.75 Kali Bay remained an uncontrolled 
area until 1 9 1 4.76 Komine was after all acting for the benefit of the 
administration which was happy to send settlers to undeveloped frontiers. 
But Komine was adept in expanding his business. In 1 9 1 1  he won a 
concession for pearl-fishing.77 In the same year he expanded his business in 
Rabaul and in 1 9 1 2  he established a trading company. From 1 9 1 2  onwards 
he was able to get permission to bring in Japanese employees for his business 
in boatbuilding, trading, and coconut planting. Suddenly a relatively large 
number of Japanese began to arrive. The administration raised no objection 
as long as they were labourers or artisans. 78 The administration may even 
have welcomed the Japanese because they alleviated the shortage of labour 
for its public works. Some Japanese were employed on road construction on 
mainland New Guinea, as the Australian sub-district naval officer at 
Thursday Island reported, 79 probably referring to road construction in the 
Morobe District which bordered northeast Papua. The 1 9 1 3- 1 4  German 
Annual Report reported the acute shortage of local labour due to excessive 
recruitment in the area. 80 Although no Japanese or Chinese labourers were 
mentioned in the German report, the location of the road construction is 
identical to that in the Australian report. It is very likely that the Japanese 
and Chinese were used to make up for the lack of local labour. Unlike their 
counterparts in Australia, the Germans evidently accepted the Japanese, due 
mainly to the administration's urgent need to ameliorate the 'unceasing 
demands for labour' to develop its territory.81 
Australian fear of Japanese in German New Guinea 
In the early 1 9 1  Os, the Australian government was nervously monitoring 
Komine's activity in the Admiralty Islands for fear of any Japanese expansion 
75Sack and Clark, Gennan New Guinea, The Draft Annual Report for 1 91 3- 1 4, 32 1 .  
761bid. ,  62. 
77Peter Sack and Dymphna Clark (eds and trans. ) . Gennan New Guinea: The Annual Reports 
(Canberra 1979) , 346. 
78Report on Territory of New Guinea, op.cit. ( 1922) , 1 5. 
79Sub-district naval officer at Thursday Island to the Naval Secretary of Navy Office, 1 7  Nov. 
1 9 1 3 ,  AA MP 1049/ l 19 1 3/0326. 
80sack and Clark, Gennan New Guinea, The Draft Annual Report for 1 91 3- 1 4, 35-6. 
81Peter J. Hempenstall, Pacific Islanders wuier Gennan Rule: a study in the meaning of colonial 
resistance (Canberra 1978) , 1 6 1 .  
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in the South Pacific. The Australian fear was instigated by a newspaper article 
which warned about Japanese expansion in the central Pacific: 
It was from Hawaii that the Japanese first began to enter California in large 
numbers and it appears likely that they will use the same island as a starting 
point for their trade with South American ports and with the islands of the Pacific 
. . .  Already a new steamship service has been started from Hilo to trade with the 
South America coast . . .  and a Japanese syndicate obtained control of the 
Admiralty Islands. 82 
Responding to the article, the Governor-General requested the Prime 
Minister to investigate the matter. The request was passed to the Defence 
Department and finally to the sub-disbict naval officer on Thursday Island. 83 
The naval officer revealed Komine's presence in the Admiralty Islands in his 
third report. 84 Faster than the naval officer, the British Ambassador in Tokyo 
carried out an investigation. His report confirmed the operation of a small 
Japanese enterprise, the Nanyo Kogyo Kaisha (South Seas Industry Company) 
in the Admiralty Islands. He also noted the smallness of the company's 
operation and its weak connection to the Japanese government.85 However, 
the ambassador, quoting the newspaper article, also stressed the growing 
Japanese interests in the South Seas, and noted an ambitious statement by 
Naval Commander Hosaka, the captain of a cruiser, despatched to the South 
Pacific by the government in search of suitable places for emigration. 86 As 
explained earlier, Hosaka did not represent the policy of the Japanese 
government, for no government officials or influential intellectuals showed 
much interest in the South Seas in this period. And Australian investigations 
hardly substantiated the existence of systematic Japanese expansion. 
However, the Australian government, having a traditional fear of invasion 
from the north, picked up eveiy tiny matter which seemed to be connected to 
Japanese expansion. Australians, relieved by squeezing out the Japanese on 
Thursday Island, continued to be annoyed by the same Japanese in the 
German territory. 
Japanese settlers 
There are several episodes concerning Komine in both written and oral 
sources. Most recount his heroic feats fighting against New Guineans and 
reconciling tribal disputes to assist the administration's punitive expeditions. 
The report of Tatsue Yoshinobu, the directing manager of an emigration 
82Sydney Morning Herald, 3 1 May 19 13.  
83Memorandum from the Governor-General to the Priine Minister, 1 0  July 19 13;  Prime 
Minister to the Secretary of the Defence Department, 22 July 19 13;  Sub-district naval officer at 
Thursday Island to the Naval Secretary, 27 / July 19 13,  AA, MP 1 049/ l 19 1 3/0326. 
84Sub-district naval officer at Thursday Island to the Naval Secretary, 10 Sept. 19 13,  ibid. 
85Report by Conyngham Greene, 8 July 19 13,  ibid. 86Sydney Morning Herald, 1 1  Oct. 19 13,  'The Islands. Japanese Aggression. Menace to 
Australia' . 
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company, the Kaigai Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha (Overseas Industrial Co. Ltd) , 
indicates that Komine was actively involved in fighting rather than merely 
providing his vessel. Based on Komine's story as told to him, Tatsue wrote of 
Komine fighting against islanders at Tahara village near Namatanai in New 
Ireland in the early 1 900s. 87 
Komine's actions on behalf of German punitive expeditions were also 
recorded by an anthropologist, Francis Bell. During his field research, Bell 
was told about Komine's peace-making among the people in Boieng, an island 
about 70 kilometres west-northwest of Namatanai.88 This probably owed 
much to Komine's competence in languages: according to his descendant, he 
could speak eight languages-English, German, Spanish, Pidgin and several 
indigenous languages. 89 This ability, as well as his navigational skill, would 
have been useful to punitive expeditions, and encouraged the pragmatic Hahl 
to use him. 
Not only his practical skills but also his strong character contributed to 
establishing relations with Germans. According to oral evidence, Komine was 
extremely disciplined and industrious:  he used to sleep only three hours a 
night. studied, and checked all his premises before breakfast. His 
obsessiveness is shown by the following episode: 
When my father, Mantoku [Komine Mantoku, Isokichi's nephew] , went to Rabaul 
to help with Uncle Isokichi's business,  my father was scolded because he went to 
the toilet before breakfast. To Uncle Isokichi from the time of getting out of bed, 
people should do something productive. Going to the toilet before doing something 
was a sign of laziness. My father told me Uncle Isokichi used to tell my father, 'If 
you remembered one word of a foreign language a day, you would be pretty fluent 
in one language in one year. '90 
Hahl might have acquired some fondness for the Japanese after his holiday 
trip to Japan in 1 9 1 0 .  He wrote in his diary: 'in Japan we spent our time in 
Nara and Kyoto, as these beautiful centres of ancient Japanese art and 
religion held far more appeal for us than the hurry and bustle in the port' . 91  
Coincidentally, Komine's acquisition of a lease in the Admiralty Islands 
occurred in the same year. 
87Tatsue Yoshinobu, 'Nyiiginia bankai tanken kik6 (3)' [Accounts of exploration to barbarian 
world in New Guinea] , Shokumin [The Colonial Review] . 4( 1 )  (Tokyo 1925) , 1 12- 19.  
88F. L. S. Bell, Warfare among the Tanga', Oceania, 5(3) (Sydney 1935) . 253-307. 
89Interview by the author with Sato Yachiyo (daughter of a nephew of Isokichi Komine} , 1 July 
1993, Nagasaki-shi, Nagasaki, Japan. 
90Ibid. 
91Sack and Clark, Gennan New Guinea, The Draft Annual Report for 1 91 3- 1 4, 1 33-4. 
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Komine was also acting as an agent for a German company. Since 1 907 he 
had acted for Hemsheim and Co. ,  who were trying to start a plantation on 
Ponam Island, in the north of the Admiralty Groups. 92 
In 1 9 1 0, as we have seen, the administration granted Komine a 1 ,000 
hectare lease on the Admiralty Islands, where he began operating a copra 
plantation. He brought in more than 1 0  Japanese as foremen to supervise 
several hundred native labourers. In the same year he set up a ship building 
yard on Manus and employed more than 1 0  Japanese shipwrights. In 1 9 1 1 ,  
he expanded his ship-building business to Rabaul on a one hectare waterfront 
lease. This business prospered. He received many orders for building ships 
from the administration and recruited more Japanese shipwrights. His yard 
produced two large sailing ships with full fittings every three months and the 
annual profit exceeded 50, 000 yen. In the same year he started trading. In 
1 9 1 2  he invested the profits from ship building and trade in copra plantations 
and completed tree planting on all his 1 ,000 hectares on Manus.93 
In 1 9 1 2  he established the Nanyo Kogyo Kaisha, after gaining further 
concessions from the administration-a 500 hectare lease (location unknown) , 
rights to fish and collect marine products and the company's right to bring in 
Japanese employees on condition that he comply with the administration's 
law on labour contracts, living standards, health, payment of wages, return 
to home country, protection and so on.94 The company's headquarters were 
at Kobe in Ja pan where he bought materials for ship building, and sent his 
shell and copra from New Guinea.95 But Komine did not have sufficient funds 
to establish the company on his own. Sissons's research reveals that he 
borrowed funds from the (German) New Guinea Company-the largest private 
company in German New Guinea (the company was heavily subsidised by the 
administration) . 96 And a Japanese record shows that Komine's company 
gained its main profits from services (mainly repairing government vessels) to 
the administration. 97 Thus actual operation of the company was dependent 
on the Germans. 
The establishment of the company was a significant step in Komine's life. 
It elevated him to a higher social status. He recruited Samejima San'nosuke 
as a secretary: Samejima was a descendent of the samurai of Satsuma and 
92German Consul-General at Singapore, R. Kiliani to Japanese Consul at Singapore, E. 
Suzuki, 5 Aug. 1909, JDR 4.2.5-240. 
93Komine to Shimizu, 19 May 19 16,  JDR 3.4.6.3. 
94Concessions of the German administration with Japanese translation, 1 8  May 19 13, JDR 
3.5.2.20 1 .  
95Kamij6 Fukashi, Sensen ichi man kairi: ?.en sekai taisenji nan'yo no sen-shi [War front in 
a thousand miles away: war history in the South Seas in the previous war) (Tokyo 1941) ,  1 84. 
96David Sissons, 'I. Komine ( 1 867- 1934) ' ( 1983) , 1 .  
9 7  Samejima San'nosuke, date unknown, 'Senj i  zaijii j6ky6 hokoku sho' [Report o n  the local 
situation during the war] , Komine Shigenori's possession (Nagasaki) , 1 .  
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more importantly an acquaintance of Admiral Kamimura Hikonoj6. According 
to Fujiki, Kamimura heard about Komine somehow and recommended 
Samejima to work for him. 98 Like Enomoto, Kamimura was enthusiastic about 
Japan's nanshin and inspired Samej ima: 
New Guinea is an important point in the Pacific. To establish a Japanese fort in 
New Guinea is a necessity for the defence of Japan. Your company is not merely 
a profit-seeking company. Your company is serving our nation. 99 
It is quite conceivable that the words of encouragement from the Admiral, 
although indirect, stimulated Komine's patriotism; it was probably around 
this time that this began to be manifested, as in the following episode: 
One night Uncle Isokichi was invited to dinner with the German Governor. During 
the dinner, the Governor remarked,  'the Japanese are poor, because you use 
wooden chopsticks to eat food, but Germans use silver cutlery' . After the dinner, 
Uncle Isokichi came home, indignant, and at once ordered thousands of 
chopsticks from Japan. Then at the next dinner with the Governor, Uncle Isokichi 
said, 'Germans use the same cutlery every time, but we use chopsticks only once 
and throw them away to make sure we use new ones all the time. o 1oo 
In the last year of German rule, Komine was on his way to becoming a 
business tycoon. In 1 9 1 3  he returned to Japan to arrange for further 
expansion of his business. He successfully approached leading Japanese 
businessmen-Baron Tsuji Shinji, Lord Matsukata K6shir6 (the owner of 
Kawasaki Ship Building Company) . Lord Shimura Gentaro, Murai Yoshibei 
(the president of the Imperial Hotel) , Okura Kihachiro (a member of the Japan 
Trade Association) and Fukushima Namizo (the auditor of the Asahi Life 
Insurance Company) . Unfortunately, the outbreak of World War I wrecked the 
plan. During his visit he also met Admiral Kamimura. It was a memorable 
meeting for Komine, and a photograph was taken showing him in a smart 
Western coat standing with Kamimura in uniform with many medals. It was 
symbolic of Komine's success. A former pearl diver was now standing with the 
Admiral like an equal partner. 101 
New Guineans also remember Komine. Several stories have been handed 
down. The elders on Ponam Island tell the story of when Komine's schooner 
Zabra was stranded on the reef of their island in 1 907. The incident can also 
98Fujiki Yoshihiro, Ny ii ginia sono ju.kin tosho no dozoku hin [Artefacts of New Guinean and 
adjacent islands) (Tokyo 1939) . 5. 
99Kamij6, op.cit. , 184; Ono Yoshiharu, Toa ky6ei-ken to nyii ginia [The East Asia Co-prosperity 
Sphere and New Guinea) (Tokyo 1942) . 169. 
1001nterview with Sato, op.cit. 
10 1The photograph is possessed by Komine Shigenort, a grandson of Komine's nephew, 
Nagasaki-Shi, Nagasaki, Japan, and is reproduced as Photgraph 1 .  
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be confirmed in the correspondence from the German Consul-General. 102 The 
islanders relate: 
Komine's boat was wrecked on the reef near the island, but he and his crew were 
frightened to land on the island because they thought we would kill him. They 
collected stones, laid them on the reef, built a hut and stayed there for two 
months. Finally the luluai of the island invited them to the island, then Komine 
agreed to settle on the island. After his boat was repaired, he went back to Pityilu 
where his plantation was. Komine was a big man and we thought he was an 
administrator at Rabaul. Komine was respected like a kiap. He was a hard man, 
too. When he got sick in Rabaul, he asked Ponam people to catch a turtle so that 
he could drink its blood. He told his employees to keep good relationships with the 
locals, otherwise they were dismissed and sent back to Japan. 103 
The story tends to confirm that Komine was working for the administration 
or at least had some close association with it as he was thought to be an 
administrator. The story also suggests that he had a plantation on Pityilu 
Island (near Lorengau in the Admiralty Islands) . It could be that the islanders' 
memory about the time is incorrect, or that Komine was working for other 
planters on the island, because the administration had not yet given him a 
lease at this time. Komine's footprint remains in the name of an island. In 
Kali Bay, Komine named a small island 'Nihon Island' ( 'Nihon' means Japan 
in Japanese) and the island still retains that name. 104 
Komine's Japanese wife, Cho, also assisted in his business. The first issue 
of her passport for New Guinea was recorded in 1 908 and the second was in 
1 9 1 0  with the stated purpose of commerce. 105 She was born in Juzenji-cho in 
Nagasaki City in 1 87 1 .  According to oral evidence, she was a beautiful and 
elegant lady and, like Komine, very diligent and particularly fussy about the 
way money was spent. 106 The couple was exceptionally outgoing for Japanese. 
Their formal appearance at government functions, Cho in traditional kimono 
and obi, attracted the curious eyes of other white residents in Rabaul. 107 
Probably her presence made Isokichi more eminent in the social life of 
cosmopolitan Rabaul. 
In the memories of New Guineans Komine overshadows other Japanese, 
as most were his employees and their activities were controlled by his 
business operations. As a result, oral information about other Japanese is 
relatively scarce. Similarly official records have little information except about 
102German Consul-General at Singapore, R. Kiliani to Japanese Consul at Singapore, E. 
Suzuki, 5 Aug. 1909, JDR 4.2.5-240. 
103InteIView by the author with Sohou, Alphonse Kawei and Mohak, Pious Pweleheu (elders) , 
1 1  Feb. 1994, Ponam Island, Manus, PNG. 
104Interview by the author with Michael Posman (a local from Kali Bay) , 12 Feb. 1994, 
Loren�au, Manus, PNG. 
10 Kaigai ryoken kafu hy6, July 1908 and Apr. 19 10,  JDR 3.8.5.8.  
1061nteIView with Sato, op. cit. 
107Threlfall, op.cit. , 1 19. 
56 JAPANESE SEITLERS IN PAPUA AND NEW GUINEA 
four Japanese, Izumi Eikichi, Endo Shigetaro, Hagiwara Hikota, and Ikesaki 
Tokuyoshi, who remained in New Guinea until the outbreak of the Pacific War 
and were interned in Australia. Their personal files are in internment records. 
Significantly they all married local non-white women in a later period . 
Relevance to Japanese social history 
As the analyses in the previous chapter show, migration in this period 
reflected Japanese social history. Migrants kept on coming from the rural 
southwest where underdevelopment continued as industrialisation was 
entrenched in urban centres. Rural depression intensified , particularly after 
the Russo-Japanese War, when industrialisation gained momentum with the 
rapid growth of export-oriented industries such as silk and cotton. The major 
impact on rural areas was the loss of self-sufficiency as agricultural 
production was integrated into the development of export commodities. 108 As 
a result, rural-urban inequality increased, accelerating the tempo of the 
emigration of the rural people to urban centres and overseas. The statistics 
verify this. In only 1 0  years from 1 904 to 1 9 1 4, the number of overseas 
emigrants increased nearly threefold-from 1 38, 59 1  in 1 904 to 358, 7 1 1 in 
1 9 14.  109 The same tendency was seen in migration to Papua and New Guinea. 
The number increased from a mere two in 1 906 to 1 09 in 1 9 14,  and most 
came from Kyiishii; 33 from Kumamoto, 28 from Nagasaki, and eight from 
Saga. 1 10 
Most migrants were dekasegi-sha (literally 'people leaving to earn money') 
on three year contracts, the same type of people seen in urban factories. 1 1 1  
Th e  largest occupational group was artisans : 4 1  shipwrights, 1 8  carpenters 
and 1 3  sawyers. Many of them were from Goryo and Oniike villages in 
Amakusa. These villages were famous for boatbuilding from the Eda era, but 
in about 1 907 many shipwrights lost their jobs due to the recession in the 
shipping industry. 1 12 Eleven fishermen were another significant group . They 
came from fishing villages such as Isahaya-cho (Kita-takaki-gun, Nagasaki 
prefecture) and Jogashima (Misaki-cho, Miura-gun, Kanagawa prefecture) . 
Fishing villages in this period were also suffering a decline in jobs due to the 
development of a modern capital-intensive fishery and the resulting decline 
of small fishermen. 1 13 Unemployment thus constituted a 'push' factor for 
108Kato Bunz6, et al. , Nihon rekishi [Japanese history] , Vol. II (Tokyo 1 992) . 1 73-4. 
109Ishikawa, op.cit. ( 1972) . 
. 
l lOData from the information in Kaigai ryoken kafu hy6, 19 12- 1 9 14,  JDR 3.8.5.8.  
1 1 1Correspondence of German ambassador at Kobe, 25 Sept. 19 12 ,  G2 Item V.II ,  folio 66, AA 
German Microfihn. 
l l2Motoda Shigeo, Amakusa an'nai [Amakusa Guide) (Kumamoto 1926) . 135.  
1 13Shimizu Hiroshi and Konuma Isamu, Nihon gyogyo keizai hattatsu-shijosetsu [Introduction 
of the history of the development of Japanese fishery economy) (Tokyo 1949) . 1 19-25. 
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emigration. It is highly probable that, like the migration to Thursday Island, 
the high wages in New Guinea became a major 'pull' factor. 
Moreover the German administration's different treatment of the Japanese 
relative to other Asians possibly became a 'pull' factor. The granting of 
European status delighted the Japanese who had been rejected in Australia 
because they were Asians. The migrants probably felt that the Germans 
recognised their national identity as subjects of an emerging empire which, 
they may have thought, was distinctive from other Asian countries.  Although 
in reality the migrants were the victims of empire-building which increased 
the poverty of rural Ja pan, the improvement of their status from poor rustics 
to 'Europeans' satisfied their pride. Of course, such pride was merely an 
illusion which would vanish as soon as they returned to their impoverished 
villages, but it was a sweet illusion that attracted the migrants to the land of 
I dojin' • 1 14 
Relevance to colonial history of New Guinea 
Within the German colony where people's lives were strictly governed 
according to race, the Japanese presence was anomalous. The Japanese 
community developed into a colony. The Japanese were colonial masters in 
their relationships with New Guineans. Like their German counterparts, they 
were traders, boatbuilders, shell collectors and planters, recruiting and 
employing islanders as crew and labourers. Yet their economic activities were 
largely independent of their German counterparts. Mainly through Komine's 
Nan'yo Sangyo Kaisha, the Japanese exported copra, shell and marine 
products to Ja pan and imported miscellaneous goods from Japan. Thus the 
Japanese developed a colonial relationship between Japan and New Guinea 
in that Japan extracted primary products by means of a cheap indigenous 
labour force and provided light manufactured goods in exchange. 
The development of the colony can be ascribed to the German acceptance 
of the Japanese as having a place among the rulers in their colonial 
apparatus. The Germans had two reasons. First, the Japanese alleviated the 
skilled labour shortage. Secondly, they assisted in maintaining and 
reinforcing the colonial structure. In helping contain New Guineans' 
challenges to the colonial structure, the Japanese were useful, particularly 
Komine who seemed to be willing to assist in punitive expeditions. It is even 
possible that the administration granted the Japanese European status partly 
to reinforce the colonial apparatus. That may also show how their national 
identity (as subjects of an expanding empire) facilitated the entry of migrants 
to the ruling group, whereas the Chinese were excluded and largely remained 
1 14The Japanese term which literally means indigenous people and is often used with 
contempt. 
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in an intermediate position between the whites and New Guineans. Thus the 
Japanese colony functioned to consolidate German rule, although that was, 
of course, on condition that the Japanese posed no threat to German 
interests. 
The emergence of the Japanese community at Rabaul contributed to the 
development of its landscape. Rabaul expanded rapidly after the 
administration decided to shift its capital from Herbertshohe in 1 9 1  O .  
Buildings, roads and wharves were constructed for a well-planned 
township. u s New arrivals from Japan increased the demand for new 
dwellings. The 1 9 1 2- 1 3 Annual Report reported the extension of Komine's 
boatbuilding yard by the construction of a number of dwelling-houses for his 
new employees. 1 16 However, as in the case of land rights, although Europeans 
in legal status, the Japanese were not accepted in the European residential 
areas . Some Japanese lived on Komine's waterfront lease while others lived 
in Malay Town and China Town-towns for non-Europeans. 1 17 Evidently their 
European status was in reality nominal. 
The emergence of a sizeable Japanese population was even accompanied 
by a Japanese brothel. 1 18 Generally, as Yano argues from his analysis of the 
patterns of Japanese business expansion in Southeast Asia, particularly at 
Singapore, the presence of karayuki-san can be considered a barometer of 
Japanese prosperity. 1 19 In Southeast Asia, karayuki-san spearheaded 
Japanese business expansion, and they were followed by traders who mainly 
sold sundries to them. In contrast, in New Guinea Komine was the first 
Japanese to arrive and to initiate business activity, and independent of 
Komine, the karayuki-san arrived. It was Ah Tam in 1 904, a wealthy and 
successful Chinese businessman at Rabaul, who brought in the first 
karayuki-san, to make them serve 'the need of Chinese and European men' . 120 
Later Japanese migrants were also different from those traders in South east 
Asia: they came to work for Komine, not for karayuki-san. The presence of 
karayuki-san in New Guinea does not conform to the Southeast Asian 
pattern; it only demonstrates Ah Tam's entrepreneurship. 
According to Threlfall the Japanese largely remained an isolated group in 
the social life of Rabaul, except for the formal appearance of Komine and his 
wife at administration functions. 12 1 He also emphasises their religious 
alienation and secretiveness: 'unlike the Chinese, the Japanese remained 
totally unreceptive to Christianity, but the practice of their Shinto religion, 
1 15J. K. McCarthy.New Guinea: Our Nearest Neighbour (Melbourne 1972) , 73. 
1 16Sack and Clark, op.cit. ( 1979) . 370. 
1 17Tirrelfall, op.cit. , 1 18. 
1 18Kawasaki and Maruba, op.cit. , 3. 
1 19¥ano, op.cit. ( 1975) . 43. 
120David Wu, The Chinese in Papua New Guinea 1 880-1 980 (Hong Kong 1982) . 52. 
121nrrelfall, op.cit. , 1 19. 
Chapter 2: Golden age, 1 901 - 1 91 4  59 
like their own forms of entertainment, was a private matter which outsiders 
were not invited to witness'. 122 This is probably correct but does not explain 
why the Japanese distanced themselves from the wider social life. Since most 
were from rural areas with little exposure to Western culture, Rabaul was the 
first place of contact with the West for most of them. It is likely that 
difficulties in language and manners, in addition to their transient nature, 
caused them to distance themselves and encouraged them to form their own 
'alienated' group. As Threlfall observes, the white population saw this as a 
sign of Japanese secrecy, a view that was possibly reinforced by the contrast 
with the customary noisy Chinese New Year celebrations which were obvious 
to every resident of Rabaul. 
1221bid. 
Chapter 3 
Turn ing poi nt ,  1 9 1 4- 1 9 1 8 
WORLD WAR I BROKE OITT IN AUGUSf 1 9 1 4 .  THE FIGHTING in New Guinea was so 
limited that no Japanese were injured nor their property damaged, but the 
uncertainty about the future of the colony affected Komine's business greatly. 
No new orders for ship building came and trading stopped. Under Australian 
military rule, the Japanese faced the challenge of creating good relations with 
them and abandoning their long-term relations with the Germans. Japan was 
allied to Britain, which meant fighting alongside Australia against Germany. 
Thus the war obliged the Japanese to switch their relations with white rulers 
from the Germans to the Australians. 
World War I 
The outbreak of World War I brought an unexpected blessing for Japan. 
Marquess Kaoru Inoue wrote to Prime Minister Okuma Shigenobu and Prince 
Field Marshal Yamagata Aritomo that the war in Europe was tenyii 
(heaven-sent help) and the best opportunity to entrench Japanese interests 
in East Asia for the future. 1 Foreign Minister Kato Takaaki also saw the war 
as a chance to 'sweep away German bases in the East' .2 The inability of 
Western powers to engage in a war on two fronts-Europe and the Pacific-Asia 
region-also encouraged Japan to enter the conflict. Britain, being 'unable to 
keep control of the Atlantic and the Pacific at the same time' , invited Japan 
to neutralise the German forces in China and the South Pacific that were 
threatening British interests in Hong Kong and Weihaiwei.3  
Although Britain suspected the Japanese of territorial ambitions and 
intended to limit Japanese activities, Japan refused to accept any restrictions 
and declared war on 23 August on the basis of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.4 
Japan's primary object was to acquire the Kiaochow Bay Leased Territoiy in 
Shantung Peninsula which Germany had taken after intervening in the 
Shimonoseki Treaty of 1 895. Japan had acquired the area as spoil after the 
Sino-Japanese War of 1 894, but Russia, France and Germany, fearing 
1Kat6, Bunz6, et al . ,  Nihon rekishi [Japanese history] . Vol. II (Tokyo 1992) . 20 1 .  
21bid. 
3Glen Barclay, A History of the Pacijicfrom the Stone Age to the present day (London 1978) . 
1 53.  
4Kajima Morinosuke, The Diplomacy of Japan, 1 894- 1 922, Volume III (Tokyo 1980) . 49-52. 
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Japanese expansion in East Asia, intervened and Germany took the area and 
developed it as a base for its East Asian interests. 
The Germans in the Pacific islands were poorly prepared for the war. They 
had no forces capable of fighting in Samoa, the Marshalls or the Carolines. 
Their only garrison, at Rabaul, consisted of 240 native soldiers and 6 1  
Europeans but had no fixed defences or field artillery, and there was only one 
machine gun in Madang in mainland New Guinea. 5 The Germans were 'fully 
aware of their own military weakness' and attempted in vain through 
diplomacy to exclude China and the Pacific from the fighting zone. 6 
On 27 August 19 14, the Japanese navy blockaded Kiaochow Bay and the 
army sent in 29,000 soldiers. Combined with 2,800 British soldiers, the Allied 
forces attacked the German fortress at Tsingtao, defended by 7,000. 
Surrounded by overwhelming forces, the Germans capitulated on 7 November. 
Suffering very light military losses (about 500 dead) , Japan took over the 
German interests in the Shantung Peninsula. Soon Japan entrenched its rule 
over southern Manchuria by acquiring the lease of the Kwantung Province 
and the Manchurian Railway, after forcing the infamous Twenty-One 
Demands on China in 1 9 1 5.7  
The Japanese navy joined the British navy in chasing the German East 
Asian squadron that was destroyed off the Falkland Islands on 8 December. 
The navy also assisted the Allies in escort duties, helping guard the 
Australian and New Zealand convoys crossing the Indian Ocean. Later they 
were deployed in the Mediterranean. 
The Japanese navy was then dominated by an aggressive group 
anticipating future war with the US in the Pacific. As a result, the navy acted 
swiftly in occupying German Micronesia, which would, the navy staff thought, 
provide bases to counter the US navy. The Japanese occupation was hardly 
publicised. That was because, as Hirama rightly argues, the navy knew that 
possession of Micronesia would be decided at the peace conference after the 
war, and tried to establish a fait accompli by the swift occupation.8 
In the decade prior to the war, Australian anxieties about its security 
against Japan were increasing, particularly after Britain withdrew its naval 
forces from the Pacific to the northern seas. As a result, the new 
Commonwealth government was resolved to improve its defence capacity by 
developing the navy, introducing compulsory military training and increasing 
5S. S. MacKenzie, The Australians at Rabaul (Brisbane 1927, republished in 1987) . 47-8. 
6Barclay, op.cit. , 1 50. 
71bid. ,  32. 
8Hirama Yoichi, 'Kaigun-shi teki ni mita nanshin no ichi-danmen: nihon kaigun o 
mikuroneshia seruyo ni fumikiraseta haikei' [One aspect of Japan's southward advance from the 
viewpoint of navy history: background of the Japanese navy's occupation of Micronesia] , Sefji 
Keizai shigaku [Politico-Economic History] , 250 ( 1 987) . 96. 
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defence expenditure 'which quadrupled in the five-year period prior to the 
outbreak of World War I ' . 9  
During World War I, Australia's main commitment was directed to Europe 
rather than the Pacific. That was largely due to the smallness of German 
forces in the Pacific, but it was also affected by the traditional Australian 
perception that the maintenance of British power was vital to its security. 
Australia's political, economic and racial ties with Britain promoted its 
imperial commitment, with the emergence of Australian nationalism which 
was 'strongly overlapped by an imperial spirit' .  10 Australia's commitment in 
Europe increased in September 1 9 1 4  when William (Billy) Hughes 'took the 
portfolio of Attorney-General and began to dominate cabinet and caucus by 
the force of his personality' . 1 1  In October 1 9 1 5  Hughes became Prime Minister 
and pursued his policy of assisting Britain by trying in vain to introduce 
conscription. Nevertheless, Australia kept sending troops to Egypt, Gallipoli 
and the Western Front in France. The cost was enormous: 59,342 were killed 
and 1 52, 1 7 1  were wounded and £364 million was spent between 1 9 1 4  and 
1 9 19. 12 
In the Pacific, Australians were also swift in occupying the German 
territories. They occupied the territories south of the equator-Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland, the Bismarcks and Nauru. They fought a small battle in New 
Guinea more than two weeks before a Japanese warship anchored off Jaluit 
on 30 September. The Australian government dispatched the Australian Naval 
and Military Expeditionary Force consisting of 'six companies of the Royal 
Australian Naval Reserve, a battalion of infantry at war strength ( 1 ,023 
strong) , two machine-gun sections, a signalling section and a detachment of 
the Australian Army Medical Corps' . 13 The destruction of a German wireless 
station at Bitapaka near Kokopo and the occupation of German New Guinea 
were their major tasks. The Germans in New Britain surrendered shortly after 
the wireless station was taken. On 1 2  September the Australians occupied 
Rabaul, then Madang on the 26th. The actual fighting was in the battle for 
the Bitapaka station, which incurred casualties of only '2 officers and 4 men 
killed' . 14 
Although the war was essentially a European event for both Japan and 
Australia, their occupation of the Pacific islands had important strategic 
significance-for Japan to counter the US naval force and for Australia to 
keep the Japanese from expanding further south. What is more important in 
9J.A. Camilleri, An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy (Sydney 1975) , 45. 
1°Nearly 400,000 Britons migrated to Australia between 1906 and 19 14. T. B. Millar, Australia 
in Peace and War (Canberra 199 1) ,  27-8. 
1 1Manning Clark, A Short History of Australia (New York 1987) , 205. 
121bid. ,  2 1 3.  
13MacKenzie, op .cit. , 23.  
141bid. '  73.  
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terms of colonial history in the Pacific was that the defeat of Germans 
ushered in a new era with a new colonial map. New colonial masters took over 
German interests with superior military strength: Japanese in Micronesia, 
Australians in New Guinea and Nauru, and New Zealanders in Samoa. The 
new map was finally endorsed in 1 92 1  as a result of the Paris Peace 
Conference. 
Rise ojnanshin 
The Japanese occupation of German Micronesia revived nan'yo fever which 
had been cooling towards the end of the Meiji period ( 1 868- 1 9 1 2) .  NWlShin-ron 
advocates quickly expressed their enthusiasm in literature. As early as 
December 1 9 1 4, the Nan'yo boeki chosa-kai (South Seas Trade Research 
Society) began to promote emigration to the islands: 
Among the South Seas islands, Japanese flags are raised high on the Mariana 
Islands, closest to Japan, on the Marshalls and Carolines. Is not today the time 
easiest to emigrate to those islands? . . .  Go, go, go and develop that heaven-sent 
treasure in the Pacific. 15 
Their enthusiasm is shown by the number of publications. According to the 
bibliography of the Nihon Takushoku Kyokai (Japan Colonisation Society) , 
even the number of general references to the South Seas was phenomenal: in 
only three years from 1 9 1 5  to 1 9 1 8  28 pieces were published-a remarkable 
contrast to the 30 pieces published in the previous 46 years from 1 868. 16 
Ideas about nW1Shin also changed. Shimizu argues that the outbreak of the 
war was a turning point in the evolution of nanshin-ron, from the Meiji 
nanshin-ron which emphasised peaceful economic expansion to the Taisho 
nWlShin-ron which was a blatantly expansionist ideology. 11 Taisho advocates 
expressed their territorial desire and proposed to establish a Japanese block 
in the South Seas. They began to assert Japanese rights in the South Seas, 
emphasising the geographical proximity (compared to the Western powers) 
and to a lesser extent Japan's historical linkages. The Japanese occupation 
of Micronesia made this possible. Southeast Asia and Melanesia were now 
immediate neighbours. Japanese vessels could reach Singapore, Manila and 
Rabaul much quicker from Ponape than from Yokohama or Kobe. 
Tokutomi Soho18 and Inoue Masaji were the leading advocates of the 
ideological evolution. Tokutomi played a crucial role. His interpretation that 
15Nan'yo bOeki chOsa-kai (ed.), Nwt'y6 no hOko [Treasure in the South Seas) (Tokyo 1914), 8-9. 
16N1hon takushoku kyokai (ed.), 7fiw nanp6 bun.ken mokuroku [Bibliography of the South Seas 
Literature, revised edition) (Tokyo 1944) , 1-55, 24 1-66. 
17Shirnizu Hajime, 'NwtShin-ron: its turning point in World War I' , Developing Economies, 25(4) 
(1987) , 386-402. 
180ne of the most influential thinkers in modern Japan. He was a journalist, historian and 
nationalist. At the Tokyo 1iial after the Pacific War, he was sentenced as a Class A war crtminal. 
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'nanshin-ron was an ideology to supplement nanboku heishin-ron [the theory 
of simultaneous advance to the south and the north] and hokushin-ron [the 
northward advance theory] ' reconciled the conflict between the navy-led 
nanshin-ron and the army-led hokushin-ron. 19 Until then the army's 
hokushin-ron had been overwhelming the navy's nanshin-ron. The 
hokushin-ron meant advancement to the continent in East Asia: it had been 
a pillar of Japanese imperial strategy after its victories in the Sino-Japanese 
War and the Russo-Japanese War. Tokutomi also introduced Pan-Asianism, 
calling it Japan's 'moral imperialism' , in which Asians had to be freed from 
white rule by Japanese.20 In this, he included the South Seas as a region from 
which white rule had to be removed. Thus he subtly combined nanshin with 
Pan-Asianism: his idea appealed to the nationalists who had been asserting 
Japan's stronger role to lead Asia. Tokutomi was also practical and 
influential. He virtually controlled nan'yo publications, supervising and 
publishing them through his publishing company Minyii-sha. 
Inoue was more impressive. He advocated a stronger and simpler form of 
expansionism than Tokutomi, although he did not follow Tokutomi's 
argument on the combination of nanshin and hokushin or 'moral imperialism'. 
In 1 9 1 5  Inoue published Nan'yo , one of the best known nanshin books. He 
emphasised that the South Seas were a natural sphere of Japanese territory, 
using the word 'dai nihon-shugi' (Great Japanism) .21 The same argument was 
introduced by Nitobe Inazo, a well-known liberal. In 1 9 1 5, he wrote an article 
titled 'Bunmei no nanshin' (The southward advancement of civilisation) . in 
which he introduced a unique but baseless idea that the Japanese were 
attracted to the South Seas because they had Malay ancestry.22 
What was more characteristic about nanshin-ron in this period was that 
ideological evolution was followed by commercialism. The trend is obvious 
from the titles of main-stream publications, which had hardly been seen 
before the outbreak of World War I, such as Nan'yo kane-mo ke hyaku-wa (A 
hundred stories about how to make money in the South Seas) , Nan'yo toko 
an'nai (Guide book to go to the South Seas) . Nan'yo no yashi saibai ni tsuite 
(About planting coconut trees in the South Pacific) . Nan'yo ni okeru honpo 
shOhin gaikyo (General situation of Japanese goods in the South Seas) and so 
on.23 In 1 9 1 5, Jitsugyo no Nihon (Business Japan) , one of the most widely 
191bid . .  p .399. 
201bid. 
21lnoue Masaji, Nan'y6 [The South Seas) (Tokyo 1 9 1 5) .  1 5. 
22Kamiya Tadataka, 'Nan'yo shinwa no keisei' [The formation of the South Seas myths], in Yano 
Toru (ed.) .  Tonan qjia-gaku 1 0  T6nan qjia to nihon [Southeast Asian Studies, vol . 10, Southeast Asia 
and Japan) (Tokyo 199 1) .  56. 
230mori Shinjir6, Nan'y6 kane-m6 ke hyaku-wa [A hundred stories about how to make money 
in the South Seas)(Tokyo 19 14) ;  Yoshida Harukichi, Nan'y6 toko an'nai [Guide book to go to the 
South Seas) (Tokyo 19 1 5) ;  Arima Hikokichi, Nan'y6 no yashi saibai ni tsuite [About planting 
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read business magazines, published a special issue, 'Nan'yo-go' (Issue for the 
South Seas)24-'a 1 70-page issue, twice as thick as normal issues, was filled 
with information about the South Seas' . 25 The opening article was a landmark 
for the emergence of commercial nanshin: 
In the South Seas, there are blessings from the sun in the sky and there are 
unexploited treasures on the land. The South Seas welcome us and do not deter 
us from exploiting their resources. They are nothing but the places which heaven 
has provided for us for the development of our race. 26 
Thus, early Taisho nanshin-ron began to develop perceptions that the South 
Seas had a rich and accessible economic potential. That had an important 
impact on the Japanese interest in the South Seas, because the perceptions 
were widespread not only among intellectuals but also in business circles. 
The establishment of private organisations and companies shows the rise 
of Japanese economic interest. On 30 January 1 9 1 5, the Nan'yo Kyokai 
(South Seas Society) was established. Although it was a private organisation, 
the Society's membership included leading nanshin-ron advocates, politicians 
and officials influential in making policies about the South Seas. The 
president was Earl Yoshikawa Akimasa, a prominent politician, 27 and the 
Vice-President was Uchida Kakichi, the Governor of Taiwan. Inoue was also 
a foundation member. The Society had two main objectives-promotion of 
trade and popularisation of the South Seas. The Society exhibited Japanese 
goods in Southeast Asia, promoted language study, sent commercial trainees 
to the area and held public lectures. It also published countless writings 
about the South Seas. One of the best known of its publications was the 
journal Nan'yo Kyo kai KaihO (The Report of the South Seas Society) (later 
changed to Nan'yo kyo kai zasshi (The Journal of the South Seas Society) in 
1 92 1  and Nan'yo (The South Seas) in 1 937) , which was widely read and 
became a major source of information. 
Businessmen hurried to take advantage of the opportunities. From 1 9 1 4  
to 1 9 1 8, 1 4  new companies were established, ushering in a new company 
rush that continued until the outbreak of the Pacific War.28 Their eyes were 
fixed on the rich natural resources in Southeast Asia, as shown in their 
coconut trees in the South Pacific] (Tokyo 19 15):  Nan'yo bOeki shinko kai, Nan'yo ni okeru. honpo 
sh6 hin gaiky6 [General situation of Japanese goods in the South Seas] (Tokyo 19 1 7) .  
24Jitsugyo no nihon-sha, No.7 ( 1 9 1 5) .  
25yano Toru, Nihon no nan'yo shi kan [Japanese historical view o f  the South Seas] (Tokyo 
1979) , 1 00. 
26In ibid . ,  207. 
27He took office as the Governor of Tokyo in 1 884, then took various ministerial positions in 
the Japanese government such as Minister for Education, Home Affairs, Law, and 
Communications. 
28Nan'yo dantai rengo kai [The Federation of South Seas Organisations] (ed.) . Dai nan'yo 
nenkan [the Year book of the South Seas] (Tokyo 1942) , 797-828. 
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investment. They mostly invested in plantations-eight companies were 
involved in rubber (reflecting the increased demand for rubber in Europe) , 
and three each in hemp, jute and copra. The other companies engaged in 
trading. A giant commercial firm, Mitsubishi, was also established and 
expanded its interests into Southeast Asia. 
The government was active in promoting economic activities. It financed 
the Kaigai Kogyo Kaisha (Overseas Industrial Company) that amalgamated 
several other emigration companies in 1 9 1 7. The company, cooperating with 
the Taiwan Ginko (Bank of Taiwan) , became a major financial institution for 
promoting emigration, industry, investment and education. 29 Although later 
the company's major interest turned to emigration to Brazil, it first 
established an extensive network in the South Seas. Agents were posted to 
Thursday Island, Darwin, Broome, Manila, Davao and Singapore. The 
company was equivalent to the Toyo Takushoku Kaisha (Oriental Development 
Company) which was formed in 1 908 with government funds in order to 
facilitate the colonisation of Korea and later Manchuria. As Irie argues, the 
establishment of the Kaigai Kogyo was the first step towards the government's 
direct involvement in the South Seas.30 
Japanese perceptions of Papua and New Guinea 
The Japanese officials did not show much interest in Papua or New Guinea, 
despite their proximity to Micronesia, because their main attention was 
directed to Micronesia and Southeast Asia. The number of publications clearly 
demonstrates this indifference. Only three books dealt with Papua and New 
Guinea, out of tens of new South Seas titles published from 1 9 1 4  to 1 9 1 8 .  
Similarly, out of the 14 companies established in the war period, 1 3  were in 
Southeast Asia and one in Micronesia. 3 1 The government did not take much 
interest, either, except the officials in the Foreign Ministry who had to 
respond to Komine's financial petition. 
Although there was no specific reference to Papua and New Guinea, the 
Nan'yo Boeki Chosa-kai (South Seas Trade Research Society) gave general 
information (geography, climate, people, culture, industry, economy and 
Japanese relations) about Micronesia, South east Asia, New Caledonia and 
New Guinea. According to the Society, the islanders in the former German 
territories had good feelings towards the Japanese. 
29The Bank of Taiwan was a semiofficial bank established in 1 899. Initially it served as a 
central bank in Taiwan (a Japanese colony) to assist resource exploitation and economic 
development. After World War I. it began to promote the economic development of Micronesia and 
the expansion of trade between Taiwan and South China and South Seas islands. 
3°Irie Toraji, HQjin kaigai hatten shi [History of Japanese overseas development] ,  Vol.2  (Tokyo 
1938) , 539. 
31Nan'y6 dantai rengo kai, op.cit. 
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The islanders had been receiving cruel treatment under the oppressive German 
colonial policies and [had been exploited] by foreign traders who had enjoyed 
their privileges as colonisers. As a result, the islanders despise them and seem 
to be welcoming the Japanese. Our navy's occupation was greeted by extremely 
overjoyed islanders. 32 
However, in the view of the Society, the islands had a low economic profile: 
the islanders had no industry except copra production and there were few 
benefits in trading. 33 
Likewise the Japanese navy did not show much interest in Papua and New 
Guinea; its main attention was directed to Southeast Asia and Micronesia. 
Captain Hosaka Hikotaro wrote Nan'yo tsii ran (The survey of the South Seas) 
in 1 9 1 6; it was a huge volume (926 pages) that gave the most detailed 
information on the South Seas. But Hosaka wrote mostly about Dutch and 
British colonies in Southeast Asia, and devoted only one page to Papua and 
two pages to German New Guinea.34 He briefly mentioned Komine and his 
business and said that Rabaul would be a promising place for Japan's 
economic development, although he pointed out that the future of New 
Guinea was uncertain and would depend on the peace treaty.35 
The lack of interest was greatly regretted by Japanese residents in New 
Guinea. Fujikawa Masajiro, 36 a manager of Komine's Nan'yo Kogyo Kaisha, 
wrote: 
Recently studying the countries and people in the South Seas has become very 
popular. However, the region that the people call Nan'y6 is usually Java, Sumatra, 
Celebes and Borneo. Some people even believe only the area around Singapore is 
Nan'yo, while some think that Nan'yo includes a wider region than those, but they 
widen it in the direction of Burma, Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines. Few 
people know about New Guinea, which lies massively to the north of Australia, 
and the thousands of small islands surrounding New Guinea.37 
Partly due to lack of information, the stereotyped perception of New Guineans 
remained unchanged. Shibata Tsune'e, an anthropologist at Tokyo University, 
wrote in the introduction to Fujikawa's book: 
German New Guinea, the northeast area of New Guinea, maintained its 
characteristics. The level of civilisation is extremely low. The natives are mostly at 
32Nan'yo Boeki Chosa-kai (ed. ) .  op.cit. , 12- 13.  
33Ibid. ,  14.  
34Hosaka made a tour to some of the South Seas islands in 1 9 1 3; Hosaka Hikotaro, Nan'y6 
tsiiran [The survey of the South Seas) (Tokyo 19 16) .  
35Hosaka, op.cit . ,  906. 
3Tue date of Fujikawa's arrival at Rabaul was not clear. According to his book, it was either 
190 1  or 1903. 
37Fujikawa Masajiro and Maruba Tamotsu, Nyu ginia papua zoku sakuhin shil [Collections of 
works of New Guineans and Papuans) (Tokyo 1 9 1 4) .  1 .  
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the stage of the Stone Agt=:, using stone implements. Cannibalism is still 
prevalent. 38 
Japanese in Papua 
Australian perceptions of Japanese 
The impact of World War I was scarcely felt in Papua. Australian indifference 
to the small number of Japanese in Papua remained unchanged. The Papua 
Annual Report from 1 9 14 to 1 9 1 8  had no comments on the Japanese, except 
for giving their total population figures. As Table 3- 1 shows, the Japanese 
population stayed static. All still lived in the Milne Bay area. Similarly the 
number of other non-indigenous coloured population showed little change, 
indicating successful migration restriction. The number of the whites 
decreased, indicating that the stagnant economy was having an effect. 
TABLE 3- 1 .  Non-indigenous populations in Papua, 1 9 1 4- 1 9 1 8  
year Jal].anese European Other coloured• 
Eastern South-Eastern total 
1 9 14 7 2 9 1 , 1 86 1 1 7 
1 9 1 5  7 2 9 1 ,037 1 19 
1 9 16 6 2 8 992 98 
1 9 1 7  6 2 8 70 1 1 09 
19 18 6 2 8 636 78 
•non-indigenous 
Source: (for 19 14) Papua Annual Report 1 9 1 3-1 4, 1 1 0- 1 1 ; (for 1 9 1 5) Papua Annual Report 
1914- 15, 99, 1 0 1 ;  (for 1916) Papua Annual Report 1915- 16, 10- 1 1 ; (for 1 9 1 7) Papua Annual Report 
1 9 1 6-1 7, 12- 13;  (for 1 9 1 8) Papua Annual Report 1 91 7- 1 8, 1 7- 1 8.  
There was a surprise visit of a team from the Japanese mining company, 
Fujita Gumi (Fujita Company) , to Port Moresby in 1 9 1 6  to investigate copper 
mining on the Astrolabe Field near Port Moresby.39 The five-man team arrived 
at Port Moresby without prior notice but managed to interview an Australian 
official, who immediately sent a report to Melbourne. According to his report, 
the Japanese seemed to have detailed information about the area and made 
concrete proposals to start operating a mine but in vain.40 However, the event 
indicates that there were some speculative Japanese industrialists who cast 
381bid. ,  introduction (no page number). 
39Fujita Gumi was then one of the giant mining companies, competing with Mitsui, Mitsubishi 
and Sumitomo. It operated the Kosaka copper mine in Akita-one of the largest copper mines then 
in Japan. 
40Government House, Port Moresby [the name of the sender unknown] to the Minister of State 
for External Affairs, Melbourne, 6 Mar. 19 16,  A l / I  16/26203. 
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their eyes on mineral resources in Papua, despite the fact that most 
industrialists showed stronger interest in Southeast Asia. 
Japanese settlers 
There are no written records of the Japanese from 1 9 14 to 19 18.  Information 
is available from oral evidence only.41 A major characteristic of the oral 
sources is the lack of recollections related to the war. The Japanese carried 
on their business in trading, shell fishing, and copra planting as before. They 
raised their families and kept on entrenching their presence in the local 
communities. 
Japanese in New Guinea 
Impact of Australian military operations 
The outbreak of war was an unexpected tribulation for the Japanese who had 
just begun to prosper under German rule. But their response showed their 
agility. The report of Samejima San'nosuke, a secretary of Komine's 
company,42 is the only Japanese detailed written account of the impact of 
World War I on the Japanese. It is titled 'Senji zaiju j6ky6 hokoku sho' (Report 
on the local situation during the war) , 43 and shows how the Japanese at 
Rabaul attempted to reconcile their relations with both Germans and 
Australians. 
On 8 August, upon the German declaration of war, the Germans at Rabaul 
prepared hastily. On the same day, the Germans detained the British and 
French, and restricted the movement of Japanese residents. All townsfolk 
raised their own flags to show their nationality, not knowing which side was 
to invade Rabaul. At dawn on 1 1  August, three Australian destroyers, the 
Yarra, W arrego and Parramatta, appeared in Simpson Harbour. They panicked 
the German residents who were expecting the German squadron to rescue 
them. 
41The oral evidence provides information for only six Japanese-Koto, Mabe, Murakami, 
Matoba, Taichiro Tanaka and Shigematsu Tanaka, although the statistics in Papua Annual Report 
show the presence of eight to nine Japanese in this period. Possibly other Japanese were traders 
operating either from Thursday Island or Rabaul who regularly visited Papua and stayed 
temporarily. 
42According to the report, Komine's company was called 'Komine Shokai' [Komine Company) , 
although German and Australian records say its name was 'Nan'yo Kogyo Kaisha' [South Seas 
Industry Company).  'Nan'yo Kogyo Kaisha' , which was formed in 19 12 ,  was a new name for 
'Komine Shokai' .  It seems that Komine was using the name 'Komine Shokai' until 1 9 1 5  in 
Japanese official documents. 
�e report is owned by Komine's descendant. Komine Shigenori in Nagasaki. The date of the 
writing of the report is unknown, but judging from the content, it seems to have been written and 
submitted in mid- 19 1 5. To whom it was submitted is not recorded, but most likely it was the 
Japanese Consul-General in Sydney, as official correspondence from German New Guinea was 
normally sent to Sydney, then to the Foreign Ministry at Tokyo. 
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At this stage Ja pan had not yet declared war against Germany. Komine co­
operated with the Germans who assured the Japanese residents of their 
safety. But the anarchy in Rabaul was also felt among the European 
residents; a German postal official noted on 1 0  August that 'there were fears 
that the Chinese might be dangerous because of threatened food shortages 
and because of unemployment among them' . 44 Then, according to Samejima, 
in order to cope with the dangerous situation, the acting-administrator, 
Eduard Haber, suggested that Komine form an armed Japanese militia. 
On 1 6  August Komine sent a message, as a representative of the Japanese 
residents, expressing sympathy for the administrator [sic] in this difficult 
situation. The administrator sent his official to reply to Komine's message with 
deep gratitude, and requested, 'Our situation depends on the war in Europe and 
our home government did not acknowledge the need to send troops to its colonies. 
We are resigned to surrender our territories to the enemy without resisting if we 
are attacked. Therefore we are not worried. However, I am most concerned about 
two thousand Chinese most of whom became unemployed because of this war. 
They do not have enough food due to the stopping of sea transport and very likely 
they will become vagrants and steal things and may rebel. That will be a most 
grievous event but there are not many Germans left in Rabaul to prevent it from 
happening. But if you lead your employees [to form a militia] , such an event can 
be prevented. The administration will supply weapons immediately if you need 
any. My worry will end if you cooperate. '  
We can only speculate whether Haber really made such a request, as  no 
German or Australian records mention it. 
The following part of Samejima's  report suggests that Komine saw the 
outbreak of the war as an excellent opportunity to 'wipe out' Chinese 
influence, since he regarded the Chinese as rivals of Japanese businessmen 
in the South Seas. However, the plan was wrecked when the Japanese 
government, using the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, declared war against 
Germany on 23 August. Hearing the news, Komine quickly notified Haber of 
his withdrawal of the proposal to form a militia. Unexpectedly, however, the 
Germans did not become hostile towards the Japanese. According to 
Samejima, 
Komine quickly called upon the administrator [sic] and said, 'Although I promised 
[to form a militia] according to your request, I would like to inform you of the 
cancellation of my promise because today Japan declared war against Germany 
and I ,  being a Japanese subject, cannot serve an enemy country. '  The 
administrator accepted Komine's cancellation and said, 'It is impossible to change 
our home country's foreign policies, but nations and individuals are different. Even 
if our nations are fighting each other, you can carry on your business as before. 
Our administration provides you with as much protection as possible. 45 
44Neville Threlfall, · From Mangroves to Frangipani: the story of Ra.haul and East New Britain' , 
MS, Division of Pacific and Asian History, Australian National University (Canberra 1988) ,  1 39.  
45Samejima, op.cit . ,  1 .  
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Haber's words proved true. The administration did not keep Komine in 
custody (although the British were imprisoned) and provided food for the 
Japanese as promised. 
Probably the Japanese declaration of war provided a dilemma for the 
Japanese in New Guinea. They would be disloyal if they maintained good 
relations with Germans, although the Germans continued to protect them. 
After all the Japanese decided to co-operate with the Australians probably for 
two reasons. The first is natural: they chose to be loyal to their home 
government. But the second one is compelling. They needed to rely on the 
Australian force for the supply of food, as they were suffering from extremely 
serious shortages and had nobody but Australians to rely on. The regular 
shipping service of the Norddeutscher Lloyd Company ceased at the outbreak 
of war; local produce was also short due to severe drought. The situation was 
so serious that Komine had to cut down rations for his employees to the 
extent that non-labourers had only one meal a day.46 Samejima noted that the 
food situation worsened around the time when the Australian expeditionary 
force arrived and occupied Rabaul on 1 2  September. 
Therefore, in order to survive, Komine had to start establishing friendly 
relations with the Australians. In doing so, he was lucky. The pilot of the 
Australian fleet happened to be Komine's acquaintance who had worked in 
Rabaul about five years earlier, and on 13 September he came to Komine's 
shipyard without knowing whose it was to ask it to install wireless facilities 
for the Australian force. 47 Komine accepted the job and started working for the 
Australians on 14 September. 48 
Samejima, on behalf of Komine, then asked the captain of the Australian 
warship, which was returning to Sydney, to deliver an urgent message about 
the serious food shortage to the Japanese Consul-General at Sydney.49 
Considering the urgency of the problem, one would have expected Komine, as 
a leader of the Japanese community, to make the request, but he did not. 
This may reflect his long-established good relations with the Germans. Also 
the undisciplined behaviour of the Australian landing force may have made 
him hesitate to rely on them. Samejima continued: 
The Australian soldiers had no military discipline. They frequently broke into the 
houses not only of the Germans but also of Chinese and natives and stole money 
and valuables. They came to Komine's shipyard and demanded drinks, and some 
soldiers even did so by threatening with their bayonets. As a result, the Australian 
commander put guards at our shipyard for about two months. 50 
46Ibid. 
47Ibid. 
48Lieut-Commander Jackson, 2 Jan. 19 1 5, AA, MP472 3/ 15/575. 
49Samejima, op.cit. , 2 .  
50Ibid. 
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Samejima's report is correct. The commander of the Australian force, William 
Holmes, also wrote to the Minister of Defence, Melbourne: 'I regret to have to 
report there has been a good deal of crime amongst the Troops since they 
settled down to routine Garrison duty here ' . 51 
Nevertheless from late September to early October Komine acted swiftly for 
the Australians. He undertook to salvage the German steamer Kolonial 
Gesellschaft, which was stranded on the reefs at Cape Lambert. The Germans 
had set fire to the boat, but the Australians wanted to use it for military 
purposes and asked Komine to salvage it. On 4 October Komine headed for 
the wreck in his schooner Namanula with four Japanese and 50 natives.52 
When he was about to salvage it, he took up a more important 
mission-piloting the Australian expedition force to capture the German 
steamer Komet.53 Although Lieutenant-Colonel J. Paton, the commander, only 
wrote that Komine 'volunteered' his services,54 Samejima explains that there 
was a profound reason for that. 
The harbour-master Jackson called upon Komine and asked him about where the 
Komet could be hiding. He also mentioned that recently the Komet captured a 
Japanese sailing boat in the East Caroline Islands and stole goods . Having heard 
this, Komine was very angry . . .  and said that Lulu was the only possible port that 
the Komet could enter on the north coast of New Britain. He also said that the 
Australians would be able to capture the Komet without using many soldiers 
because of the topography where it was hiding. Then he said he would volunteer 
to assist the expedition. And he jumped on the Nusa. 55 
Samejima's accounts may not be reliable . There is no official report on the 
Komets attack on a Japanese ship in either Japanese or Australian sources, 
although it was possible because the Komet sailed between Angaur in the 
Palau Group and New Britain from 1 4  August to early October.56 Again, it is 
most unlikely that Jackson knew of any attack, because he did not know the 
movements of the Komet until he got information that it was hiding on the 
north coast of New Britain on 4 October. 57 
Samejima's explanation suggests two possible scenarios. Either Jackson 
lied to Komine because he needed his knowledge of local waters and people; 
or Samejima fabricated the story. The Japanese at Rabaul needed a pretext 
to assist the Australians, because overt assistance would anger the Germans 
who had protected them even after the outbreak of war. The Japanese had to 
51Colonel Administrator William Holmes to the Minister of Defence at Melbourne, 1 3  Nov. 
19 14,  AA, AWM33 1 1 . 
52Samejima. op.cit. 
53Although the Komet was not a battleship, the Australians feared that its wireless facilities 
could be used to coordinate the operation of the German Pacific fleet. 
54Lieutenant-Colonel Paton's correspondence. 12 Oct. 19 14,  in MacKenzie, op.cit. , 1 33. 
55Samejima, op.cit. , 2 ;  the Nusa was an Australian boat with the expedition. 
56MacKenzie, op.cit. , 127-8. 
571bid .. 129 .  
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maintain good relations with the Germans in order to continue their 
businesses, because the Germans still controlled most commerce in New 
Guinea: the Australian forces were inexperienced in colonial administration 
and left most economic operations in their hands. 
The following is Samejima's account of the capture of the Komet. 
The South Seas rarely get misty, but the mist was so thick that the Komet 
neglected to set a watch and none of their crew noticed the Nusa's approach. The 
Nusa's crew waited until daybreak, preparing to launch a small boat in case that 
they found the enemy boat. The harbour-master persistently cautioned Komine to 
capture the Komet [not to destroy] , and Komine repeated confidently, 'All right, sir.' 
On 9 October, the sky in the east became bright. At half past four, the Nusa 
entered the bay. When she passed the projecting point, the hiding Komet was 
sighted. The Komet, which used to have a white body, was now painted grey. 
Quickly the Nusa's crew lowered a boat, and Komine led three British [sic: they 
should be Australian] sailors and approached the Komet, raising a white flag in 
case of being attacked. The boat reached the stem and Komine and others climbed 
onto the deck. A Chinese boy noticed them and rushed to alert the German 
commander. Although the commander immediately came out on the deck, still 
wearing pyjamas, it was too late. The British sailors were already standing by the 
Komet's cannon. The German crew and native fighters were too frightened to 
resist. The commander looked resigned, although reluctant. Komine told him, 'We 
have been good friends for a long time, but my action today is not a personal 
action. I acted so because Japan and Britain are at war against Germany. Please 
surrender immediately. '  Komine led the commander into his bedroom and locked 
the room from the outside and placed a guard. Then he ordered the German crew 
to prepare for sailing and commanded the ship on its way to Rabaul. The Komet 
arrived in Simpson Harbour on the morning on 1 1  October. The [Australian] 
governor and other people were rejoiced to hear of the unexpected feat and 
admired Komine's bravery. Komine went home, but the governor sent a car to pick 
him up to hear his full report. I accompanied him, carrying souvenirs-captured 
documents from the Komet, her flag and a painting of the German emperor. The 
British governor and his staff officers celebrated the capture of the Komet, 
welcoming Komine as the main guest. They held a big banquet and cheered 
Britain and Japan. Komine cheered banzai three times. On the same day, the 
Japanese squadron radioed to the administration to inquire after the safety of 
Komine and other Japanese. I hurried to the administration headquarters and 
replied by radio, saying, 'We and our properties are all safe but we are suffering 
from a shortage of food. We request supplies of rice and soya sauce urgently. '  On 
the following day, the governor granted the title of captain to Komine with a letter 
of appreciation for his assistance and declared that Komine was no longer required 
to take off his hat to salute except for saluting the govemor.58 
Jackson's report to Holmes on the capture of the Komet also verifies Komine's 
bravery and Australian appreciation. 
58Samejima, op.cit . ,  2 .  
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I would point out the following additional points for your consideration:-
( I) Mr. Komine (Japanese) of Rabaul was on board Komet [sic; it should be 
Nusa] , and thanks to his help and knowledge of natives Kometwas exactly located. 
Mr. Komine showed great enterprise and an absolute indifference to the 
probability of Nusa receiving Komefs fire; he also showed his great anxiety to help 
us by abandoning his occupation of salving a wreck off the Talele Islands in order 
to accompany the expedition. 59 
The Australian records show the invitation to Komine to the official dinner. 60 
However, there are no records to confirm Samejima's accounts of Komine's 
persuasion of the German commander, the granting of the title of captain and 
his privilege not to have to take off his hat-except for several letters that 
referred to 'Captain' Komine. 61 Probably Komine's persuasion was Samejima's 
exaggeration and the granting of the title of captain and the privilege was 
unofficial. 
Komine also assisted the Australians by providing them with the 
information that 'a German trader (Heninrich Wahlen) in Rabaul was 
communicating to Germans in America information regarding the movements 
of the Australian naval and military forces in and around Rabaul, by means 
of documents concealed in bales of merchandise shipped by him to America' . 62 
Due to this service, Komine was granted Wahlen's fishing rights in the 
western Islands. 
The capture of the Komet provided Komine with an excellent opportunity 
to initiate friendly relations with the Australians.  And his assistance 
continued. He piloted the expedition to the Admiralty and Hermit Islands from 
1 9  to 30 November.63 But this participation was also motivated by his 
self-interest. Komine was anxious about his wife and employees and 
plantations in the Admiralty Islands, as communications with the islands had 
been cut since the outbreak of war. The expedition satisfied Komine's 
self-interest. The first destination was Rambutju Island (2 1 November) where 
Komine owned a plantation. On the following day, having made the Germans 
capitulate at Lorengau, the force reached Pityilu Island where Komine had 
another plantation. The following morning Captain Travers breakfasted with 
Mrs Komine. And just before returning to Rabaul, the expedition force 
59Jackson, 12 Oct. 19 14, in MacKenzie, op.cit . .  135. 
604 Dec. 19 14, Ex-German New Guinea. Diary of events in connection with the Australian 
Naval and Military Expedition under the command of Colonel W. Holmes DSO, VD . 10 Aug. 
19 14-22 Feb. 19 15, AA, AWM33 10/ 1 / 1 .  
611bid. ;  Report by an intelligence officer, Captain J .  Travers, 3 Dec. 19 14, AA, AWM33 1 0/4. 
62Acting Prime Minister of the Commonwealth to Japanese consul-general, 13 July 192 1 ,  
A457I 1 690/3. 
63 19 to 30 Nov. , Ex-German New Guinea. Diary of events in connection with the Australian 
Naval and Military Expedition under the command of Colonel W. Holmes DSO, VD . 1 0  Aug. 
19 14-22 Feb. 19 15, AA, AWM33 10/ 1/  1 .  
1 Komine lsokichi (left) and Admiral Kamimura Hikonoj6 (right) in 1 9 1 3  (photograph 
provided by Komine Shigenori) 
2 Japanese naval officers and New Guineans (date unknown) (photograph provided 
by Nagahama Tome) 
3 Imaizumi Masao and New 
Guineans around 1 920 
(photograph provided by 
Imaizumi Kotaro) 
I 
4 Japanese shipwrights and New Guinean labourers in Rabaul in the 1 930s 
(photograph provided by Izumi Mitsuru) 
5 The schooner Ebisu Maru, owned by Kikuchi Ichisuke in the 1 930s (photograph 
propvided by Izumi Mitsuru) 
}.; 
• 
j�, _ 
6 Blocks lived in by Japanese in Malay Town, Rabaul, in the 1930s (photograph provided by Nagahama Tome) 
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salvaged Komine's auxiliary schooner wrecked on Korat Reef three months 
previously. 64 
Komine was successful in establishing good relations with the Australians. 
Consequently, the shortage of food was temporarily alleviated by the help of 
Burns, Philp. Soon the Japanese residents rejoiced to see the arrival of the 
Japanese squadron at Rabaul on 28 December. 65 Komine and Samejima 
explained the shortage of food to the Japanese captains and received ample 
rice and soya sauce. Samejima's account then concludes with a business 
report for the 1 9 14 financial year and notes that the outbreak of war did not 
greatly affect business that year, as most orders for ship building had been 
contracted in the previous year. New contracts were made with the 
Australians-the repair of the Madang, Sarrwa and Kolonial Gesellschaft. 66 
Australian attitudes 
Japan's participation in the war as an ally of Britain encouraged the 
Australians to be friendly. The Australians showed genuine hospitality when 
two cruisers (Chikuma and YahagO and two destroyers (Yamakaze and 
Umikaze) visited Rabaul on 28 December 1 9 14.  The Administrator, Brigadier 
William Holmes, entertained the Japanese captains at dinner at Government 
House and the Japanese reciprocated.67 On 5 April 1 9 1 5, the cruiser Nisshin 
arrived at Rabaul and S. A. Pethebridge (second administrator) took the 
Japanese captain Kanahara sightseeing around Rabaul and held an official 
dinner.68 Mutual respect seems to have developed, according to the report of 
the Australian district officer at Madang, when the Nisshin visited on 1 1  
April.69 Furthermore, when an official dinner was held to celebrate the King's 
Birthday on 3 June, the Japanese captain and officers of the warship 
Manshu, which arrived on the same day, were invited .70 Similarly, when the 
Japanese Training Squadron visited Rabaul in the end of July 1 9 1 5, the 
acting administrator 'made their stay here [at Rabaul] as enjoyable as possible 
under the circumstances' . 7 1  The administrator's hospitality was greatly 
appreciated: the Japanese Rear Admiral commented that 'I cannot be too 
much grateful for your hospitality and warmth you have extended to the 
officers and men under my command and I am sure they will carry about the 
64Ibid. 
65Samejima, op.cit. 
66Ibid. 
67Holmes to the Minister of State for Defence, 29 Dec. 19 14, AA, AWM33 1 0/4. 
68Rabaul, Administrator, Memorandum for the Minister of state for defence, 8 Apr. 19 15,  AA, 
AWM33 12/4. 
�baul, Administrator, Memorandum for the Minister of state for defence, 1 May 19 15,  AA. 
AWM33 12/5. 
70Memorandum for the Minister of State for Defence, 5 June 1 9 1 5, AA, AWM33 12/6. 
7 1Memorandum for the Hon. the Minister of State for Defence, Melbourne, 2 Aug. 19 15,  AA, 
AWM33 12/8.  
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most delightful remembrance of their visit to this fair territory' . 72 Indeed, the 
Training squadron had received a warm welcome also in Australia before 
coming to New Guinea. The Japanese Consul-General Shimizu Seizaburo at 
Sydney reported it to the Foreign Ministry at Tokyo, 73 and later the Foreign 
Minister Okuma Shigenobu sent an official letter of appreciation to the British 
Ambassador at Tokyo. 74 
Australian friendliness was also directed to the Japanese residents. 
Pethebridge reinforced the European status of the Japanese by introducing 
regulations for the burial of Europeans and Japanese in the European 
cemetery at Rabaul. 75 This shows a clear contrast to the Australian attitudes 
towards the Chinese, who were to be buried in an area in the Botanic 
Gardens separate from the European and Japanese cemetery. 76 
Japanese relations �th the Australian administration continued to 
develop, and the way they developed resembles that of their relations with the 
German administration. Just as Komine's relations with the Germans had 
been established by the administration's need of Komine's vessel for 
administrative purposes, his relations with th� Australians developed due to 
their lack of vessels to patrol the out-stations. First, the Australian force 
assigned Komine to repair the former German steamer Nusa and hired 
Komine's launch Banzai for general naval purposes. 77 Komine exploited the 
situation to improve his business which had been badly affected by the war. 
Upon Komine's request, Holmes urged Melbourne to pay for the repair work. 78 
The Australians also gave exceptional protection for Komine's trading. Komine 
was allowed to export a small shipment of copra and marine produce directly 
to Japan in Japanese ships, although after the Australian occupation all 
products from New Guinea were to be sent to Sydney by Burns, Philp . 79 
Despite this protection, however, by the end of 1 9 1 5  Komine's business 
suffered acutely from the war, and in November he had to assign 'all right, 
title, estate, interest, claim and demand in his Leasehold Lands in the 
Admiralty Group (Manus) to the New Guinea Company by way of security for 
72Rear Admiral Chisaka's letter quoted in ibid. 
73Shimizu to Kato, 16 July 19 15,  JDR, 5. 1 .3 .4 .  
740kuma to the British Ambassador, 1 Sept. 19 1 5, in ibid. 
75Government Gazette, British Administration-(late) German New Guinea, 15 Dec. 19 16,  
Vol .III, No. 12  (Rabaul) , 1 06. 
76lbid. However, later the administration also gave European status to the Chinese and 
repealed the discriminatory regulation on the locations of the burial in 1 9 1 8. 
77Jackson, 2 Jan. 19 1 5, AA, MP472 3/ 1 5/575. 
78Holmes to the Minister of State for Defence, 2 Jan. 1 9 1 5, ibid. 
�emorandum for the Ministry of State for Defence by Pethebridge, 14 Dec. 1 9 1 5, AA, A WM33 
1 2/ 1 1 :  List of Japanese vessels and cargoes for and out of Rabaul, date unknown, AA, 
CP66 1 / 1 5/ l  BOX 1 .  
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debt' . 8° Komine asked the Australians for help, and the Administrator 
advanced money to Komine to protect him against foreclosure by his 
mortgagee, the Neu Guinea Compagnie. 81 At the same time, Komine petitioned 
the Japanese Consul-General in Sydney for financial support from the 
Japanese govemment.82 His letter was a long one extending over nine pages, 
in which the first half explained how he came to New Guinea and established 
good relations with the German administration, and the latter part related 
how the war affected his relations with the Germans and his business 
operations. He wrote that he had lost all German trust after he assisted the 
Australians to capture the Komet, and that the Germans now hated him so 
much that he could no longer conduct business with the New Guinea 
Company and Hernsheim & Co. 83 Surprisingly Komine's petition was 
accompanied by two letters from Pethebridge. The first shows that the 
Australian administration attempted to save Komine's business operations 
from being taken over by the Germans. 84 His second letter explains why the 
administration was so generous: 'since the War started and during British 
Occupation of the Colony, Komini [sic] has on all occasions, given us valuable 
assistance in many ways, and I regard his presence in the Colony as an 
important factor during the future development' .  85 
Having received these letters, Consul-General Shimizu wrote to the Foreign 
Ministry at Tokyo. Shimizu sympathised with Komine and urged the 
government to assist him, introducing him as 'a rare entrepreneur in the 
South Sea Islands' . 86 However, the Foreign Ministry declined to assist because 
of the delicate international situation, pointing out that the disposal of former 
German territories was still uncertain. 87 The reply was relayed to Komine, who 
then wrote a second petition in which he expressed his deep dismay and 
emphasised the Australian administrators' friendly attitude. 88 Shimizu also 
wrote to Tokyo again but had no success.89 
Help came through Komine's relatives. They managed to persuade 
Minamikata Tsunekusu, a millionaire in Wakayama prefecture and the 
80Govemment Gazette, British Administration-(late) Gennan New Guinea, 15 Nov. 19 1 5, Vol.11, 
No. 1 1  (Rabaul) . 8. 
81Prime Minister's Department, Papers prepared in the Pacific branch in connection with the first 
assembly of the League of Nations, Geneva, November 1 920, No.VII, Australian interests in islands 
north of equator and Japanese interests in Gennan New Guinea.-A review of policy from 
September, 1 9 1 4, to July 1 920, 12 ,  AA, A5954- 1203/2. 
82Komine to Shimizu, 19 May 19 16,  JDR. 3.4.6.3.  
83Both companies dominated commerce in German New Guinea. Komine had been doing 
business with both. 
84Pethebridge to Shimizu, 22 May 19 16,  ibid. 
85Pethebridge to Shimizu, date unknown but marked No. 2 in Japanese, ibid. 
86Shimizu to Ishii, 1 0  June 1916 ,  ibid. 
87The Foreign Ministry, date unknown, ibid. 
88Komine to Shimizu, 24 Oct. 19 16,  ibid. 
89Shimizu to Terauchi, 9 Nov. 19 16,  ibid. 
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president of the Nanyo Sangyo Kabushiki Kaisha (South Seas Industrial 
Company) , to purchase and re-structure Komine's company. Minamikata 
agreed to buy the company for 800,000 yen, retaining Komine as a managing 
director. The official re-structuring was endorsed by the acting administrator 
Seaforth MacKenzie on condition that: the company pay all its debt to the 
administration, pay outstanding wages immediately to all employees, and 
guarantee the payment of the former company's promissory notes to the 
administration and appoint a manager (or representative) proficient in English 
and British commercial regulations.90 MacKenzie's endorsement was based on 
his consideration of the 'international policy' that Ja pan was the ally of the 
British and the risk that 'Mr. Komine should be in danger of being absorbed 
by a German company' . 91 On 10 October 1 9 1  7 the Company officially took 
over all Komine's business interests and registered his company as a branch 
at Rabaul . 
There is another example of international politics working favourably for 
Komine, 92 when Komine and his employees were suspected of 'wrongly 
removing certain articles from German steamer MO RWE' .  93 No evidence was 
found and no action was taken against Komine because Pethebridge thought 
that the conviction would cause a diplomatic problem and 'considered that 
unless conviction absolutely certain unwise at that time proceed further' . 94 
Australian government attitudes 
From 1 9 1 7, in contrast to the administration's friendly attitude towards the 
Japanese, Australian officials in Melbourne, then the Australian capital, 
began to take restrictive measures. Australian government policy reflected 
international politics over the disposal of German territories in the South 
Pacific. Australia's main concern was to secure New Guinea as its spoils, just 
as Tokyo was determined to take over Micronesia. 
Tokyo acted first. The Japanese government restricted the entry and 
trading of non-Japanese in Micronesia. In retaliation the Australian 
government restricted Japanese migration and trading in New Guinea. On 3 1  
March 1 9 1 7  the Australian Defence Minister, George Pearce, informed the 
Japanese Consul-General at Sydney that 'the number of Japanese employees 
in New Guinea should not at any time exceed the number at the 
commencement of the military occupation' . 95 In the same year, the Australian 
90Report by Arata Gunkichi, Mar. 192 1 ,  Komine shokai baishii shimatsu [Settlement of the 
purchase of the Komine Company] , JDR, 3.5. 12 . 12 .  
91MacKenzie to the Minister for State of  Defence, 8 Mar. 1 9 1 8, AA, AWM33 55/2. 
92Pethebrtdge to Defence, Melbourne, 24 July 1 9 1 7 ;  Trumble to the administrator, 20 July 
1 9 1 7 ,  AA, AWM33 45/2. 
93Pethebrtdge to Defence, 25 July 1 9 1 7, ibid. 
94lbid. 
95Prime Minister's Department, op.cit. , p. 1 1 ; The military administration in New Guinea was 
placed under the Defence Minister at Melbourne. 
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government restricted direct copra trade between Rabaul and Japan. The 
restriction was maintained despite repeated protests by the Japanese 
Consul-General Shimizu. 96 Komine also attempted to open trade 
unsuccessfully. He offered to purchase the government ship Srunoa when it 
was for sale, provided that trade with Japan was permitted, but it was 
refused.97 
Shimizu pointed out in his letter to the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo that one 
of the reasons for the trade restriction was the Australian fear that the 
Australians would lose their monopoly of the copra trade, because the 
Germans, who hated the Australians, would sell all copra to Komine if the 
trade was permitted.98 Similar fear was shown in Pearce's letter to the Prime 
Minister. He feared the Japanese monopoly because Australians traders had 
fewer vessels than their Japanese counterparts.99 
Melboume's policies reflected public feeling in Australia. Edmund Piesse, 
the Director of Military Intelligence ( 1 9 1 6- 1 9 1 9) ,  and the Director of the 
Pacific Branch of the Prime Minister's Department ( 1 9 1 9- 192 1 ) ,  reported: 
The instant participation of Japan in the war, and the assistance given in escort 
for the first convoy of Australian troops, brought about during the first few months 
of the war, a much warmer feeling towards Japan than had existed for many years 
previously. But the Japanese occupation of the islands north of the equator in 
September and October 1 9 1 4  caused anxiety as soon as it became known to the 
public. It was not seen that these islands were required by Japan for her own 
defence, and their commercial value was trifling; their occupation seemed then to 
point to some aggressive purpose. 1 00  
Thus the 'warm' feelings towards the Japanese changed to suspicion causing 
restrictive measures to be applied. 
Japanese settlers 
The Japanese population in New Guinea began to decline, mainly because the 
outbreak of the war had caused uncertainty about the future of New Guinea. 
Although complete yearly statistics are not available either in Japanese or 
Australian sources, according to a telegram from the Japanese navy there 
were 1 1 9 Japanese (98 males and 2 1  females) in 1 9 14,  but this total was 
reduced to 77 (55 males and 22 females) in 19 1 6. 101 However, there was still 
96Shimizu to Defence Department . Melbourne, 4 Dec. 19 18 ,  AA, AWM33 46/6. 
97Johnstone to Defence, Melbourne, 8 May 1 9 1 8 ,  AA, AWM33 46/3. 
98Shimizu to Uchida, 9 December 19 18 ,  JDR, 3 .4.2 .50- 1 3-2. 
99Pearce to Prime Minister, 20 Apr. 19 18,  AA, MP1 049 1 9 18/073. 
100'Australia & Japan, note of statements made by Major E. L. Piesse in a conversation with 
Mr. Hanihara, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Mr. S. Shimidzu, Consul-General for Japan 
at Sydney, Gwaimusho, 25th December 19 19', MS882, Piesse Papers, Series 5. Japan, Folders 1 ,  
Manuscript Room, National Library of Australia, Canberra. 
101The Vice-Minister of the Navy to the Vice-Admiral Takeshita, 8 July 19 19,  JDR, 7 . 1 .5. 10 .  
However, the census by the Australian military administration shows different figures; there were 
236 (20 1 males and 36 females) in Dec. 1 9 14 (Government Gazette, British Admin-
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a steady, although decreasing, inflow of Japanese from 1 9 14 to 1 9 1 8 .  The 
number of passports issued by the Japanese Foreign Ministry to the Japanese 
bound for New Guinea was 33 in 1 9 14:  32 before August and one on 4 
August. No passports for New Guinea were issued in 1 9 1 5, but in 1 9 1 6  the 
number was 1 6. In 1 9 1 7  and 19 18,  only three were issued each year. 102 Those 
figures indicate that the decline in the Japanese population in New Guinea 
was due to the increase in the Japanese departing. The bad management of 
Komine's business encouraged his employees to return after their contracts 
and he attracted few migrants. 
According to Australian statistics, the Japanese were still the second 
largest civilian 'white' population. In 1 9 1  7 there were 680 Germans, 92 
Japanese and 66 British. 103 The Japanese population mainly consisted of 
professional migrants such as artisans (boat builders and sawyers) , 
fishermen, traders, planters and prostitutes. In 1 9 1 7, the largest occupational 
group was 33 male 'artisans, labourers and etc . ' ,  followed by 1 3  female 
'others' ,  12 male 'settlers and planters' ,  10 male 'sailors and fishermen' ,  eight 
male 'business and traders' and eight female 'private' .  104 The 1 3  female 'others' 
were very likely prostitutes working in the brothel owned by Ah Tam and the 
eight female 'private' would have been wives who accompanied their 
husbands. 
The Japanese community 
The Japanese were developing from a mere group of artisans to a 
self-contained community with amenities such as stores, restaurant, barber, 
brothel and cinema. 105 The community had now grown into the type seen in 
major towns in Southeast Asia. The development was accompanied by 
internal changes. The monolithic community under Komine's leadership 
began to crack, as other Japanese established businesses and started 
competing with him. The largest competitor was Okaji Santaro's Okaji Shokai 
(Okaji Company) . 106 The company was established in May 1 9 14 on Buka 
istration-German New Guinea. Vol.1, No.3, 15 Sept. 19 14, Rabaul, p.p.4-5) and 92 (69 males and 
23 females) in 1 9 1 7  (Government Gazette, British Administration-German New Guinea, Vol.N, 
No.6, 15 June 1917 ,  Rabaul, p.69) . The Australian figure of 1914  seems to be inaccurate because 
the number of passports issued by the Japanese Foreign Ministry to Japanese bound for New 
Guinea by 1 9 1 4  was about 1 00.  
102Kaigai ryoken kafu hyo [The list of  overseas passport issues] . 19 14- 19 1 8 ,  JDR, 3 .8 .5 .8 .  
103Govemment Gazette, British Administration-German New Guinea, Vol.N, No.6,  1 5  June 
1 9 1 7  (Rabaul) . 69. 
104Ibid. 
105Such amenities were observed by the naval officers who visited Rabaul. See Nihon teikoku 
kaigun gunrei bu [Japanese Imperial Navy Military Command Section] . Dokury6 taiheiy6 shot6 
shi [Accounts of German Pacific Islands] (Tokyo 1 9 1 5) .  52, kept in Gaiko shiry6 kan [Diplomatic 
Record Office] (Tokyo). 
1060kaji first went to Thursday Island in 1 90 1  when he was 19 years old and later moved to 
New Guinea; Oct.- Dec. 190 1 ,  JDR. 3 .8 .5 .8 (microfilm no.ryo-026). 
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Island adjacent to Bougainville, and operated a general store and copra 
plantation and exported marine products. 107 Its scale was much smaller than 
Komine's.  In 1 9 1 7  the Okaji Company's capital was 1 5,000 yen, its annual 
profits were 30,000 yen, the number of Japanese employees was five and 
there were 40 local labourers, while Komine's company's corresponding 
figures were 300,000 yen, 700,000 yen, 45 and 500. 108 Another company was 
established on 1 5  May 1 9 1 5. Three Japanese ship builders (Mori Seizaemon, 
Hamasaki Tomoshir6 and Nishikawa Zen'ichi) set up S. Mori and Co. after 
acquiring a leasehold from the administration. 109 The scale of S. Mori and Co. 
is unknown. 
Possibly the establishment of new companies stimulated the trade between 
Japan and New Guinea. Imports from Japan tripled from £ 1 0,650 in 1 9 1 5  to 
£3 1 ,064 in 1 9 1 8, and exports to Japan increased almost fourfold from 
£ 1 2, 1 88 in 1 9 1 5  to £48, 546 in 1 9 1 8  (still a negligible amount in the total 
external trade of Japan) . 1 10 
In 1 9 1 8  the Japanese community received the addition of a unique 
Japanese, Imaizumi Masao. He acquired half an acre leasehold in Rabaul and 
opened a picture theatre, New Britain Pictures. 1 1 1  Before coming to Rabaul, 
he was in the Dutch East Indies where he had been hunting birds of paradise 
and exporting them to London. 1 12 His cinema screened both Japanese and 
Western pictures for Japanese and white residents, and employed Australian 
technicians. 1 13 More interestingly, the way he had gone to the Dutch East 
Indies shows his distant connection to Enomoto Buyo, the first Japanese 
official who advocated colonising New Guinea. Imaizumi came to the Dutch 
East Indies with Jutar6 Hosoya-a close friend of Imaizumi and a son of 
Judayli Hosoya (a samurai of Sendai-han) . 1 14 Judayli had fought alongside 
Enomoto in the Boshin War of 1 868. Jutar6 admired Enomoto and supported 
his idea of southward advancement. Then he came to Dutch New Guinea full 
107Suzuki Eisaku (Japanese consul general at Sydney) to Uchida Yasunart, JDR, 3.4.6.8.  
108Gaimu sh6 tsush6 kyoku [Bureau of Commerce, Ministry of Foreign Affairs] , Kaigai nihon 
jitsugyo sha ch6sa [The report on Japanese entrepreneurs abroad] (Tokyo 19 1 7) ,  1 75. 
109Govemment Gazette, British Ad.ministration-Gennan New Guinea. Vol. 11 ,  No.5, 15 May 1915, 
Rabaul, p. 1 1 ; inteIView by the author with Nishikawa Mokutar6 (ex-Rabaul shipwright in the late 
1 9 1 0s) . 29 June 1993, Amakusa. Kumamoto, Japan. 
u°I>rime Minister's Department, Tenitory of New Guinea, Treatment of Foreigners and Foreign 
Interests, A Sununary to 3 1 st March, 1 923, Melbourne, p.  9,  in 'Piesse Paper, Series 6' , MS882, 
Manuscript, National Library of Australia, Canberra. 
1 1 1 1bid . ,  8. 
1 12Dutch document on admission of travel, 29 Aug. 1 9 1 3; Invoice of Australian Films Ltd. to 
lmaizumi's New Britain Pictures, 13 Nov. 1924, manuscripts owned by Imaizumi K6tar6, Nagoya, 
Japan. 
1 13lmaizumi Kotaro's letter to the author, 3 July 1993. 
1 14sendai-han was located in the north of Honshu, the main island of Japan. It is now called 
Miyagi prefecture and its capital is Sendai city. Samurai of Sendai were retainers of the Shogunate 
government and resisted the establishment of the new government of 1 868. 
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of enthusiasm to develop the South Seas for Japan. As Jutaro and Imaizumi 
were close friends, Imaizumi may have been influenced by Jutaro's 
enthusiasm. The rumour of Komine's bravery in New Guinea as well as the 
chance of success in starting a new business may have motivated Imaizumi. 
Race relations 
Generally the Australians at Rabaul, apart from the administrative staff, did 
not pay much attention to the Japanese. Other than official reports related 
to Komine, there are few Australian accounts of the Japanese and those are 
all brief and none mention any individual (not even Komine) . Captain Jens 
Lyng, one of the administrative staff, was the only Australian to observe the 
Japanese relatively closely and publish his impressions. He wrote about the 
Japanese women in the section describing Rabaul's China town, introducing 
them as part of the landscape that added an oriental flavour. 1 15 
The articles in the newspaper The Rabaul Record also show Australian 
indifference. There were only three on the Japanese from 1 9 14 to 1 9 1 8. 
Interestingly, unlike the public in Australia who were anxious about the 
Japanese influence in the South Pacific, the articles show that local 
Australians did not relate local Japanese to the general fear of Japanese 
aggression. The first article described how the Japanese fishermen removed 
the live fish from inside the trochus shell, the second was about the poor 
quality of Japanese matches, and the third gave a lively account of a 
Japanese wrestling tournament between visiting sailors and the local 
Japanese. 1 16 It seems that most Australians at Rabaul saw the Japanese 
merely as part of local scenery in an exotic territory. 
There are few records showing Japanese relations with New Guineans. No 
intermarriages took place, and oral evidence is generally not sufficiently 
specific to identify the period between 1 9 1 4  and 1 9 1 8 . However, one event, 
recorded by the administration, may indicate one aspect of Japanese attitudes 
to New Guineans. Nakayama Bukachi, an employee of Komine, was murdered 
by a young local man, Sapo, at Kali Bay in Manus in late November 1 9 1 6. The 
Australian District Officer found that the murder took place because of the 
brutality of Nakayama's treatment of the man. He reported, 
I am also convinced that the boy was cruelly beaten by the Japanese [Nakayama] 
who not only beat him but trted to throttle him, he also beat his head on the 
hatch. The marks on the boy's body plainly show the rough treatment that he 
received and there was no doubt that the boy was thoroughly frtghtened, so 
picking up the bamboo struck the Japanese the one fatal blow. 1 17 
1 1 5Jens Lyng, Our new possession (later German New Guinea) (Melbourne 1 9 1 9) .  1 26.  
1 16Rabaul Record, 1 Mar. 19 16,  1 Oct. 19 16 ,  1 Sept. 1 9 1 7 ,  Rabaul. 
1 17Captain Webster to the Administrator, 25 Nov. 19 16, AA, A2/ l  17 /37 14.  
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At the court Sapo's act was regarded as 'self-defence' but he received a 
sentence of 'six months imprisonment to be served in Rabaul' .  1 18 Although the 
cause of Nakayama's brutality was not reported, the event shows that some 
Japanese accepted the use of violence towards New Guinean employees, as 
the murder happened on a schooner with other Japanese crew on board. 
1 18Memorandum for the Administrator, 4 Dec. 19 16,  ibid. 
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THE AUSTRALIAN CIVIL ADMINISTRATION WAS ESTABLISHED in 1 92 1  and inherited 
policies established during the military period. The administration continued 
to restrict Japanese migration to New Guinea and also trading for several 
years. Consequently Japanese influence became marginal: by 1 940 their 
population had shrunk to about 40. Komine died in 1934. The nature of the 
community changed. The Japanese were mostly businessmen, unlike the 
earlier period when most were artisans or labourers. 
Japan, Australia and New Guinea in international politics 
The Paris Peace Conf ere nee 
The international situation changed rapidly in the inter-war period. 
Bargaining and appeasement were evident in the process of constructing and 
de-constructing the international collective security systems. Imperial powers 
continued to strugge to secure their colonies. Australia recognised the 
increasing strategic value of New Guinea, while Ja pan was J apanising 
Micronesia. 
At the Paris Peace Conference ( 1 9 19- 1 92 1) .  the victors of World War I 
bargained to divide German colonies, and tried to secure Llieir spoils through 
the League of Nations. A new colonial map was drawn in the Pacific-Asia 
region-German colonies vanished but more colonies accrued to Japan and 
Australia. 
To Ja pan, the Conference was a milestone, in that the Western powers 
accepted her as a major colonial power: she was counted as one of the Five 
Powers (with Britain, France, the US and Italy) . In Japan newspapers reported 
daily discussions of Japanese delegates with their Western counterparts and 
excited the public. Similarly, the Conference was significant to Australia: her 
representation as a Dominion represented the acknowledgment of 
nationhood. 1 As a result, discussions concerning Japan and Australia were 
affected by their pride and prestige as young modem nations. This reinforced 
their mutual perceptions: the image of racist Australians was imprinted on 
Japanese minds, while Australians were increasingly suspicious that 
1John Latham, The significance of the Peace Conference from an Australian point of view 
(Melbourne 1920) . 3. 
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expansionist Japanese were looking at every opportunity to take white men's 
lands. 
Although silent on European affairs, the Japanese were vocal on 
Pacific-Asia matters: especially the cession of German rights in Shantung 
Province, their claim to German Micronesia and the abolition of racial 
discrimination. Of those three, the Shantung Province was the issue on which 
they were most determined not to compromise. The province was a gateway 
to Japanese expansion in East Asia and a shield against Russian southward 
expansion. The government instructed its delegates not to sign the treaty if 
their claim was rejected .2 The Japanese also had a strong claim to German 
colonies north of the equator, reinforced by a secret treaty made with Britain 
during the war. The Japanese insistence on the insertion of a racial equality 
clause in the charter of the League of Nations was weaker than those two 
claims. It was a matter of prestige : they saw the discriminatory treatment of 
Japanese in the US, Canada and Australia as a disgrace, and believed that 
they should be treated as equal to their Western counterparts, as citizens of 
a modern independent nation, not like other Asians colonised by Western 
powers.3 
The leading Australian delegate, William (Billy) Hughes, strongly opposed 
the last two claims, because both challenged the essence of Australian 
defence and foreign policy-the White Australia Policy. However, his main 
opponent in the German territory issue was not the Japanese but the US 
President, Woodrow Wilson, who proposed the mandatory system in which all 
countries should have the same right of access. Wilson's proposal was based 
on his idealistic Fourteen Points, but in effect it was also aimed at countering 
other colonial powers' expansion in the Pacific. Hughes thought that this 
proposal would threaten Australia's exclusive right to German New Guinea, 
as it would allow Japanese access. To Hughes, New Guinea was a buffer 
against Japan's southward expansion: 'The ring of these South Pacific islands 
encompasses Australia like a chain of fortresses . . . and any Power which 
controls New Guinea, controls Australia. '4 He vigorously resisted Wilson's 
proposal. The Japanese also objected, although less vigorously, being 
concerned about their commercial rights in New Guinea. After lengthy 
discussions and compromise, agreement was reached finally: Class 'C' 
Mandates-virtually exclusive colonies-were applied to all German Pacific 
territories. 
2Uchida to Matsui, 21 Apr. 19 19, in Gaimu-sho [Foreign Ministry] . Nihon gaik6 bunsho taish6 
8 nen dai 3 satsuj�kan [Japanese diplomatic documents, 19 19,  vol .3,  no. l )  (Tokyo 197 1 ) .  242. 
3wakatsuki Yasuo, Hainichi no rekishi [History of discrimination against the Japanese) (Tokyo 
1972) . 138. 
4Frank Owen, Tempestuous Journey: Uoyd George His Life and TI.mes (London 1954) . 550. 
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In Hughes's eyes, the Japanese proposal of racial equality was closely 
associated with the mandate issue. He thought that the Japanese were trying 
to manipulate the treaty in order to send migrants to New Guinea as well as 
to Australia. 5 Hughes frantically opposed it, because he thought that 'to allow 
coloured immigration was to risk social suicide, to jeopardise a society' . 6 
Although the Japanese 'had no wish to dispatch immigrants' to Australia and 
their proposal was 'essentially a matter of prestige' ,  7 Hughes was relentless 
despite the objection of Edmund Piesse, the Director of the Pacific Branch in 
the Prime Minister's Department. Piesse suggested that: 
But even if there are reasons for maintaining racial discriminations against 
Asiatics , we must face the facts that these discriminations give great offence in 
Japan, and to a less extent in other Asiatic countries, that they contribute to the 
maintenance of strained relations between Japan and the white races, and they 
are used in Japan as a justification for armaments-the existence of which 
contribute in turn to the maintenance of armaments in Australia and other white 
countries. Are racial discriminations so vital to us that it is worthwhile to maintain 
them when they produce these results? Surely the answer is that they are not. 8 
However, the White Australia Policy was a sacred cow which most Australians 
would not sacrifice for anything. John Latham, one of the delegates, wrote: 
The principle of White Australia is almost a religion in Australia. Upon it depends 
the possibility of the continuance of white democracy-indeed, of any democracy, 
in a real sense-in this continent. Any surrender of the policy is inconceivable-it 
rests upon the right of every self-governing community to determine the 
ingredients of its own population. If that right is surrendered , the essence of 
self-government disappears. 9 
It was a 'moral imperative' for Hughes to scrap the Japanese proposal, even 
if it was watered down eliminating any reference to migration. 1° Finally, the 
Japanese gave up their proposal, and used it only as a bargaining chip for 
Western acknowledgment of Japanese rights in Shantung. 1 1  Thus the 
Australian objection facilitated the Japanese expansion in China. Similarly, 
the Australian objection consolidated Japanese exclusive control of 
Micronesia, as the Japanese could use the same argument to prevent 
5Manning Clark, A Short History of Australia (New York 1987) , 2 13. 
6william Hudson, Billy Hughes in Paris: the birlh of Australian diplomacy (Melbourne 1978) , 
55. 
7David Sissons, 'The Immigration question in Australian diplomatic relations with Japan 
1875- 1919, '  paper presented to the 43rd Congress of the Australia and New Zealand Association 
for the Advancement of Science (Brisbane 197 1 ) ,  38. 
8Pesse, Edmund, 9 Jan. 1920, draft for 'V. Future Policy, 19. The racial discrimination should 
be reduced to the utmost possible extent, '  12 ,  in AA, A5954 1203/2. 
9Latham, op.cit. , 9 .  
10C. Hartley Grattan, The Southwest Pacific Since 1 900: A Modem History. Australia, New 
Zealand, The Islands, Antarctica (New York 1963) , 65. 
1 1Wakatsuki, op.cit. , 1 53.  
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non-Japanese from entering. As Nelson rightly argues, it was a dilemma for 
Australians that 'every time they asserted the right to keep what they held 
and to impose their unfettered right on their new possessions, they were by 
implication strengthening the case of the Japanese to have their way in 
Micronesia. ' 12 
The Washington System 
The Paris Conference led to the establishment of the so-called 'Washington 
System' in which major Western powers and Japan concluded several treaties 
at Washington in 1 92 1  and 1 922. It reinforced the 'Pax Anglo-Saxonica' ,  
establishing a collective security system to maintain the status quo set at the 
Paris Conference. 13 Limitations on naval armaments were agreed, although 
they in reality gave Japan naval superiority against the US in the Pacific. And 
the Four-Power Pact was concluded between the US, Britain, France and 
Japan, replacing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which had been antagonising 
the US. 
In concluding the treaties, Ja pan was obliged to co-operate with the 
Western powers because of the 'dual' nature of the development of her 
imperialism: militarily Japan was catching up with the West but economically 
she was still heavily dependent on the US and Britain for raw materials and 
markets. 14 At this stage Japan needed to avoid conflict with the Western 
powers in order to develop its economy. 
On the abolition of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Australia (although not 
represented at the Conference) initially objected, fearing that Britain would 
not be able to restrain the Japanese from expanding in the Pacific . However, 
seeing the collective security system established, Hughes (then the Prime 
Minister) ratified the treaties, saying 'This Treaty establishes an equilibrium 
in the Pacific. As far as any action of man can do so, it insures peace for the 
next ten years for Australia' . 15 
Hughes's optimism proved right. In the 1920s Japan and Australia enjoyed 
relatively relaxed relations. Their trade steadily grew and the shift of the 
destination of Japanese emigration to South America mitigated the Australian 
fear of the 'Yell ow Peril' .  Piesse observed that 'the danger to Australia from an 
increase of population in Ja pan seems remote, and should not affect 
12Hank Nelson, 'Sacred trust and self-interest: Australia, Rabaul and beyond' , in Craig Wilcox 
(ed. ) ,  The Great War: gains and losses-ANZAC and Empire (Canberra 1995) , 1 1 1 . 
13Hosoya Chihiro, Ry6 taisen kan no nilwn gaik6 [Japanese diplomacy between the two wars] 
(Tokyo 1988) , 2 .  
14Eguchi Keiichi, ' 19 10- 1930 nendai no nihon-ajia shihai eno michi-' [Japan from 1 9 1 0s to 
1 930s-the path to rule Asia] , in Asao Naohiro et. al. (ed. ) ,  Nilwn Tsu shi dai 1 8  kan kindai 3 
[History of Japan, Vol.3 ,  modern period 3] (Tokyo 1994) , 3 1 .  
15Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Vol.XCIX (Melbourne 1922) , 789. 
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Australia's attitude toward her' . 16 Indeed the mid- l 920s was a temporary 
'golden period' in Japan-Australia relations. 17 
Collapse of the Washington System 
The Great Depression of 1 929 initiated the collapse of the Washington 
System. 'Have not' nations such as Ja pan, Germany and Italy began to 
challenge the System set up by 'have' nations such as Britain, the US and 
France. Those 'have not' nations sought opportunities to expand their colonies 
in order to overcome their economic stagnation. In the 1 930s, Ja pan sent 
troops to Manchuria. So did Germany to the Rhineland. And Italy invaded 
Ethiopia. But until the end of the decade, Britain, the US and France 
exercised 'appeasement' policies against those aggressive actions, attempting 
to maintain the colonial map drawn in Paris. 
The London Naval Treaty of 1 930, which aimed at balancing the naval 
strength of major powers (including Japan) , resulted in a vain attempt to keep 
international peace. In the following year, Japan began to invade Manchuria 
and set up a puppet government. The League of Nations, which was supposed 
to assure collective security, was useless to stop Japanese aggression: it did 
not take any concrete measures except condemning the action and 
recommending withdrawal from China. In Japan, some navy and army staff 
and right wingers expressed their indignation against the Western objection 
to Japanese rule in Manchuria. They began to gain public support and 
gradually influenced foreign policy. Consequently Japan left the League of 
Nations in 1 933 and the London Naval Treaty in 1 936, demonstrating her 
apparent denial of the Pax Anglo-Saxonica. 
In Australia, fear of Ja pan increased and was manifested in her foreign 
policies. First, Australians followed Britain's appeasement policy toward 
German aggression in Europe, presuming that open hostility, which might 
result in a British pact with Russia against German aggression in Poland, 
would make Japan co-operate closely with Germany, because Japan had been 
perceiving Russia as her most likely enemy in northeast Asia. In the 
Australian view, appeasement would prevent 'a war in the Pacific 
simultaneously with one in Europe-a situation in which Britain could not 
send sufficient strength to Singapore, and Australia would be left to defend 
itself . 18 
Australians applied a similar appeasement policy against Japanese 
aggression in China, based on the optimistic assumption that so long as 
Japan was occupied in China, she would not advance south and would not 
16Piesse, Edmund, 'Japan and Australia' , Foreign Affairs, Vol.4 ( 1926) . 488. 
1 7  Herny P. Frei, Japan's Southward Advance and Australia (Melbourne 199 1) .  1 14. 
18Ertc Andrews, 'The Australian Government and Appeasement', The Australian Journal of 
Politics and History, Vol. 1 3  ( 1967) . 4 1 .  
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threaten Australian security. 19 But the situation changed when the 
Washington System collapsed in 1 936 with the Japanese abrogation of the 
London Naval Treaty. Then Australians attempted to neutralise the Japanese 
threat by establishing a collective security pact in the Pacific. 20 They proposed 
the 'Pacific Pact' in 1 937 and lobbied Russian, Chinese, French,  Dutch, 
American and Japanese ambassadors in London and their governments to no 
avail. 
In the late 1930s, the Australians desperately began to pressure Britain to 
reinforce the garrison at Singapore, seeing her defence capability as 
insufficient against possible Japanese invasion in the South Pacific. The 
government also adopted the 'trade diversion policy' which favoured British 
textile manufacturers and impeded Australia-Japan trade in wool and textiles, 
in an attempt to cajole Britain into diverting its military strength to the 
Pacific. But the policy was an 'irrational exercise in economic nationalism' ,  as 
Australia-Japan trade was growing and was substantially in Australia's 
favour.21 More significantly, the policy undermined Japanese goodwill towards 
Australia and 'revived anti-Australian sentiment in Japan where feelings bred 
of hostility to Hughes had apparently been softening' . 22 
In 1 938 the Japanese government declared the Toa shin chitsifjo (New 
Order in East Asia) to find a solution to the prolonged war in China, but the 
declaration failed to reduce Chinese resistance and invited US economic 
sanctions. And Japanese isolation intensified. Then the government 
concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in 1 940. The pact was 
aimed at facilitating southward aggression in Southeast Asia, presuming that 
the US would diminish her desire to be involved in Asian affairs and so Japan 
could avoid a head-on collision with the US.23 The Japanese military also 
predicted that German victories in Europe would prevent Britain, France and 
the Netherlands from being involved in conflicts in Pacific-Asia if Japan 
invaded their colonies. 
Micronesia was another reason for Ja pan to conclude the Tripartite Pact. 
Germany in the late 1 930s, under Hitler's dictatorship, began to reclaim 
territorial rights in former colonies. At that time the strategic importance of 
Micronesia to Ja pan was increasing because of the possibility of naval 
operations in the southwest Pacific: Japan was building bases on the islands. 
The Japanese secretly negotiated with the Germans on a 'scheme for a public 
Japanese acknowledgment of the right of Germany to her former colonies 
19Frei, op.cit. , 127 .  
2°William Hudson. Towards a Foreign Policy: 1914- 1 941 (Melbourne 1967) , 67. 
21William Hudson, Australian Diplomacy (Melbourne 1970) ,  24. 
22Ibid. ,  25. 
23Hosoya Chihiro, Nihon gaiko no zahyo [Coordinates of Japanese diplomacy] (Tokyo 1979) , 
75. 
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accompanied by an agreement on Germany's part to sell her former Pacific 
islands mandated to Japan to the latter power' .24 In later negotiations, the 
Japanese insisted upon their exclusive control of the South Seas and even 
proposed the division of Australian territories-Papua to Japan and New 
Guinea to Germany. 25 In the end, although excluded from the clauses of the 
Pact, verbal agreement was made: Ja pan would retain Micronesia; other 
former German Pacific territories would be returned to Germany after the war; 
and then Germany would sell some territories to Ja pan. 26 Meanwhile the 
Australians rebuffed the German claim. 27 The Australians faithfully kept to 
the non-militarisation clause in the mandate for the territory. 
By contrast, the Japanese military was planning operations from 
Southeast Asia to the South Pacific.  At the same time the government was 
making last ditch efforts to get concessions from the US over China. However, 
the Tripartite Pact hardened US attitudes contrary to Japanese expectation, 
and the US reinforced its embargo on oil and froze Japanese assets. That was 
a severe blow to Japan which was heavily dependent on the US for oil 
supplies-essential fuel for naval operations. Thus, Japan had to find 
alternative sources of oil and other raw materials. Resource-rich Southeast 
Asia became a primary target. Consequently, shortly after the declaration of 
the Dai toa kyoei ken (Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere) , Japan 
launched her attack against Pearl Harbor. 
Maturation of nanshin 
The acquisition of German Micronesia made nanshin no longer a mere theory 
and it gave a new concept to intellectuals, policy makers and businessmen: 
'Micronesia and Taiwan would function as bases for the advance to Southeast 
Asia' .28 A new geographical concept-'Southeast'29-also appeared in a school 
text book in 1 9 1 9, reflecting increased attention to Southeast Asia. Similarly 
24Gerhard Weinberg.The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Gennany: starting World War II 1 937- 1 939 
(London 1980) . 1 36. 
�ihon kokusai seiji  gakkai [Japanese Association of International Politics) ,  Taiheiyo senso 
eno michi., dai 7 kan, nichibei kaisen [The road to the Pacific War, Vol.7,  The outbreak of Japan-US 
war) (Tokyo 1963) . 56-7 .  
26Japanese Foreign Minister to German ambassador at Tokyo. 27 Sept. 1 940, German 
ambassador at Tokyo to Japanese Foreign Minister, 27 Sept. 1940, in Nihon kokusai seiji gakkai 
[Japanese Association of International Politics) . Taiheiyo senso eno michi, dai 5 kan, sangoku 
domei, nisso chmitsujoyaku [The road to the Pacific War, Vol.5, Tripartite Pact. USSR-Japan 
Non-Aggression Pact) (Tokyo 1963) . 224-5. 
27Quoted in William Hudson (ed. ) .  New Guinea Empire: Australia's colonial experience 
(Melbourne 197 4) . 6. 
28Shimizu Hajime, 'Nilwn shilwn shugi to nan'yo [Japanese capitalism and the South Seas] , in 
Yano Torn (ed. ) .  Koza tonan qjia gaku dai 1 0  kan tonan qjia to nihon [Southeast Asia Studies, 
Vol. 10,  Southeast Asia and Japan) (Tokyo 199 1 ) .  92. 
29'Tonan ajia' in Japanese. It literally means 'east-south Asia'. 
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new terms-uchi or ura-nan'yo (inner or back south Seas: Taiwan and 
Micronesia) and soto or orrwte-nan'y6 (outer or front South Seas: India, 
Southeast Asia, Australia, Melanesia and Polynesia)-emerged around this 
time, showing the development of the Japanese conception of the South Seas 
that placed Japan in the centre of the southwest Pacific. 
Numerous intellectuals advocated Japan's southward advance and the 
military joined their advocacy in the late 1930s. The military had to gain 
natural resources in Southeast Asia (particularly oil in Dutch East Indies) in 
order to continue the war in China, as the US and Britain imposed 
embargoes, responding to the Japanese aggression in China. At the same time 
the government introduced policies to facilitate Japanese trade with Southeast 
Asia, and included nanshin in the national policy in the late 1930s. Private 
companies and migrants followed this southward tide. The public was agitated by 
the bombardment of nan'yo literature, which increased quickly: even for general 
references, the number increased fourfold from 99 in 1920-29 to 405 in 1930-39.30 
Ideology, government policy and organisation 
The main reason for the upsurge of Japanese interest in nan'yo, particularly 
Southeast Asia, was economic: new sources of raw materials and markets 
were needed for the development of heavy industry in order to catch up with 
Western economies, and to diversify export markets to rectify heavy 
dependence on US and Chinese markets. 3 1 The government led the 
commercial promotion, which was demonstrated in the number of government 
publications. Taiwan sotoku kanbo chosa ka (Research Section of the Chief 
Secretary of Taiwan Governor-General) , the leading government research 
institution of the South Seas, published about a hundred reports 
(Minami-shina oyobi nan'yo chosa [Survey of South China and the South 
Seas] series) on trading, investment, management of plantations, fishing, 
mining and so on. 
In the mid- l 920s the Department of Foreign Affairs took an initiative. In 
1 926 the Department held the Nan'yo Boeki Kaigi (South Seas Trade 
Conference) , inviting officials of other departments and representatives of 
various industries, to promote South Seas trade. The main items on the 
agenda at the Conference were investment, trade, transport, customs and 
commercial treaties. It was a significant milestone showing the beginning of 
the government's involvement in that it was the Department of Foreign 
3°Iwamoto Hiromitsu, Taiheiyo senso zen no papua oyobi nyiiginia eno dekasegi imin-nanshin 
to hakugo shugi no aida ni ikita hitobito [Japanese Migrants to Papua and New Guinea before the 
Pacific War: People caught between the 'Nanshin' Policy and the 'White Australia' Policy] . Imin 
Kenkyii Nenp6 [Annual Review of Migration Studies] . Vol. I ( 1995) , 95. 
31Shimizu, op.cit. 
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Affairs, not private organisations such as the South Seas Society or the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, that took the lead.32 
In 1 928 the Department of Foreign Affairs presented a report entitled 
Boeki. kigyo oyobi imin yori mitaru nan'yo (The South Seas in view of trade, 
companies and emigration) , in which the Department proposed policies to 
promote trade, establish organisations to facilitate export and investment, 
and a special fund to assist emigration. Although none of the proposals were 
put into practice, the report was significant.33 The necessity for national 
commitment was acknowledged, as the Department used the term 'nan' yo 
kokusaku' (national policy towards the South Seas) for the first time in official 
reports.34 
Nan.shin-ran advocates raised their voices in the early 1 930s, responding 
to the collapse of the Washington System. They began to focus on the 
strategic argument, that nan'yo was Japan's life line, although carefully 
emphasising the necessity to avoid conflict with Western colonial powers.35 
The mid- 1 930s was the most significant period for the development of 
nan.shin-ran. It began to turn militaristic , as the navy set out with a concrete 
nan.shin plan. In 1935 the aggressive group, 'hanjoyaku ha' (anti- [London] 
Treaty faction) , set up the Tai Nan'yo Hosaku Kenkyii-kai (Study Committee 
for Policies towards the South Seas) . The Committee studied both economic 
and military expansion; it advocated the promotion of trade and emigration 
through the Takumu sho (Department of Colonial Affairs) and the Nan'yo 
Kohatsu Kaisha (South Seas Development Company) and emphasised the 
military role of Taiwan and Micronesia as advance bases. 36 
The navy was already militarising Micronesia. In the early 1930s, after the 
Western powers restricted Japanese naval capability at the London Treaty of 
1 930, the navy secretly started building bases in Palau, Tinian and Saipan. 
In order to evade the Western powers' monitoring, they were camouflaged as 
places to dry fishing nets or farms, and the South Seas Development 
Company assumed responsibility for construction. 37 Although the Study 
32Shimizu Hajime, ' 1920 nendai ni okeru 'nanshin ron' no kisu to nan'yo boeki kaigi no shiso 
(The trend of southward advancement theory in the 1920s and the ideology of the South Seas 
Trade Conference] , in Shimizu Hajime (ed. ) ,  Ryo taisen kan ki nihon tonan qjia kankei no shoso 
(Various aspects of Japan-Southeast Asia relations between the two wars) (Tokyo 1986) , 24-5. 
33Gaimu-sh6 tsusho-kyoku [Commerce Bureau of the Department of Foreign Affairs] , B6eki, 
kigyo oyobi imin yori mitarn nan'yo [The South Seas in view of trade, companies and emigration) 
(Tokyo 1928) . 
341bid. ,  l .  
35Fujiyama Raita, 'Umi no seimei sen to waga nan'yo hatten (Sea life line and our South Seas 
development] ,  Shokumin [The Colonial Review] . 12(9) ( 1933) . 7-8. 
36Hatano Sumio, 'Showa kaigun no nanshin ron [The southward advancement theory of the 
navy in the Showa period] ,  ZOkan rekishi to jinbutsu [Special issue, History and People) (Tokyo 
1984) , 279 . 
371bid. '  282. 
Chapter 4: Decline, 1 91 9- 1 940 93 
Committee at this stage avoided expressing outright hostility against Western 
powers, it strongly argued for the opening of markets and natural resources 
in Southeast Asia, particularly in the oil-rich Netherlands East Indies. 38 
In 1 936 the government took a crucial step. It integrated nanshin in the 
national policy. After abrogating the London Naval Treaty in January, the 
government held the Five Ministers Conference (attended by the ministers of 
the departments of Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Navy and Army) 
in August and announced 'the Guidelines for National Policy' that included a 
resolution to advance south 'peacefully' . 39 In November the policy was 
executed. The Nan'yo Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha (South Seas Colonisation 
Company) , a giant national company comparable to the Taiwan Colonisation 
Company, was established. The company's main venture was the development 
of phosphate mining on Angaur and Fais. 
Coinciding with the government declaration, some intellectuals began to 
focus on Japan's long historical connection with nan'yo , starting from the 
l 7th century trading, called Goshuinsen baeki, 40 to the Meiji explorer-traders. 
Iwao Seiichi, a historian and professor of the Taipei University (the leading 
academic institution in South Seas studies) , played a central role. In 1936 he 
wrote Kinsei shoki nihoajin nan' yo hatten no rekishi (History of Japanese 
development in the South Seas in early modem times) .41 In 1939 he published 
an article 'Nan'yo ni okeru nichi-6 kankei no suii' (The change of 
Japan-European relations in the South Seas) in which he contrasted Western 
colonisation, which was strongly backed up by governments, with Japanese 
emigration which had no government support. 42 Then in 1940, Iwao published 
the best-known book in the study of Japan-South Seas relations, Nan'yo 
nihon ma.chi no kenkyii (Study on Japanese towns in the South Seas) . Other 
historian-writers are Irie Toraji and Kakei Kiyosumi. Irie, a former archivist 
of the Foreign Ministry, wrote two volumes of HQjin kaigai hatten shi (History 
of Japanese overseas development) on Japanese emigration since 1 868, in 
38Goto Ken'ichi, Sh6wa ki nihon to indoneshia [Showa Japan and Indonesia] (Tokyo 1986) , 
35-6. 
39Appendix No. 16, in Yano Toru, Nihon no nan'yo shi kan [Japanese historical view of the 
South Seas) (Tokyo 1979) . 2 12 .  
"°lbe first shogun of the Edo Era, Tokugawa Ieyasu, encouraged the South Seas trade, before 
the shogunate government adopted the sakoku [seclusion] policy. In order to protect trading ships, 
he instituted the system to issue shuinjo [red-seal permits] which were the letters of official 
endorsement of trade to the countries that the Japanese traders were dealing with. The trading 
was so active in the early 16th century that approximately 100,000 Japanese settled in Southeast 
Asia mainly for business purpose and created Nihon machi [Japanese town] . 
411wao Seiichi, Kinsei shoki nihonjin nan'yo hatten no rekishi [History of Japanese development 
in the South Seas in the early modern times] (Taipei 1936) . 
42lwao Seiichi, 'Nanyo ni okeru nichi-6 kankei no suii [The change of Japan-European relations 
in the South Seas] ' ,  in Tozai kosh6 shi ron [Theory on the history of East-West contact] (Tokyo 
1939) . 509-56. 
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which he devoted a considerable section to the South Seas. 43 Kakei, although 
not a well-known writer, wrote Nanpo shoho ni okeru oseki nihon jin no 
katsuyaku (Japanese activities in the southern area in the old times) .44 
Although all these works are purely academic and have few references to 
government policies, the timing of their publication precisely coincides with 
the beginning of Japanese military actions in the late 1 930s. 
The navy initiated the military nanshin. In February 1 939, naval forces 
occupied Hainan Island, an iron ore-rich island, on the pretext of cutting off 
the southern support route to Chiang Kai-shek, then in March the Spratly 
Islands. Both were strategic bases for the advance to Southeast Asia. The 
navy's actions were quickly followed by the cabinet's policy statement: the 
Konoe cabinet expressed 'the Outline of the Basic National Policy' , declaring 
'the construction of the New Order in Greater East Asia based on the solid 
consolidation of Japan, Manchuria and China' on 26 July in 1940.45 This 'New 
Order', being modified from the 'New Order in East Asia' of 1938, included the 
South Seas. 46 
Shortly after the cabinet decision, the Imperial Headquarters announced 
nanshin by force. On 27 July, it produced 'the outline of measures taken in 
response to changing international situation' .  Under the clause of 'the use of 
force against southern area', it stipulated that 'in case China problem cannot 
be solved . . .  the use of force is possible in order to solve the problem in the 
southern area' .47 The outline was the unambiguous endorsement of the 
military invasion of Southeast Asia. 
The army saw its best opportunity when Germany defeated France and the 
Netherlands in Europe in mid- 1940. In September the army quickly sent 
forces to occupy northern French Indochina in order to secure the naval base 
in Camranh Bay and the airfield at Pnompenh. Thus the army, the traditional 
advocate of the northward advance , finally joined nanshin. 
In the last year before the outbreak of the war, intellectuals completed the 
justification for nanshin on three main grounds: independence from the 
Western economies, national defence and nationalism. However, it was a 
different form of nanshin-ron from the one that Enomoto and other Meiji 
nanshin-ron advocates asserted about half a century earlier: they were 
fundamentally non-militaristic free trade advocates. But those Meiji 
nanshin-ron advocates were exploited by their later counterparts . The new 
431Iie Toraji, HQiin kaigai hatten shi [History of Japanese overseas development) (Tokyo 1 938) . 
44Kakei Kiyosumi. Nanpo shohO ni okern oseki nihonjin no katsuyaku [Japanese activities in 
the southern area in old times] (Tokyo 1938) . 1 .  
45Quoted i n  Boei-cho b6ei kenshii sho senshi shitsu [War History Office, Defence Training 
Institute. Defence Agency] (ed.) .  Dai hon'ei rikugun bu (2) shOwa 1 6  nen 1 2  gatsu made [The Army 
Section of the Imperial Headquarters (2) until December 1940] (Tokyo 1968) . 55. 
461bid . . 56. 
47Quoted in ibid . .  59. 
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nW1Shin-ron advocates 'deformed' the Meiji  nanshin-ron, by exalting the Meiji 
advocates as national heroes despite the fact that the nanshin-ron had 
attracted far less attention in the Meij i  period, and created the impression 
that the Japanese had had long-term interaction with the South Seas.48 
Investment and trade 
Japan's economic relations with the South Seas developed steadily. The 
growth of the overall Japanese economy, government promotion of South Seas 
trade and the international situation facilitated Japanese investment in the 
South Seas. As Table 4- 1 shows, between 1 9 1 9  and 1 94 1 ,  78 companies were 
established. It was a remarkable increase, compared to only 32 companies 
established between 1 870 and 1 9 1 8. Most companies were in Southeast Asia 
and directed toward resource-development such as minerals, oil, rubber, 
lumber, jute, cotton, copra and fishery, reflecting the general focus of interest 
of nanshin-ron advocates and the government. 
The timing of the investment, which concentrated in the 1930s, shows the 
association with the international situation: the US and Britain raised tariffs 
against Japanese products in the early 1 930s; China, the second largest 
trading partner after the US, began to boycott Japanese products after the 
Japanese invasion in 1 93 1 ;  and the prolonged war in China forced Japan to 
find alternative sources of raw materials to meet increasing military demands. 
TABLE 4- 1 .  The number of Japanese companies established in the South Seas, 
1 9 1 9- 1 94 1  
Micronesia Southeast Asia South Pacifrc Taiwan unknown total 
19 19 1 4 0 1 6 
1 920-29 2 1 1  1 14  
1930-39 2 1  23 3 3 3 53 
1940-4 1 5 5 
total 24 43 3 4 4 78 
Source: Nan'yo dantai rengo kai [The Federation of South Seas Organisations) (ed. ) ,  Dai nan'yo 
nenkan [the Year book of the South Seas) (Tokyo 1 942) , 797-828. 
Consequently Japan-South Seas trade increased dramatically. As Table 4-2 
shows, total exports increased from 252.5  million yen in 1920 to 474.2 million 
yen in 1937 and imports from 1 88.3 million to 540.4 million. Southeast Asia 
was the largest trading area, followed by Australia and New Zealand, while 
Micronesia remained marginal. However, the proportion of the South Seas 
trade in the total Japanese trade remained small; it only increased from 10 .2 
per cent in 1 920 to 14 .5  per cent in 1 937.49 
Similarly, the position of Japan in the total South Seas economy remained 
marginal. In 1 939, the proportion of the trade with Japan was only 6. 7 per 
48Yano, op.cit. , 1 87 .  
4�e same source as Table 4-2. 
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cent, while the US, Britain, China, and Netherlands occupied about 90 per 
cent. 50 The Mitsubishi Research Institute of Economies admitted: 'the 
fundamental reason [for the low profile in South Seas economy] is . . .  the 
result of our [underdeveloped] industrial strength' compared to Western 
economies. 51 
TABLE 4-2. Japanese trade with the South Seas from 1 920 to 1 937 (million yen} · 
Micronesia Southeast Asia"' Australia & New Zealand total 
export import export import export import export import 
1920 0.03 0.09 1 84.8 1 25.9 67.7 62.4  252.5 1 88.3 
1930 0.06 0.2 133.0 130.4 28.6 94.6 1 6 1 .6 225.2 
1937 0.3 1 .2 382.6 325.4 9 1 .3 2 13.8 474.2 540.4 
*Tile countries of  Southeast Asia varied by year due to the availability of  statistics: 
1920: British Malaya, Dutch East Indies , French Indochina, the Philippines and Thailand 
1930, 1937: British Malaya and Borneo, Dutch East Indies, French Indochina, the Philippines and 
Thailand. 
Source: data from Naikaku tokei-kyoku 193 1 :  1 68, 1938: 204-9, Kokusei-in 1 92 1 :  1 42.  
Emigration 
Emigration to the South Seas increased more than threefold from 3 1 , 8 1 1 in 
1 9 1 9 to 95, 528 in 1 936 (Table 4-3) , although the proportion in the total 
Japanese emigration remained marginal: it was only eight per cent in 1 936.52 
The increase was mainly due to emigration to Micronesia that drastically 
increased in the 1 930s. The government assisted the emigration: the Nan'yo 
cho (South Seas Government) , the Japanese colonial administration in 
Micronesia, leased land and the Nan'yo Kohatsu Kaisha (South Seas 
Development Company) , the private company part-funded by the government, 
recruited thousands of labourers for its sugar plantations. Emigration 
increased especially after Ja pan resigned from the League of Nations in 1933. 
Emigration to Southeast Asia remained largely static in the 1 920s, because 
the government adopted a foreign policy to co-operate with other powers in 
the framework of the Washington System and discouraged emigration to 
Southeast Asia, which might cause friction with the Western powers. This 
attitude was articulated in the statement of the Foreign Minister, Shidehara 
Kijuro, at the South Seas Trade Conference of 1926. He stated, 'the agenda of 
this conference does not include immigration issues. '53 Although emigration 
began to increase in the 1930s, the increase was far less dramatic than in 
soi:imoto Nobuyuki and Sato Hiroshi (ed. ) .  Nan'yo chiri taikei dai 1 kan nan'yo soron [Outline 
of the geography of the South Seas, Vol. I .  Introduction to the South Seas] (Tokyo 1 942) , 137-8. 
51Mitsubishi keizai kenkyii sho [Mitsubishi Research Institute of Economy] (ed . ) .  Toyo oyobi 
nan'yo shokoku no kokusai b6eki to nihon no chii [International trade of Oriental and South Seas 
countries and the position of Japan] (Tokyo 1933) . l .  
52Data from Ishikawa Tomonori, 'Tokei yori mita shutsu-imin-shi 3 '  [Emigration history in the 
view from statistics] . Chiri kagaku [Geographic science] .  Vol. 16 ( 1972) . 27-8. 
53Quoted in Shimizu, op.cit. ( 1 986) . 28. 
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Micronesia. The main reason was that there was little demand for Japanese 
labourers, unlike in Micronesia, as cheap labour was locally available. As a 
result, migrants were mainly company employees and their numbers were 
subject to fluctuations in the economy. 54 Also the Dutch administration 
applied restrictions on foreign labourers from 1 935. The Japanese population 
in Australia, New Zealand and the South Pacific islands declined, as Australia 
continued to restrict Asian migration and this affected most Japanese in this 
region. 
TABLE 4-3. Japanese population in the South Seas, 1 9 1 9 to 1 94 1  
Southeast Asia* Micronesia Australia, New Zealand Total 
1 9 1 9  
1925 
1930 
1936 
23,740 
2 1 ,359 
35,240 
36,375 
1 ,79 1 
7,33 1 
19,835 
55,948 
& South Pacific Islands 
6,280 
3,883 
3,984 
3,205 
3 1 ,8 1 1 
32,573 
59,059 
95,528 
*Southeast Asia includes Brttish Malaya, Borneo, Sarawak. India, Burma, Srt Lanka, Netherlands 
East Indies, the Philippines, and Guam 
Source: 1 9 1 9- 1925: Ishikawa Tomonort, 'Tokei yort mita shutsu-imin-shi 3' [Emigration history 
in the view from statistics] , Chiri kagaku [Geographic science] ,  Vol . 1 6  ( 1972) . 27-8. 
Japanese perceptions of Papua and New Guinea 
Corresponding to the rise of the militaristic nanshin-ron, Japanese interest in 
Papua and New Guinea increased in the late 1930s. The number of publications 
demonstrates this. As Table 4-4 shows, most publications appeared in the same 
period. Only one book was published before 1923, according to z.oho nanp6 bunken 
mokuroku [Bibliography of the South Literature, revised edition] . However, interest 
in Papua and New Guinea was slight compared to Southeast Asia. In �no nanpo 
btmken moku.roku.. the list of publications on Southeast Asia occupies 144 pages, 
while that of Papua and New Guinea occupies only three. 
Although marginal, the increase of the information on Papua and New Guinea 
was dramatic. The government was the initiator. In 1938 the Department of Foreign 
Affairs published Eiiyo papua [British Terrttoiy of Papua] and Goshii inin tochi ryo 
nyii ginia [Australian Mandated Territoiy New Guinea] , and the Department of 
Colonisation published a book with the same title. 55 Then in 1939 the 
administration in Micronesia published two massive volumes-400 pages long Nyii 
giniajyo (goshii in.in tochi ry6) [The situation in New Guinea (Australian Mandated 
Territoiy)] and 145 pages long Ny ii giniajyo (papua ryo hen) [1be situation in New 
54Shimizu Hajime, 'Tokushii n1 atatte [Introduction of the special issue] , '  Ajia keizai [Developing 
Economy] , XXVI-3 ( 1 985) . 4. 
55Gaimu sh6 oa kyoku [Section of Europe, Department of Foreign Affairs] , Eiry6 papua [Brttish 
terrttory of Papua) (Tokyo 1938) ; Gaimu sho oa kyoku [Section of Europe, Department of Foreign 
Affairs] , Goshii inin tochi ryo nyii ginia [Australian Mandated Terrttory New Guinea) (Tokyo 1938) ; 
Takumu sho takumu kyoku [Section of Colonisation, Department of Colonisation) , Goshii inin 
tochi ryo nyii ginia [Australian Mandated Terrttory New Guinea) (Tokyo 1938) . 
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Guinea (Territory of Papua)].56 Those books introduced history, population, religion, 
education, climate, hygiene, geography, politics, etc. And they were based on 
information from English sources such as New Guinea Handbook, Pacific Island 
Year Book, Pactfic Islands Monthly, Rabaul Tunes, Gazette of Papua, Annual Re]X>rt 
of Papua, Papuan Cowier and the ordinances of the Australian administrations. 
A sharp contrast to Japanese interests in Southeast Asia can be seen in the 
contents of the publications. The Japanese were not so interested in the economy 
of Papua and New Guinea. Table 4-5 shows that almost half of the publications 
were about the general situation and travel, and only eight out of 42 were on 
industry and natural resources. 
Until the early 1930s, Japanese perceptions of Papuans and New Guineans 
remained the same. Tatsue Yoshinobu, who travelled with Komine in the early 
1900s, wrote that 'fierce natives' were impeding development, 57 and Miyoshi Hoju 
called New Guinean women the ugliest in the world._58 However, in the late 1930s 
perceptions sharpened. The government publications showed the 'tribal' diversity 
(e.g. coastal people were peaceful but inland people were still rebellious), 59 and the 
effectiveness of Australian rule through administration and missions which 
produced some educated Christian natives. 60 
TABLE 4-4. The number of South Seas publications, 1923 to 1 94 1  
1923 3 
1924 1 
1932 1 
1933 3 
1937 4 
1938 10 
1939 7 
1940 4 
194 1  9 
total 42 
Source: Nihon takushoku kyokai [Japan Colonisation Society] (ed.) ,  Z6ho nW1p6 bunken mokuroku 
[Biography of the South Literature, revised edition] (Tokyo 1944) . 233-5. 
56Nan'ycch6 chokan kanb6 chosa ka [Research Section of the Secretary-General of the South 
Seas Government] , Nyii giniajfj6 (goshii inin tochi ryo J [The situation in New Guinea (Australian 
Mandated Territory)] (Koror 1939) ; Nan'yo cho chokan kanb6 chosa ka [Research Section of the 
Secretary-General of the South Seas Government], Ny ii giniajfj6 (papua ryo hen) [The situation 
in New Guinea (Territory of Papua)] (Koror 1939) . 
57Tatsue Yoshinobu, 'Shokujin shu seisoku suru nyiiginia tanken dan ( l) '  [Accounts of 
exploration in New Guinea; land of cannibals ( 1 ) ) ,  Shokumin [The Colonial Review] , 3( 1 1) ( 1924) . 
99. 
58Miyoshi Hojii, 'Nan'yo no on'na samazama' [Vartety of the South Seas women] , Shokumin [The 
Colonial Review), 12( 12) ( 1 933) . 100. 
�an'yccho chokan kanb6 chosa ka [Research Section of the Secretary-General of the South 
Seas Government], Nyii giniajfj6 (papua ry6 hen) [The situation in New Guinea (Territory of 
Papua)] (Koror 1939) . 18 .  
�an'yccho chokan kanb6 chosa ka [Research Section of  the Secretary-General of  the South 
Seas Government] , Nyii giniaj!J6 (g6shii inin tochi ryo ) [The situation in New Guinea (Australian 
Mandated Territory)] (Koror 1939) , 40. 
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TABLE 4-5. Classification of publications on Papua and New Guinea, 1 923 to 1 94 1  
number 
Biography 
General situation and travel accounts 
Geography 
Race and culture 
Politics and foreign relations 
Industry and economy 
Fishing 
Mining 
total 
Source: same as Table 4-4. 
1 
23 
8 
4 
2 
2 
42 
The introduction of New Guinean artefacts also modified stereotyped 
perceptions. The Minami no kai (Society of the South) published Nyu ginia 
dozoku hin zushil (Illustrated New Guinean artefacts) which introduced 
collections of artefacts and their relations with native religions and customs. 
Interestingly Matsue Haruji, the Directing-Manager of the South Seas 
Developing Company, was the owner of the collections, which he had bought 
from Komine.61 A similar book was written by Fujiki Yoshihiro, an 
anthropologist. His book, Nyu ginia sono fukin tosho no dozoku hin (Artefacts 
of New Guinea and adjacent islands) , had introductory sections by artists and 
anthropologists who appreciated the high quality of the artefacts and 
commented favourably, in terms such as 'New Guinean artefacts are 
excellent' or 'New Guineans are artists' .62 
Although slight, there was some government interest in the economy. 
Muramatsu Kaoru, an official of the Research Section of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs, compared the economic potential of Australian New Guinea 
with Dutch New Guinea, and pointed out that 'Australian New Guinea was 
superior to Dutch New Guinea in various points' such as in copra planting 
and coastal shipping.63 The Nan'yo Keizai KenkyU Sho (Research Institute of 
the South Seas Economy) , a government research organ specialising in the 
economy of the South Seas, reported the oil search in Papua. 64 The Institute 
also noted the shortage of labour, industries and the Australian exploration 
61Minami no kai [Society of the South] , Ny ii gillia dozoku hill zushii [illustration of New Guinean 
artefacts].Vol. l and 2 (Koror 1937) . 
62Fujiki Yoshihiro, Ny ii gillia sono jukill tosho no dozoku hill [Artefacts of New Guinean and 
adjacent islands] (Tokyo 1939) . 1-2.  
63Matsuoka Kaoru, 'Ranryo nyfiginia gaikan [Outlook of Dutch New Guinea] ' ,  Kaigai yii 
[Overseas emigration], 10(6) ( 1937) . 17 .  
64Nan'y6 Keizai Kenkyii Sho [Research Institute of the South Seas Economy] . 'Kaitaku jidai no 
niuginia sekiyu jij6 [Situation of oil in New Guinea: development stage]' .  Kenkyii shiryo [Research 
Materials], 2( 1 1) ( 1 939c) , 49- 5 1 .  
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in the highlands. 65 But all those publications seem to be mere translations 
from English sources. 
The government was also aware that Australians placed great strategic 
importance on Papua and New Guinea. Nagatsuka Jiro argued that 
Australians had always regarded Papua and New Guinea as an important 
defence line, pointing out that their attempt to annex Papua and New Guinea 
was the manifestation of this recognition.66 
The increase in references to Japanese migrants was an important trend 
from the mid- 1930s. It stressed the fact that Japanese had had a long linkage 
with New Guinea. It was a significant change because until then nobody had 
demonstrated much interest. Government publications, such as the ones of 
the Department of Colonisation and the South Seas Government, devoted 
many pages to the history of Japanese migration (mainly about Komine) and 
commercial activities.67 Although this was a plain description of events and 
accounts of the migrants, it was the first time that the migrants were taken 
up by officials with such intensity. 
Nanshin-ron advocates played a more important role. They exalted Komine 
as a national hero. In 1935 Sande mainichi (Sunday Everyday) , a popular 
weekly magazine, published an article titled 'Showa no Yamada Nagamasa, 
Nihon-t6 o sasagete tanshin doku-kan o ikedoru: Nan'yo no kaitaku-sha 
Komine Isokichi' [Yamada Nagamasa of the Showa period captured a German 
ship alone with a Japanese sword: a pioneer of the South Seas, Komine 
Isokichi] . 68 The article began with a comment: 'This is the story that 
impressed Debuchi Gen, a special envoy to Australia, who said "This is the 
most appropriate episode to promote Japan-Australia relations'" . The article 
emphasised Komine's relations with Germans and Australians dramatically. 
It described how bravely he rescued the German governor who was being 
65Nan'yo Keizai Kenkyii Sho [Research Institute of the South Seas Economy] , 'Ny\iginia ni okeru 
rodoryoku ketsubO mondai: ajia jin o irerubeki ka [Labour shortage problem in New Guinea: 
should we import Asian labour?] ' ,  Kenkyil shiryo [Research Materials] , 2(8) ( 1 939) ; 'Goshu 
ny\iginia sangyo gaikan [Outlook of industries in New Guinea] ' ,  Kenkyil shiryo [Research 
Materials], 2 (12) ( 1 939) ; 'Eiryo ny\iginia tanken hokoku [Report of the exploration of British New 
Guinea] , '  ( 1 )-(4) . Kenkyil shiryo [Research Materials], 3(6-9) ( 1939) . 
66Nagatsuka Jiro, 'Niuginia (goshu inin tochi ryo) papua gappei mondai no ichi shinten 
[Development of the issue of the annexation of New Guinea (Australian mandate) and Papua)' ,  
Kenkyil shiryo [Research Materials] ,  2(7) ( 1939) . 10- 1 1 . 
67Takumu-sho takumu-kyoku [Section of Colonisation, Department of Colonisation] , op.cit. , 
83-93; Nan'yo cho chokan kanbO chosa ka [Research Section of the Secretary-General of the South 
Seas Government], op.cit . .  3 14- 18.  
68Mainichi shinbun-sha [Mainichi Newspaper Co. ] ,  Sande mainichi [Sunday Everyday] , 8 July 
1935, 'Showa no Yamada Nagamasa, Nihon-to o sasagete tanshin doku-kan o ikedoru: Nan'yo no 
kaitaku-sha Komine Isokichi' [Yamada Nagamasa of the Showa period captured a German ship 
alone with a Japanese sword: a pioneer of the South Seas, Komine Isokichi] , 30. Yamada is a 
popular legendary figure believed to have served the Ayutaya dynasty in Thailand as a military 
commander in the l 7th century. Nwtshin-ron advocates from the late 1930s to the early 1940s 
regarded him as a symbol of Japanese pioneers in the South Seas. 
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attacked by natives on  a jungle track: 'Mr Komine jumped off a seven-meter 
high cliff like a bird into the fighting and saved the life of the governor by a 
close shave' .  The article said that the capture of the Komet was proposed by 
frustrated Komine who saw the Australians unable to do anything because 
they were unfamiliar with the local geography, and that Kornine organised the 
expedition and when he found the Komet he climbed onto the deck by himself 
just carrying a Japanese sword and successfully persuaded the German 
commander to surrender. Because of this feat, he was given the chronometer 
of the Komet and the title of both naval and army captain. The article also 
emphasised that Kornine was a good friend of the German captain and looked 
after his family at Rabaul while the captain was imprisoned by Australians, 
and later the captain thanked Komine, saying 'Now I have learnt the 
greatness of the Japanese' .  Most accounts in the article are exaggerated (see 
Chapter 3, Section 1 ,  World War I) . No other written records and oral evidence 
can confirm that Kornine carried a sword or the German captain thanked him 
(generally the Germans resented Komine's action) . At the time of writing the 
article, Kornine was already dead and nobody (except for those who actually 
knew him) could challenge the accuracy of the accounts, so the writer could 
say almost anything to dramatise the events. 
More significantly, the article was re-introduced in April 1 94 1 .  Captain 
Kamijo Fukashi wrote Sensen ichi-man kairi: zen taisenji nan'yo no rekishi 
(The war front of ten thousand miles: the history of the South Seas during 
World War I) and inserted it in full. 69 Kamijo added a detailed account of the 
capture of the Komet, although the addition seems to be his translation from 
MacKenzie's The Australians at Rabaul which had been published in 1927. 
Similarly, in August 1 94 1  the Nanpo sangyo chosa kai (Society of the South 
Seas Industry Research) published Nyii ginia, a book giving general 
information on Papua, Australian New Guinea and Dutch New Guinea, and 
repeated the story about Komine's feat, although briefly. 70 Thus just before 
the outbreak of the Pacific War, the government and nanshin-ron advocates 
began to popularise the Japanese in New Guinea, obviously intending to 
propagate and justify the nanshin. The Japanese in New Guinea, who had 
attracted little public attention in Ja pan, were suddenly and comprehensively 
integrated into the vast scheme of Japanese expansionism. 
�j6 Fukashi, Sensen ichi-man kairi: zen taisenji nan'y6 no rekishi [The war front of ten 
thousand miles: the history of the South Seas during World War I] (Tokyo 194 1) ,  1 82-93. 
7°Nanpo sangy6 chosa kai (Society of the South Seas Industry Research] (ed . ) ,  Nyii ginia (New 
Guinea) (Tokyo 194 1 ) ,  148. 
102 JAPANESE SETfLERS IN PAPUA AND NEW GUINEA 
Japanese in Papua 
Australian attitudes 
Australians scarcely noticed the small number of Japanese. An official report 
in the late 1930s stated that 'with regard to the Territory of Papua, there are 
no Japanese' . 71 The smallness of the Japanese population was one reason. 
The limited activities of the Japanese was another. Japanese business 
operations were too minor to threaten Australian interests, and they were 
confined in Milne Bay and had little interaction with the Japanese in New 
Guinea.72 Consequently no reports about the Japanese appeared in the Papua 
Annual Report or the Government Gazette between the two wars. 
However, Australians were concerned about the Japanese who attempted 
to enter the territory. In 1 939 Nan'yo Boeki Kaisha (South Seas Company) 
sent trade envoys to Samarai and Port Moresby and entertained the residents 
with films of Japanese industries and tourist attractions. The Pacific Islands 
Monthly reported the visit uneasily: 'in spite of wars and the echoes of wars, 
and the manifest distrust of all British communities in the Central and South 
Pacific, the Japanese continue with their program of commercial 
penetration-part of their campaign to secure economic domination of the 
Pacific' . 73 
There was another incident involving Nan'yo Boeki. The company 
purchased the steamer Papuan Chief. wrecked and lying on a reef near Port 
Moresby, and sent a Japanese crew to salvage it. The entry of the crew to Port 
Moresby was granted in July 1940, but the Department of Defence 
Co-Ordination had strongly objected, insisting that: 'the view of the 
Department of the Army is that it is undesirable for Japanese at Port 
Moresby, particularly having regard to movement of troops and other defence 
measures now taking place' . 74 However, the Department of Foreign Affairs 
supported admission provided that the crew stayed at Port Moresby for a 
limited period. Finally the Prime Minister decided to grant entry and advised 
Lieutenant Governor Murray: 'No doubt you will be able to restrict movement 
of crew at Port Moresby to a minimum, without this being obvious to the 
crew' . 75 
It was a delicate time just before the outbreak of the war. Prior to that, 
there was an incident which embarrassed the Australian government and 
71Tenitortes of New Guinea and Papua', Date unknown (possibly around 1939) . AA, A5 18/ l 
09 18/2. 
72lnterview by the author with Tanaka, Mary [daughter of Tanaka Taichiro) .  22 Dec. 1994, 
Samarai, Milne Bay, PNG. 
73Nationwide News, Pacific Islands Monthly, November 1939, 59. 
74Telegram quoted in 'Memorandum for the Secretary, Department of External Affairs', 8 July 
1940, AA, A98 1 / l  PAPUA 3. 
75Prtme Minister to the Lieutenant-Governor, 9 July 1940, ibid. 
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could have worsened its relations with Japan. In June 1 937, the Australian 
patrol boat Larrakia 'wrongfully and without lawful authority, and by force of 
arms seized and took possession' of the Japanese fishing vessel New Guinea 
Maru on the high seas in the Arafura Sea and imprisoned the captain and the 
crew.76 The Japanese appealed to the Supreme Court of the Northern 
Territory, which ordered the Australian government to pay compensation. 77 
Possibly the incident affected the attitude of the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and made it more diffident in the case of the Papuan Chief 
Australians were concerned about the possible effect of the war on 
Papuans. They feared that their authority would be undermined by war 
against a non-white race. Just one month before the war, the government 
anthropologist, F.E. Williams, wrote explicitly anti-Japanese articles in his 
newspaper The Papuan Villager which circulated among Australian-educated 
Papuans. The article introduced the Japanese as 'not white men . . . [and] 
very warlike people . . .  [who] have made a number of cruel wars against their 
neighbour, China, '  and concluded that: 
Japan is like a vei:y snappy little dog, barking at three big dogs that j ust lie down 
and look at her. The three big dogs are Great Britain, America and Russia. If this 
little dog ever begins to bite, then the three big dogs will jump at her and tear her 
to pieces. 78 
Japanese settlers 
The pre-war Japanese population was last recorded by the administration in 
1 920: six lived in the Eastern Division and one in the South-Eastern 
Division. 79 From 192 1  to 1948, the administration did not record the 
non-Papuan coloured population. Although the 1947-48 Annual Report 
(published in 1949) listed the coloured population, statistics were only for 
1 92 1  and 1933 and no Japanese were recorded in either year. 80 The only 
available data are the 1933 census by the Australian government that listed 
two Japanese in the category of 'not able to read and write English, but able 
to read and write a foreign language' and 14 Japanese 'classified according to 
race. '81 The two Japanese are undoubtedly Tanaka and Murakami. The 14 
Japanese were most likely mixed-race Japanese. 
Information about the Japanese in this period can also be derived from oral 
evidence. According to this, most early Japanese settlers died between the two 
76Statement of claim in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory of Australia, 1 8  June 
1938, AA. A l / 1 1938/20320. 
77Japanese lugger actions in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory of Australia, 8 Nov. 
1938, ibid. 
78The PapuWl Villager, Oct. 194 1 ,  No. 10, Vol. 13 .  
79Papua Annual Report (Melbourne 1920) , 13 .  
80Papua Annual Report (Melbourne 1949) , 34. 
81Census of the Commonwealth of Australia, Vol. 1 (Canberra 1933) . 573-4. 
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wars, and their mixed-race children took over their trade. The children 
continued to keep Japanese names and their businesses and mostly 
prospered. 
All informants (including local elders who are not related to the Japanese) 
say that the Japanese maintained amicable relations with Australians, 
Papuans and other Asians. Kala Murakami recalls that Charley Wisdel (an 
Australian) , who also worked for Whitten brothers in Samarai, was a good 
friend of his father. Also a Chinese cook called Maxim, and some Filipinos, 
were good friends of Japanese. But no informants suggest that the Japanese 
had a high profile in the community. 
Japanese in New Guinea 
Australian government attitudes 
Officials in Melbourne perceived the Japanese in New Guinea very explicitly 
as part of Japanese expansionism. Atlee Hunt, a member of the Royal 
Commission on Late German New Guinea (and the Secretary of the 
Department of Territories) , regarded the development of Japanese commercial 
activities in Taiwan, India, Dutch East Indies and the Philippines as 'no doubt 
part of a vast system' . 82 At this time there was a diplomatic dispute about the 
Australian restriction on direct trade between Rabaul and Japan. The 
Australian government stopped the Japanese trading in New Guinea from 
1 9 1 9 to 1 920 on two grounds-to retaliate against Japanese restriction on 
Burns, Philp's trade in Micronesia and to monopolise trade in New Guinea. 
In 1 9 19,  the government refused to grant permission to the Japanese vessel 
Nanking Maru to ship copra, discharge and load cargo at Rabaul. Similarly in 
1920 the government refused the application of the Madras Maru to discharge 
cargo at Rabaul. The Japanese government protested and the Japanese press 
condemned the Australian actions. 83 
As a result, diplomatic relations were strained, and rude behaviour by the 
Australian military staff at Rabaul who received the Japanese crew of Madras 
Maru added to the tension. It was alleged that Australian soldiers, under the 
influence of alcohol, abused and used violence against the Japanese returning 
to the ship. 84 Hearing of the incident, the administrator immediately reported 
to the Prime Minister, who quickly expressed regret to the Japanese 
Consul-General in Sydney, saying 'I shall be obliged if you will be good 
enough to inform the Japanese Government of the regret of the 
82'Activities of Japanese and Germans in Rabaul' , date unknown (definitely after 19 19;  Hunt 
was appointed the Commissioner of the Royal Commission on Late German New Guinea in 19 19). 
AA, CP66 1 /  15/ 1 BOX 1 .  
83Japan Advertiser, 2 3  May 1920; Japan Weekly Chronicle, 2 7  May 1920. 
84Prime Minister, S.S. 'Madras Maru' Incident at Rabaul, 7 December 1920, AA, A3932/ 1 
SC397. 
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Commonwealth Government at this occurrence' . 85 The soldiers were punished 
and the Japanese government did not take the matter up publicly. 
Nevertheless the Australian government kept a firm attitude on the trade 
issue, in spite of Piesse's suggestion that hard-line policies would affect 
diplomatic relations.86 Hughes bluntly rejected the Japanese official protest.87 
And Hunt thought Japanese activities were 'calculated to bring about one 
result i .e .  grave embarrassment to Australia . . .  [by] making Australia's 
position as difficult as possible' .  88 
Japanese traders sought in vain for a loophole. The Osaka Shosen Kaisha 
(Osaka Merchant Ship Company) applied for permission to open trade with 
the Solomons. Probably the company planned to purchase copra from a 
Japanese trader, Okaji, in Bougainville, thinking that he would act as a 
middle man between Rabaul and Japan. But the application was refused, for 
Australian officials thought that 'it seems obvious that Japanese 
frequentation of ports in the British Solomons is as dangerous to Australian 
interests as Japanese trade with Rabaul' .  89 
Regarding the Japanese residents in New Guinea, the Royal Commission 
recognised 'the desirability of adopting any policy which would free the 
Territory from Japanese influence' ,  and considered MacKenzie's proposal to 
purchase all Japanese properties.90 However, the Commission turned it down 
being sceptical of its likelihood of success. 91 
From the late 1 920s, officials in Canberra began to consolidate their 
perceptions of the danger of Japanese attack. They suspected that Japanese 
migrants in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia were part of 
government-organised Japanese expansion. The Australian Navy was 
monitoring the activities of the Japanese in New Guinea, Netherlands East 
Indies and Thursday Island intensively. 92 Similarly, Australian officials 
thought that Japanese fishing vessels operating illegally in waters north of 
Australia had some connection with espionage. Naval Intelligence collected 
detailed reports of Japanese poaching in the Gulf of Carpentaria, Ninigo 
85Prime Minister to Tamaki, 22 July 1920, ibid. 
86Memorandum for the Secretary, Prime Minister's Department, 16 Apr. 1920, ibid. 
87Prime Minister's Department, 1923, Territory of New Guinea: treatment of foreigners and 
foreign interests, p. 17,  in MS882, 'Piesse Paper' , Manuscript Room, National Library of Australia, 
Canberra. 
88'Activities of Japanese and Germans in Rabaul' ,  op.cit. 
89The Secretary, Prime Minister's Department, 24 Jan . 1920, AA, MP 1049 1920/047. 
00Royal Commission on (late) German New Guinea', 6 December 19 19, AA, 8 197 /0 2022/ 1 /3. 
It is doubtful whether MacKenzie really attempted to free New Guinea from Japanese influence, 
as his relations with Komine were cordial and good during the war. His proposal to purchase 
Japanese properties, which were indeed all Komine's properties, seemed to be aimed at assisting 
Komine who was short of funds to run his business. 
9 1 Ibid. 
92Correspondence to Director of Naval Intelligence are in AA, MP 1 049 / 5 1 877I 1 3  I 66. 
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Group, Solomon Islands, and so on. 93 The Commander of the Royal Australian 
Navy predicted 'the landing of the [Japanese] armed force somewhere on Cape 
York Peninsula' in the event of war.94 And a naval expert pointed out the 
significance of the islands of Micronesia as Japanese advanced bases and 
emphasised the vulnerability of Rabaul. 95 
Australian fear increased towards the end of the 1 930s. The Prime 
Minister's Department studied Japan's southward advancement policy.96 The 
Department monitored the entry of every agent of Japanese companies in New 
Guinea, when the giant Nippon Mining Co. sent a geologist to investigate the 
copper ore deposit in the Nakanai District on northwest coast of New Britain 
in 1 937 and the Nanyo Boeki Kaisha sent four Japanese to investigate the 
goldfields at Wau in 1939. Their activities were reported in detail to the 
Department by the administration at Rabaul, although none of those activities 
could be substantiated as spying. 97 The acting administrator reported: 'It is 
believed that every Japanese is a potential intelligence officer for Japan, but 
unfortunately it is not practicable to substantiate that belief by quoting 
incidents in support' . 98 
Rabaul' s view 
The Australians at Rabaul were also alarmed by the development of Japanese 
Micronesia. The secrecy of the Japanese administration aroused their 
suspicion. The seriousness of their concerns was illustrated by a long report 
in the Rabaul Tunes by Gordon Green, an Australian traveller who made a trip 
to Japan via Micronesia in 1 929.99 He reported in detail high tariffs imposed 
on imported goods and strict restrictions on his travel by the police. 
The Australian concerns turned to fear in the 1930s, when they learnt that 
the Japanese population in Micronesia was increasing rapidly, and when 
militarisation was rumoured. Numerous articles about Japanese Micronesia 
in the Rabaul Tunes, which were mostly long and detailed, indicate this fear. 
In 1 932, the newspaper reported: 
93Cormnander (Ret.) R.A.N.R. to Director of Naval Intelligence, 25 Oct. 1929; S.C. Thompson 
to Mr. Solomons, 29 Oct. 1933; Admiralty Reporting Officer to Director of Naval Intelligence, 8 
Nov. 1932, AA, MP 1049/5/0 1877I 13/ 1 52. 
94Commander (Ret.) R.A.N.R. to Director of Naval Intelligence, 28 Apr. 1936, ibid. 
95A Naval Expert, 'Mandated Territories-Some Defence Consideration', in Frederic Egglestone 
(ed. } ,  The Australian Mandate for New Guinea (Melbourne 1928} , 95. 
96'Southward advancement policy' received by the Prime Minister's Department, 6 Dec. 1938, 
AA, Al606/ l SCBS 12/ l .  
97Administrator to the Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department, 2 1  Oct. 1937, AA, A5 18/ 1 
W834/ l ;  Acting administrator to the Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department, 20 Jan. 1939, 
AA, A8 16/ l 19/304/ 188. 
98Acting administrator to the Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department, 20 Jan. 1939, ibid. 
99Rabaul Times, 18 Jan. 1929, Rabaul. 
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Japanese had fortified the more strategic points in the Carolines, and was also 
Japan-ing the natives of her mandated territory in a wholesale manner by 
inter-marriage with the women of the islands. In 1 920 there were some 3,600 
Japanese; when the 1 930 census was taken the number increased to nearly 
20,000! 100 
When another Australian traveller reported Japanese naval exercises in 
Micronesian waters, 101 the editor immediately wrote an alarming article. 102 A 
month later, the editor repeated the alarm: 'Japan is endeavouring to present 
an amicably-inclined face to the nations of the world' ,  and criticised the 
inability of the League of Nations to keep Japan and Germany in the 
League. 103 Rabaul's anxiety increased when a well-known German journalist, 
Herbert Rittlinger, stopped at Rabaul after his trip to Micronesia but declined 
to comment about the fortifications. The Rabaul Times reported, 'Perhaps he 
has seen things, and has given his word not to divulge the information which 
he has collected' . 104 Their anti-Japanese feelings were heightened by anger 
against the frequent appearances of Japanese poachers in New Guinea 
waters. At the same time the Australians in Rabaul felt that Canberra was 
neglecting to protect them, and condemned the Federal Government. 105 
However, Rabaul's fear seems to have been directed mainly towards 
Japanese in Micronesia and Japanese poachers, not to the local Japanese 
residents. Economically the local Japanese hardly threatened Australian 
interests, as the Administrator Brigadier-General Thomas Griffiths reported 
to Melbourne. 106 The Rabaul Times did not express any hostility towards the 
local Japanese except for one article about the death of a Japanese suspected 
of spying. The article was ve:ry brief (one paragraph) compared to the articles 
about Japanese Micronesia or poachers. The whole article says: 
A prominent Japanese merchant by the name of Y. Nishimura, died here suddenly 
whilst in a detective's office undergoing questioning. Other prominent Japanese 
have been questioned and later deported. Many documents have been seized and 
it is rumoured that a gigantic espionage system has been discovered. 107 
But it is doubtful that Nishimura was a spy. If any gigantic espionage system 
had existed, the incident would have attracted the attention of Canberra or 
100Rabaul Times, 22 Apr. 1932. 
1011bid. ,  15  Sept. 1933. 
1021bid. ,  22 Sept. 1 933. 
1031bid. ,  2 7  Oct. 1933. 
1041bid. ,  2 2  Dec. 1933. 
1051bid. ,  19 Jan. 1934 and 1 7  May 1935. 
106Memorandum for the Secretary, Department of Defence, Melbourne, 20 Sept. 1920, AA, 
AWM33 57/5. 
107Rabaul Times, 14 Dec. 1934. 
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Naval Intelligence, but there is no official record in Australian sources. 108 The 
name of Nishimura cannot be found in the list of passports issued for 
travellers bound for New Guinea in the Japanese Foreign Ministry record or 
Japanese literature. There is no oral evidence, either. This suggests that he 
was a merchant based outside New Guinea. Possibly he acted somehow 
suspiciously in the eyes of some Australians and was caught by the police, 
then his sudden death provoked a rumour that he was a spy. The incident 
may simply show the nervousness of Australians in Rabaul against non-local 
Japanese. 
Despite its anxiety about Japanese expansion, the Rabaul Times wrote 
about the local Japanese in a respectful and friendly way. The editor praised 
Komine's carpenters' 'very clever piece of work' to shift Bums, Philp's 
bungalow without causing much disturbance. 109 When the arrest of a New 
Guinean called 'Komini' for stealing was in the news, the editor noted 'not our 
esteemed Japanese fellow townsman' . 1 10 At the death of Komine in 1 934 he 
was written about as one held in high esteem: he was 'one of the oldest and 
best-known identities in the Territory' and 'the whole [Rabaul] community 
extends its deep sympathy' to his widow. 1 1 1  
The Rabaul Times's warm comments on the film show held by the Rabaul 
branch of Nan'yo Boeki suggest that personally Australians remained friendly 
to the local Japanese even after the outbreak of war in Europe. The branch 
was run by Tashiro Tsunesuke, a long time resident. The show was held twice 
in October and December 1 939. The newspaper reported that the 'films 
showing the industrial and agricultural life [of Japan] were exceedingly 
interesting' and that 'a crowded house fully appreciated the interesting 
portrayal of Japanese social and industrial life' .  The second show was even 
combined with fund raising by local white women (Ethel Smith and Tootsie 
Hamilton) for the Red Cross. 1 12 The absence of hostility was probably due to 
the smallness of the local Japanese population and their long personal 
acquaintance with white residents. 
The Japanese population 
The Japanese population declined gradually under Australian migration 
regulations, particularly due to the clause that unless Japanese men were 
married when they first came to New Guinea, they could not bring their 
108All intelligence files (including secret files) related to Japanese activities in New Guinea, 
Micronesia and waters north of Australia in this period seem to be open to the public, but the 
author could not find a record related to Nishimura's death. 
109Rabaul Times, 8 July 1927. 
1 101bid. ,  26 Apr. 1929. 
1 1 11bid . ,  5 Oct. 1934. 
1 121bid. ,  20 Oct. 1939 and 15 Dec. 1939. 
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wives. 1 13 This regulation effectively reduced the number of Japanese who were 
mostly single males on two-to-three year contracts. Also the restriction not to 
allow the population to increase higher than the number in 1 9 14 stopped new 
Japanese from migrating. Some left New Guinea and even fewer came in. As 
Table 4-6 shows, the number decreased by about half from 87 in 1 92 1  to 38 
in 1940. The decline of the female population was high, suggesting that quite 
a few married couples left New Guinea. 
Consequently, in terms of numbers, the Japanese became an extremely 
marginal group. As Table 4-7 shows, they were far fewer than other 
non-indigenous groups and their proportion among these groups declined 
from 2 .7  per cent in 1 92 1  to 0 .5 per cent in 1 940. 
TABLE 4-6. Population of Japanese by gender in New Guinea, 1 92 1 - 1 940 
male female total male female total 
192 1 69 18  87  1932 29 6 35 
1923 59 14 73 1933 38 6 44 
1924 5 1  8 59 1934 37 7 44 
1925 46 8 54 1935 38 7 45 
1926 40 6 46 1936 33 6 39 
1927 4 1  6 47 1937 38 2 40 
1928 42 7 49 1938 35 3 38 
1929 37 8 45 1939 36 4 40 
1930 38 7 45 1940 36 2 38 
193 1 33 7 40 
Source: Report to the League of Nations on the Administration of the Tenitory of New Guinea 
( 1922) . 139; ( 1924) . 94; ( 1925) . 68; ( 1926) , 54; ( 1927) . 40; ( 1928) . 90; ( 1929) . 69; ( 1 930) . 98; 
( 193 1) .  108; ( 1932) . 1 06; ( 1933). 96; ( 1 934). 1 16; ( 1 935) .  104; ( 1936). 98; ( 1937) . 1 0 1 ;  ( 1938). 128; 
( 1 939) . 1 3 1 ;  ( 1940) . 129; ( 194 1) .  1 3 1 .  
TABLE 4-7. Population of Japanese and other non-indigenous groups in New Guinea, 
1 92 1 - 1 940 
Japanese Chinese British German other total 
192 1 87 1 ,402 7 1 5  579 390 3, 1 73 
1923 73 1 ,365 765 325 399 2,927 
1924 59 1 ,330 824 3 1 6  465 2,994 
1925 54 1 ,303 944 3 10 434 3,045 
1926 46 1 ,279 1 ,086 299 422 3, 1 32 
1927 47 1 ,254 1 .34 1 293 464 3,399 
1928 49 1 ,259 1 , 629 332 482 3 ,75 1 
1929 45 1 ,253 1 ,808 328 494 3,928 
1930 45 1 ,238 1 ,992 348 532 4, 1 55 
193 1 40 1 , 179 1 ,992 370 56 1 4, 142 
1932 35 1 . 2 1 5  2, 140 402 574 4,366 
1933 44 1 .353 2,594 379 845 5,2 1 5  
1934 44 1 .399 2,847 377 549 5,2 16 
1935 45 1 .424 3,026 404 554 5,453 
1936 39 1 .448 3,288 442 47 1 5,688 
1 13Terrttortes of New Guinea and Papua' , Date unknown (possibly around 1939) . AA. A5 18/ l 
09 18/2. 
1 10 
Table 4-7 contd 
1937 40 
1938 38 
1939 40 
1940 38 
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1 , 525 
1 , 737 
1 ,890 
2,06 1 
3,329 
3,472 
3,547 
3,345 
469 
473 
473 
439 
534 
563 
588 
6 1 5  
Source: same as Table 4-6 
5,897 
6,283 
6,538 
6,498 
The occupational composition also changed. As Table 4-8 shows, by 1 938 
artisans (carpenters and sawyers) and labourers disappeared, whereas the 
number of traders and trading company agents and fishermen increased. The 
increase of those two occupations is important when the total population 
decreased by more than half. As a result, the proportions of traders and 
trading company agents and fishermen increased respectively from 3.8 per 
cent in 1 92 1  to 1 3.9 per cent in 1938 and from 7.7 per cent to 23.2 per cent. 
TABLE 4-8. Occupations of the Japanese in New Guinea, 1 92 1  and 1 938 (no.  and %) 
trader & planter & boat carpenter sawyer fisherman barber factory other total 
trading plantation builder hand"' 
co. 's agent manager 
192 1 
no. 4 27 10 12 3 8 3 1 1  25•• 1 03••• 
% 3.8  26.2 9 .7  1 1 .6  2 .9 7 .7  2 .9  10.6 24.2 1 00 
1938 
no. 6 13 7 0 0 10 3 0 4 43••• 
% 13.9 30.2 16.2 0 0 23.2 6.9 0 9.3 1 00 
-This seems to be labourers in boat building yard. 
•-nus includes 13 accompanying family members (mostly wives and children). 
••*These figure from the Japanese source contradict those from the Australian source in Table 
4-6. The Japanese figures seem to be more accurate, because they are more detailed about the 
occupational classification than the Australian ones. 
Source: Nan'y6 ch6 ch6kan kanb6 ch6sa ka [Research Section of the Secretary-General of the 
South Seas Government] , Nyiiginia jy6 (g6shii inin t6chi ry6) [The situation in New Guinea 
(Australian mandated territory)) (Koror 1939) , 3 18- 19.  
Japanese economic activities 
The change in the occupational structure was caused by the emergence of 
new small businessmen. The largest company, Komine's Nan'yo Sangyo, was 
liquidated in 193 1  and some of his business was bought by Nagahama. At the 
same time, small fishing companies and a new branch of a trading company 
were established. Consequently, as Table 4-9 and 4- 1 0  show, the number of 
businesses increased from two in 1 9 1 9  to 1 2  in 1 940. Those new companies 
did not require many employees, except for Nagahama's plantations, because 
they were mostly run by family members. 114 Simultaneously the scale of ship 
building was reduced, so the demands for artisans declined, and the costly 
Japanese employees were replaced with cheap New Guineans. 
1 14JDR, E.4.0.0. 1 1 .  
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Although the population had declined and a large company disappeared, 
Japanese trade with New Guinea increased. After the restriction on trade was 
lifted, exports increased rapidly from £458 in 1 923 to £34,92 1  in 1 939 and 
imports from £525 in 1 925 to £7,266 in 1 939 (Table 4- 1 1) .  The total trade 
(exports and imports) increased from £3,373 in 1 925 to £42, 1 87 in 1 939, at 
a rate of 1 ,000 per cent. However, this increase is not so astonishing, as the 
total New Guinean trade increased by 820 per cent in the same period. us The 
proportion of Japanese trade remained extremely marginal in the total New 
Guinea trade, although it increased very slightly from 0.6 per cent in 1 925 to 
0.9 per cent in 1939 (even at its peak in 1 937 the proportion was only 2.3 per 
cent) . u6 
TABLE 4-9. Japanese businesses in New Guinea in 1 9 1 9  
name of businessman company name type of business 
1 .  Komine Isokichi Nan'yo Sangyo general store, boatbuilding, 
fishery, copra planting 
2. Okaji Santar6 Okaji Company general store, copra planting 
capital (yen) 
1 ,000,000 
1 5,000 
Source: Gaimusho tsiish6 kyoku [Bureau of Commerce, Department of Foreign Affairs],  Zaigai 
1wnp6 jitsugy6 sha shirabe [Report on overseas Japanese businessmen) (Tokyo 1919) ,  2 13, in JDR, 
Tsii 189. 
TABLE 4- 10.  Japanese businesses in New Guinea in 1 940 
name of businessman company name type of business 
1 .  Nakamura S6shichi Nakamura Company fishery 
2. Kimura Hideichiro Kimura Company fishery 
3. Kikuchi Ichisuke Kikuchi Company 
4. Tsujii Shigeru Tsujii Mano Company 
Mano Kisabur6 
5. Ikeda Kuniz6 
6. Ishibashi Umakichi 
7. Tsurushima S6kichi 
8. Ishimoto Terunart 
(representative)• 
9. Asanuma Ichimatsu 
10. Izumi Eikichi 
1 1 . Nagahama Taichi 
(with Ah Tam) 
12. Nagahama Taichi 
(with Shin Loon) 
Ikeda Company 
Ishibashi Company 
Tsurushima Company 
South Seas Trading 
Company, Rabaul 
branch 
Asanuma Factory 
Izumi shipyard 
Kali plantation 
Sau plantation 
Rambutjo plantation 
Pitelu plantation 
Papitelai plantation 
Uraputor plantation 
Kabil plantation 
*Tashiro Tsunesuke was a local agent. 
1 15Data from the same source as Table 4- 1 1 . 
1 161bid. 
fishery 
fishery 
fishery 
fishery 
general store, retailer 
wholesaler, trader of marine 
products and trochus shell 
trading 
mechanical repairs 
ship building 
copra planting 
copra planting 
copra planting 
copra planting 
copra planting 
copra planting 
copra planting 
Source: JDR, E.4.0.0. 1 1 . 
capital (yen) 
3,000 
8,000 
10,000 
10,000 
7,000 
7,000 
100,000 
1 5,000 
10,000 
50,000 
180,000 
39,000 
85,000 
65,000 
140,000 
25,000 
25,000 
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TABLE 4- 1 1 . Japanese trade with New Guinea, 1 9 1 9- 1 939 (£) 
export import total 
1923 458 
1924 194 
1925 2,848 
1926 
1927 10,303 
1928 18,805 
1929 23, 103 
1930 27,050 
193 1 13,947 
1932 22,046 
1933 25,369 
1934 42,757 
1935 76,030 
1936 73,747 
1937 98,585 
1938 46,627 
1939 34,92 1 
525 
4,065 
3,633 
4,243 
7 ,783 
9,839 
12,035 
10,027 
8,620 
7,445 
7,266 
3,373 
10,303 
18,805 
23, 103 
3 1 , 1 15 
17 ,580 
26,289 
33, 1 52 
52,596 
88,065 
83,774 
107,205 
54,072 
42. 187 
Source: Report to the League of Nations on the Administration of the Tenitory of New Guinea 
( 1926),60- 1 ;  ( 1927). 47-8; ( 1927). 54-6; ( 1 928) . 39-40; ( 1929). 53-62; ( 1930). 63-73; ( 193 1) .  60-70; 
( 1 932) . 59-68; ( 1933) . 77-86; ( 1934). 69-79; ( 1 935) . 66-75; ( 1936) . 67-77; ( 1937) . 9 1 - 1 00; ( 1938) . 
94- 103; ( 1939) . 93- 1 02; ( 1940) . 85- 10 1 .  
Although the total trade was slight, it was lucrative and the balance always 
greatly favoured Japan. A typical Japanese trade pattern developed-export 
of light manufactured goods and import of raw materials. The major exports 
were tinned fish, clothes and textiles (Table 4- 12)-common Japanese exports 
in the pre-war period. Tsurushima and Nan'yo Boeki, retailers of Japanese 
goods at Rabaul, used to advertise the sale of kimono, silk underwear and 
even Sapporo beer. 1 17 The major Japanese imports were shell (mainly 
trochus) , followed by copra and beche-de-mer (Table 4- 1 3) ,  reflecting the 
increase in the businesses engaged in those industries (Table 4-9 and 4- 1 0) .  
The demand for those products was, however, slight in Japan: even copra, 
one of the major exports from the South Seas, occupied less than one per cent 
in 1 937 in the total imports of Japan. 1 18 
The trade and investment show a classic pattern of colonial trade. The 
Japanese invested capital in primary industries and used New Guinean 
labour for production, while expanding the local market for their 
manufactured goods. In the plantations and shipyards, the Japanese used 
New Guinean labourers. As Table 4- 14  shows, all fishermen employed New 
Guinean crews; all plantations had New Guinean labourers; and the shipyard 
and even general store had New Guinean employees. In total 324 New 
Guineans were employed by about 40 Japanese. The Japanese recruited New 
1 1 7Rabaul Times, 16 Nov. 1934 and 3 1  Dec . 1937. 
1 18Naikaku tokei-kyoku [the Statistical Bureau of the Cabinet) (ed .) , Dai Nihon teikoku t6kei 
nenkan [Statistical yearbook of the Great Japan Empire] ,  Vol. 57 (Tokyo 1938) .  2 14. 
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Guineans widely from Manus, New Ireland, New Britain and Bougainville. 1 19 
Like white settlers, the Japanese suffered from the shortage of labour and 
even went to the area along the Ramu River in mainland New Guinea to 
recruit. 120 
TABLE 4- 1 2 .  Major items of Japanese exports to New Guinea, 1 928- 1 939 (£) 
tinned fish apparel & attire textiles cement matches other total 
1928 2,606 3 ,475 9 , 196 1 , 1 99 479 1 ,850 18,805 
1929 762 1 ,9 1 5  5,045 2,473 93 12 ,4 1 5  23, 103 
1930 2,807 8 1 8  8,772 454 260 1 3,939 27,050 
193 1 496 3 19 8,505 1 ,284 7 3 ,336 1 3,947 
1932 2,307 1 ,047 14,4 18  1 ,456 33 2 ,785 22,046 
1933 2,789 3,082 1 1 ,379 1 ,090 304 6,725 25,369 
1934 2,935 4, 1 50 2 1 ,79 1  1 ,569 53 1 1 1 ,78 1 42,757 
1935 7,325 6 ,580 39,083 2,704 868 19,470 76,030 
1936 1 1 ,426 5,487 26,64 1 2,962 62 1 26, 6 1 0  73,747 
1937 12,008 6,959 50,526 1 ,370 894 26,82 1 98,585 
1938 7,002 3 ,370 22,024 1 ,563 1 , 160 1 1 ,508 46,627 
1939 13,256 3 ,659 3,352 995 3,0 18  10,64 1  34,92 1 
Source: the same as Table 4- 1 1 . 
TABLE 4- 1 3 .  Major items of Japanese imports from New Guinea, 1 93 1 - 1 939 (£) 
copra shell beche-de-mer other total 
193 1  3,620 13 3 ,633 
1932 4,2 1 5  28 4,243 
1933 7,595 1 50 38 7 ,783 
1934 9,8 16 23 9 ,839 
1935 662 1 1 ,340 33 12,035 
1936 359 9,520 148 10,027 
1937 4,232 4,340 48 8,620 
1938 2,690 2,880 1 ,875 7 ,445 
1939 7,040 226 7 ,266 
Source: the same as Table 4- 1 1 .  
TABLE 4- 14 .  New Guinean labourers in Japanese businesses, 1 940 
company name no. of New Guinean employees no. of other non-Japanese employees 
Nakamura Company 8 
Kimura Company 
Kikuchi Company 
Tsujii Mano Company 
Ikeda Company 
Ishibashi Company 
Tsurushima Company 
South Seas Trading Company 
Asanuma Factory 
Izumi Shipyard 
Kali plantation 
25 
25 
20 
22 
20 
3 
8 
20 
30 
2 (Malays) 
1 (Filipino) 
4 (Chinese) 
1 19various oral evidence collected by the author (from Nov. 1993 to Mar. 1994 in PNG) confirms 
this. 
12°Fujiki, op.cit. , p.6.  
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Table 4-1 4  contd 
Sau plantation 
Rambutjo plantation 
Pitelu plantation 
Papitelai plantation 
Uraputor plantation 
Kabil plantation 
total 
Source: JDR, E.4.0.0. 1 1 . 
Japanese settlers 
8 
28 
25 
40 
22 
20 
324 7 
Japanese settlers were, as the Australians in Rabaul perceived, no menace to 
the security of New Guinea. They lived their day to day life like other ordinary 
townsfolk. Unlike in Micronesia or Southeast Asia, they formed no political 
organisations or religious groups. They formed the Japanese Society in 1 932, 
but it was a social club used only by the Japanese. They were aware of the 
Australian fear of Japanese development in Micronesia, as it was often 
rumoured and reported in the newspaper. And they knew about developments 
in Micronesia because Nan'yo Boeki's liner came regularly to Rabaul from 
Ponape bringing news. Probably they felt neglected by their own government, 
knowing of the 'Japanisation' of Micronesia: the establishment of schools, 
shrines, temples and even education of Micronesians. However, they also 
knew that any public expression of admiration for development in Micronesia 
was detrimental to good relations with the Australians. All they could do was 
hide their patriotism and concentrate on their daily business, hoping that one 
day their government would praise their development of New Guinea. 12 1  
The Japanese divided into three groups-businessmen at Rabaul, mobile 
fishermen, and plantation managers and planters on Manus, New Ireland and 
Bougainville. 122 Most lived in Rabaul and others often visited there. Rabaul 
was a meeting place for business transactions, socialisation and gathering 
precious information about Japan. In Rabaul, the Japanese community, 
although small, was well known. They had stores, a garage, shipyard and 
barber's shop, most of which advertised in the local newspaper. 123 Although 
the precise number of the Japanese in Rabaul throughout the period is 
unknown because of the lack of a local population census except for 1 933 and 
121InteIView by the author with Hatamoto Otosaku (ex-Rabaul shipwright 1937- 1940) . 3 July 
1993, Nagasaki, Japan. Hatamoto was interned in Australia during the Pacific War. He proudly 
told the author that the Japanese at Rabaul were san.gyo kaihatsu-in (industrial development stafl) 
and therefore Australian treatment in the internment camp was good. That indicates they thought 
that they were contributing to the development of New Guinea, even though it was for Australia. 
122For detailed infomation about individual settlers, see Iwamoto Hiromitsu, 'Japanese 
southward expansion in the South Seas and its relations with Japanese settlers in Papua and New 
Guinea, 19 19- 1940' , South Pacific Study, 1 7( 1 )  ( 1996) . 29-8 1 .  
123Rabaul Times, 17  June 1927, 1 May 1936, 1 6  Nov. 1934 and 3 1  Dec. 1937. 
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1 940, on average about 20 Japanese seem to have resided in the town. In 
1 933 the Commonwealth census recorded 1 7  according to nationality (i.e. , 
allegiance) and 29 according to race. 124 The first figure is veiy likely the actual 
number of the Japanese and the latter seems to be mixed-race Japanese. In 
1 94 1  when all Japanese were interned, 1 6  out of total 29 internees were 
arrested in Rabaul. 125 
Their material possessions made them visible, out of proportion to their 
numbers. They had nine motor vessels ,  three motor cars (two latest model 
Plymouth sedans and one Ford V-8 sedan 1938 model) , two trucks and one 
motor cycle, and most owned houses. 126 However, their social status did not 
equal that of white residents. They were still not accepted in European 
quarters as in the German period. Most Japanese lived in the area now called 
Malaytown and Malaguna, and Japanese stores and Imaizumi's cinema were 
in Chinatown. 127 The Japanese quarters in Malaytown were sometimes called 
'Japantown' . 128 
Komine remained a leader of the community. He acted as a lobbyist when 
Australia restricted Japan-New Guinea trade. In 1 920 he visited Sydney to 
petition the Australian government to lift trade restrictions. 129 He also 
unsuccessfully sought permission from the Prime Minister to raise £ 1 0,000 
to £1 5,000 by mortgaging his plantations to a Sydney company, George 
Morgan & Co. Ltd. 130 In Sydney he was interviewed by the Daily Telegraph. A 
short article appeared with a photograph. Probably Komine exaggerated his 
experiences in New Guinea deliberately in order to impress Australians. The 
article said that he was a 'Pacific Pioneer' and 'built a row-boat . . .  to navigate 
360 miles of the Fly River . . . by permission of Sir William MacGregor' . His 
assistance to the Australian forces at World War I was admiringly reported 
and the article concluded that 'he did a heap of service generally, for which 
the [British] Empire stands in his debt' . 13 1 
As on his visit to Sydney, Komine sometimes acted like an official 
representative of the Japanese in New Guinea. Some Australians in fact 
thought that he was an official. An Australian traveller, Lilian Overell, 
mistakenly thought him a consul. 132 Similarly, Manus people thought he was 
a Japanese kiap. 133 
1 24Census of the Commonwealth of Australia, Vol. l (Canberra 1933) ,  58 1 .  
125AA, MP 1 103/ l MJ 18500-MJ 1 8533. 
126Ibid. 
127Various oral evidence collected by the author, Jan. 1994, Rabaul, PNG. 
128Rabaul Gazette, Vol.6, No.2 (Rabaul 19 19) .  28. 
129Komine to Prime Minister, 12 July 1920, AA, A3932/ 1 SC397. 
130Piesse's report, 26 May 192 1 ,  AA, A457/ l 673/8. 
131DaUy Telegraph, 9 July 1920, Sydney. 
132Lillian Overell, A Woman's impression of German New Guinea (London 1923) , 9. There was 
no Japanese consulate at Rabaul. 
133various oral evidence collected by the author, Mar. 1994, Manus, PNG. 
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Komine led the Japanese economic activities until just before the Great 
Depression. In 1 929, his company made £26,000 profit and employed 1 4  
Japanese and 362 New Guineans, while Nagahama, who had the second 
largest business among the Japanese, made only £3,000 and employed one 
Japanese and 1 0  New Guineans. 134 
However, Komine's status began to decline when the Great Depression 
savaged all planters in New Guinea. 135 Komine was no exception. His 
businesses made large losses and his debt to Burns, Philp increased to the 
extent that he could not pay wages to his employees. In this crisis he asked 
the Consul-General, Inoue Kojiro, in Sydney for financial assistance. Inoue 
wrote to the Foreign Minister, Shidehara Kijiiro, regarding Komine's request 
to borrow funds at low interest. 136 Shortly afterwards Hanaoka Masaichi, the 
directing manager of the headquarters of the Nan'yo Sangyo Kaisha in Japan, 
sent a formal petition to Shidehara. 137 Prominent white residents in Rabaul 
also radioed to Tokyo to ask for assistance for Komine. They included the 
administrator Colonel Wisdom, the Catholic Missionary Society, the Methodist 
Church and the Anglican Bishop. 138 
However, Tokyo was reluctant to respond. Inoue pressed Shidehara again 
saying, 'unless the Japanese government took some measures or gave credible 
guarantee on the payment of his debts, it would be very conceivable that 
Japanese businesses, which had been firmly built on the islands, would be 
overturned from the foundation' .  139 Komine was frustrated and wrote a long 
letter to Inoue, emphasising that he started his business because he was 
encouraged by the admirals of the Imperial Navy, and appealed to national 
prestige. More importantly Komine clearly indicated his imperial ambition: 
My purpose [in starting the business] was not to make profits but to lay a 
foundation for the development of the Empire in future. Therefore I kept good 
relations with German administrators and, of course, with Australian 
administrators. As imperial subjects, I and other Japanese have endured 
difficulties until today so that we should not disgrace the Empire. 140 
In response, Inoue appealed to Tokyo more strongly but in vain. 14 1 Even the 
Bank of New South Wales recommended 'favourable consideration of his 
[Komine's] application' to Tokyo, but the government declined any 
1 34Gaimu-sho tsiisho-kyoku, Zaigai honpo jitsugyo sha shirabe [Report about overseas 
Japanese businessmen) (Tokyo 1929) . 339, in JDR, Tsii 193. 
135Heather Radi, 'New Guinea under Mandate 192 1-4 1 ' ,  in W. J.  Hudson (ed. ) ,  Australia and 
Papua New Guinea (Sydney 197 1) .  120. 
1361noue to Shidehara, 10 July 1930, JDR, E.2.2 . 1 .3- 1 .  
137Hanaoka to Shidehara, 22 July 1930, ibid. 
138Administrator Wisdom, 14 July 1930; Catholic Missionruy Society, 22 July 1930; Methodist 
Church, 23 July 1930; Anglican Bishop, 25 July 1930, ibid. 
139lnoue to Shidehara, 5 Aug. 1930, ibid. 
140Komine to Inoue, 12 Aug. 1930, ibid. 
141Telegram, Inoue to Shidehara, 16 Sept . ,  ibid. 
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assistance. 142 Japan could not intervene in the affairs of the Australian 
mandate, because it would have caused a diplomatic problem with Australia; 
Japan had been excluding non-Japanese economic activities, particularly the 
operations of Bums, Philp, in Micronesia. Consequently, although Frederick 
Ewen Loxton (a director of Bums, Philp and sympathetic honorary consul in 
Brisbane) intervened and succeeded in postponing the foreclosure for two 
months, 143 Komine's business (including properties) was auctioned on 30 
December 1 930. 144 At this time he was 64 years old, probably too old to run 
a business, as Inoue wrote in his letter to Shidehara that Komine needed able 
advisers. 145 
After he lost his business, he returned to his old trade-shell 
fishing-despite his age. One day in October 1 934 he took a schooner to sea 
and died. He was then 68 years old. It was an ironic end to his dramatic life. 
He died like a careless fisherman, not like a once successful businessman. He 
was poisoned by a lobster which he caught and ate. 146 But his funeral revived 
his past glory. Hundreds of New Guineans from Manus, New Ireland, and 
Bougainville, Chinese and Europeans, including the Acting-Administrator 
Wanliss and other officials attended. 147 Tatsue Yoshinobu, Komine's old friend 
since his exploration days, erected a monument in the European cemetery. 148 
His body was cremated and his wife went back to Nagasaki with his bones. 
However, Komine's death did not end Japanese business activities. At the 
time of liquidation, Komine persuaded Nagahama Taichi, a shipwright from 
Goryo village in Amakusa, to take over his business. Komine recruited 
Nagahama in the 1 9 1 0s because Nagahama's family in Amakusa were 
well-known as master shipwrights for generations. In Rabaul, Nagahama 
worked for Komine for some years, but soon became independent and set up 
his own shipyard and coastal shipping business. 149 Fortunately Nagahama's 
business was not much affected by the fall of copra prices because he was not 
a planter. Komine told Nagahama that successors of Ah Tam, a wealthy 
Chinese resident in Rabaul and Komine's long-time friend, would provide as 
much assistance as possible for the purchase of Komine's businesses. 
According to Nagahama's daughter, what Komine most feared was that his 
14�elegram from the Bank of New South Wales to the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo, 6 Sept. 1930, 
ibid. 
143lnoue to Shidehara, 30 Oct. 1930, ibid. 
144Rabaul Times, 18 July 1930; Managing Director of Burns, Philp to Inoue, 30 Oct. 1930, ibid. 
145Inoue to Shidehara, 5 Aug. 1930, op.cit. 
1461nterview by the author with Sato Yachiyo (Komine's nephew's daughter) , 1 July 1993, 
Nagasaki, Japan. 
147Various oral evidence collected by the author, Jan.- Mar. 1994, Rabaul, Kavieng, Manus, 
PNG; Pacific Island Monthly, 22 Nov. 1934, Sydney, p. 16.  
148Nanp6 sangyo chosa-kai, 194 1 ,  Nyiiginia [New Guinea] , Nanshin-sha, Tokyo, p . 149. 
149lnterview by the author with Nagahama Tome (a wife of Nagahama Yoshiyuki, a Rabaul 
shipwright and a nephew of Taichi Nagahama) , 30 June 1993, Amakusa, Japan. 
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assets would be taken over by Bums, Philp, extinguishing Japanese influence 
in New Guinea. 150 Nagahama bought all of Komine's plantations with Ah 
Tam's successors (Lee Tam Tuck, Tee Chee Wee, Tse Dong, See To Fat 
Whye) . 151 Naturally Nagahama, now the wealthiest Japanese in New Guinea, 
took over the leadership of the community. In 1 932 he became the founder 
and first president of the Rabaul Japanese Society. 152 His nephew, Yukiyoshi, 
also worked in his shipyard . Although Nagahama did not have a history of 
bravery like Komine, probably he had an air of dignity cultivated by his 
upbringing in his master shipwright's family where the master-apprentice 
relationship was strictly maintained. Like Komine, he lived in Malaguna. 
The fishermen operated widely from the Ninigo Group to Bougainville and 
fished mainly for trochus shell. They worked for Komine until the liquidation 
of his business. After that, most formed companies and sold their catch to 
Tsurushima and Nan'yo Boeki . They all owned at least one schooner and 
employed many Manus people. 153 Most lived in Rabaul, except for Kikuchi 
Ichisuke and Nakamura Soshichi because of their marriages to New Guinean 
women. Both lived in Talasea. 
Plantation managers and planters were the last major group. Most worked 
in Manus either for Komine or Nagahama. Originally they came to New 
Guinea as fishermen or boatbuilders. Probably they were hard workers and 
won credit from Komine or Nagahama (both well-known for their strictness 
towards their employees) . Their ability to form good relations with New 
Guineans probably helped them to be appointed managers. Most married 
local women, which indicates that they were liked and accepted by the local 
communities. 154 That was an important factor in managing plantations where 
hundreds of New Guineans had to be employed. 
Race relations 
The Japanese managed to form amicable relations with members of the main 
races in New Guinea. In the colonial structure which was strictly hierarchical 
by race, the Japanese precariously secured a position almost equal to the 
Australians in formal terms; in reality they did not enjoy the full privileges 
which Australians had. The Japanese held the position of business partners 
to the Chinese, and masters to New Guineans. Their peaceful relationship 
150A letter to the author from Saij6 Setsuko (a daughter of Nagahama Taichi) , 13 July 1993. 
151 'Agreement' , date unknown, AA, Al379 EP/J/85 1 SECTION E. 
152Gaimu-sh6 tsiisho-kyoku, Zaigai nihonjin-kai narabijitsugyo dantai shirabe [Report on 
Japanese societies and businessmen overseas] (Tokyo 1939) , 180, in JDR, Tsii-2 10; In the 1930s, 
the Japanese government encouraged the Japanese in the South Pacific to establish local clubs, 
reflecting the rise of Japanese interest in the South Seas. The Japanese societies were established 
in Rabaul, Noumea, Suva and New Hebrides in 1932 and in Tonga in 1935. 
153Manus people were renowned for their seamanship and navigation. 
154Generally inter-racial marriages take place with acknowledgment of the community. They 
rarely take place based on individual decision. 
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with the Australians was partly attributable to their numerical and economic 
marginality. 155 The Australians could maintain their friendliness, because the 
Japanese hardly affected their interests. This contrasts with Australian 
uneasiness with the Chinese when their number increased and their business 
expanded. 156 If the Australians had not restricted Japanese migration and 
trading, the Japanese could have experienced the same fate as they did on 
Thursday Island from the 1 890s and eventually been driven out of New 
Guinea. The amicable Japanese-Australian relations developed in this 
artificial situation. 
At a personal level, however, the administrators always respected Komine. 
That was demonstrated at the times of Komine's financial difficulties and 
funeral. Other Japanese also made personal friends. Nozaki Tsunejro,  the 
boatbuilder, and his wife had been friends of John Thurston, a prominent 
planter, 'for many years' . 157 In fact, the childless couple adopted Josephine, 
a daughter of Thurston. 158 Asanuma Ichimatsu and Izumi Eikichi were 'great 
friends' of Gordon Ehret, a Rabaul trader, and did much repair work for 
him. 159 Similarly ex-Rabaul shipwright Hatamoto Otosaku recalls good 
relations with his Australian counterparts. 160 He was building boats for the 
administration with Australian boatbuilders and they used to go to the beach 
in Kokopo together. 
The Japanese knew that their presence was at the mercy of the 
Australians. This made it almost impossible for them to show their patriotism 
or Japaneseness. Unlike in Micronesia, they built no Japanese shrines or 
temples. There was no New Year celebration in a Japanese style, unlike the 
Chinese. Nor was there the Bon Festival in mid-August. 161 Probably these 
Japanese events were celebrated privately among themselves in Izumi's house 
which was unofficially called the 'Japan Club' . 162 The Club was their only 
sanctuary in New Guinea; most Japanese used to meet there. They probably 
thought it wise to confine their activities to themselves in order not to offend 
any Australians, even though that in itself might have invited suspicion. 
1550fficial trade restriction was lifted in 1923, but the migration restriction, which stopped the 
coming of new Japanese, virtually blocked Japanese business expansion. 
15!\Tartous articles in the Rabaul Times verify this: 14 Mar. 1930; 5 Aug. 1932; 2 June 1933; 
19 Mar. 1937; 23 Apr. 1937. 
157Administrator to the Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department, 21 Oct. 1937, AA, 
A5 18/ l W834/ l .  
1581nterview with Oehlerich Cecil (grand-daughter of Izumi Eikichi) , 2 3  Mar. 1994, Brisbane. 
1591nterview by the author with Gordon Ehret (ex-Rabaul trader) , 22 Mar. 1994, Brisbane, 
Australia. 
160Interview by the author with Hatamoto Otosaku (ex-Rabaul shipwright from 1937- 1940) , 
3 July 1993, Nagasaki, Japan. 
16The New Year day celebration and the Bon Festival (day for remembering ancestors' souls) 
were most common annual events in Japan. They are equivalent to Christmas and Easter. 
1621nterview by the author with Asanuma, Michael (son of Asanuma Ichimatsu), 2 1  Mar. 1994, 
Brisbane, Australia. 
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In order to keep friendly relations with the white settlers, the Japanese 
followed Western customs. They celebrated Coronation Day, putting their own 
entry in the procession. 163 Similarly, most inter-racial marriages were 
celebrated in Christian churches, although the Japanese did not accept the 
Christian faith. They hardly taught the Japanese language or Japanese 
customs or religions to their mixed-race children. 164 And most mixed-race 
children were sent to Vunapope Mission School run by German Catholics. 165 
Japanese relations with New Guineans had two aspects. The Japanese 
were masters. Like their white counterparts, most Japanese maintained 
master-servant relations. They were well aware of the racial hierarchy and 
considered themselves equal to white masters. 166 Some regarded New 
Guineans as mere labour and treated them cruelly. For example, there was 
a violent master, called Narumi, who always ill-treated his New Guinean 
crew. 167 However, what distinguished the Japanese masters from their 
European counterparts was their cordial efforts to cultivate good relations, 
because good relations, which assured a supply of cheap labour, were 
essential to their economic survival . They had little capital (none were large 
capitalists and all were artisans or fishermen when they arrived) ; they could 
not attract investment from large Japanese capitalists who were far more 
interested in Southeast Asia; and the Japanese government never provided 
assistance due to the delicate diplomatic relations with Australia. 
Komine set an example in forming such cordial relations. All oral evidence 
confirms that Komine brought many gifts and the islanders were happy to 
provide their labour in exchange. 168 He also instructed other Japanese, 
particularly plantation managers, to treat the islanders well, otherwise they 
were brought back to Rabaul. More importantly, Komine faithfully fulfilled 
reciprocal obligations with the islanders. That was extremely important in 
Melanesian tradition and was often neglected by white settlers. The following 
episode recounted by the elders of Ponam Island, where Komine's schooner 
was wrecked and he was helped by the islanders in 1 907, 169 is a good 
example. When the luluai of the island died in 1 925, Komine came from 
163Rabaul Times, 16 Apr. 1937; 14 May 1937. 
164y"artous oral evidence collected by the author, Nov. 1993 to Mar. 1994, PNG and Australia. 
165'Admission 190 1-63 (boys and girls) ' ,  Vunapope Catholic Mission School; the book was 
shown to the author by courtesy of Sister Bernadette. According to the registration, 14 boys and 
four girls attended the school from 190 1 to 1963. 
166Interview with Hatamoto, op.cit. 
167Interview by the author with Kolomat, Korup and Pokomo, Poloat (elders who worked on 
Japanese schooners in young days) . 6 Feb. 1994, Lou Island, Manus, PNG. 
1 68Various oral evidence collected by the author, Jan.-Mar. 1994, Rabaul, Kavieng, Manus, 
PNG. 
169See the section on Komine Isokichi, Japanese settlers, Japanese in German New Guinea, 
in Chapter 2. 
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Rabaul bringing a concrete grave and buried him. The grave, which has 
Komine's name on its lower part, is still in the island's cemetery and the story 
of friendship between their luluai and Komine has been handed down from 
generation to generation. 170 
Forming family relationships through marriages and the adoption of 
children was another important tradition in Melanesian society, which 
Komine also followed. He adopted a New Guinean boy and sent him to Tokyo 
for education in the 1 920s. The boy attended a private junior high school but 
got sick and died after a year. 171 A shipwright from Amakusa also adopted a 
boy and brought him back. 172 As seen in the previous section, some Japanese, 
who came young to New Guinea, married local women. The marriages of 
course reinforced relationships with the islanders. 
The Japanese also formed good relationshps with the Chinese. It was 
another requirement for their survival. Komine once regarded the Chinese as 
formidable rivals. But the Japanese, since their migration and trading had 
been restricted, could not compete with the Chinese who were far more 
numerous and had a more extensive trading network extending to Southeast 
Asia. To make the Chinese their rivals in business would have been unwise. 
As a result, the Japanese had many business deals with the Chinese. Tsujii 
Shigeru sold his engineering business to Wong Fat in 1 929. 173 Komine's 
business was bought by Nagahama and the successors of Ah Tam in 1 930. 
Nagahama also bought a Chinese plantation in Namatanai when the planter, 
Lum Fook, died in 1 928. 174 Indeed, Bernard Chan, a prominent ex-Rabaul 
Chinese businessman, recalls his good relations with the Japanese, despite 
the fact that the Chinese generally disliked the Japanese due to their invasion 
in China: 
After the Japanese invasion into China, some Chinese started to boycott the 
Japanese goods, but this was in a small way, because without Japanese goods, 
these shops were unable to operate. The second reason of the Chinese not against 
the local Japanese, because Nagahama and the other Japanese national are 
friendly people. 175 
Some oral evidence confrrms Chan's memory. Tsurushima had many Chinese 
friends and used to play mahjong with his best Chinese friends-members of 
1 70Interview by the author with Sohou, Alphonse and Mohak, Pious (elders) , 1 1  Feb. 1994, 
Ponam island, Manus, PNG (see photograph 7) . 
171'felephone interview by the author with Imaizumi K6tarc5 (son of Imaizumi Masao) , 23 June 
1993, Japan. The boy had a Japanese name, Taro or lchir6. 
117Tlle author has decided not to reveal detailed information about the boy in order to protect 
his privacy. The boy grew up in Japan, served in the Pacific War, married a Japanese woman. 
173Rabaul Times, 19 Apr. 1929. 
1 74New Guinea Gazette, 1929, No.22 1 .  p. 1 8 1 5. 
175A letter to the author from Chan, Bernard, 8 Aug. 1994. 
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the prominent Seeto family. 176 According to some informants, the Japanese 
were always on the side of the Chinese when Australian racism against Asians 
was strong: for instance, Nakamura used to stand up to the Australians when 
they harassed the Chinese. 177 
176Telephone interview with Barbara Croydon, 24 Jan. 1994, Rabaul, PNG. 
177Interview with Kai Chew (old Chinese resident) , 25 Jan. 1994, Rabaul, PNG; interview with 
Nakamura Andrew (son of Nakamura Soshichi) , 23 Jan. 1994, Rabaul, PNG. 
7 Concrete grave brought by Komine from Rabaul to Ponan Island in Manus when the 
luluai of the island died in 1 924 (photograph by Hirornitsu Iwamoto) 
8 Nan'yo Boeki 
Rabaul Branch in 
the 1 930s (photo 
Nagahama Tome) 
9 Nagahama Tai.chi (l.eft) at Rabaul, a hill called the Mother in the background 
(photograph provided by Nagahama Tome) 
1 0  Tanaka Tai.chiro in the 1 920s (photograph provided by Tanaka Noboru) 
1 1  Mary Tanaka, a daughter of Tanaka Taichiro, in the 1 920s (photograph provided 
by Tanaka Noboru) 
1 2  Mary Tanaka in December 1 993 at her home on Samarai Island in Milne Bay 
(photograph by Hiromitsu Iwamoto) 
Chapter 5 
Elim ination ,  1 941 - 1 949 
TuE PACIFIC WAR ENABLED BOTH JAPANESE AND AUSTRALIANS to consolidate their 
perceptions of the Japanese settlers in Papua and New Guinea. To the Japanese, 
they were patriots who pioneered the development of the tropical islands for the 
Empire. To the Australians, they were spies subtly mingling with the natives in 
order to prepare the way for the Japanese invasion. The settlers were caught 
between those perceptions and experienced one of the greatest tragedies during 
and after the war. 
Internment 
Internment policy 
The Australians promptly interned some Germans and Italians upon the outbreak 
of war in Europe and later Japanese and others. It was the reiteration of the 
exercise at the time of World War I when Germans 'were arrested, often at 
gunpoint in their homes or at work, and immediately imprisoned without 
knowing what offence they were supposed to have committed' .  1 At this time the 
wide concept of 'enemy aliens' developed, which included naturalised or even 
Australian-born people who were of 'enemy origin' one or two generations back. 2 
In the late 1 930s, the internment policy was developed further with a wider 
concept of enemy aliens and stronger government power. Internment was one of 
the 'Special Internal Security Measures' and was executed not under the National 
Security Regulations but at the prerogative of the Minister.3 
Probably Japanese nanshin in French Indochina greatly affected the 
internment policy. The Australians regarded the Japanese as the most dangerous 
enemy aliens and set a policy different from those for Germans and Italians. The 
Japanese did not receive consideration on account of old age, although the 
1Ian Harmstorf and Michael Cigler, The Gennans in Australia (Melbourne 1985) , 129.  · 
2Gerhard Fischer, Enemy Aliens: Internment and the home front experience in Australia 1 91 4- 1 920 
(Brisbane 1989) , 66. 
3Department of Defence, War Book of the Commonwealth of Australia (Chapter II) (Canberra 1939) . 
2. 
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government 'had previously decided not to intern enemy aliens over 70 years old 
or those who had resided in Australia more than 20 years' . 4  This strict policy was 
based on the War Cabinet's view on Japanese that 'their well-known fanaticism 
and devotion to their country would probably lead to attempts at sabotage on the 
part of any Japanese here in a position to do this' . 5  Consequently, the rate of 
Japanese internment was the highest among enemy aliens in Australia and its 
territories:  the Japanese 97 per cent, Italians 3 1  per cent and Germans 32 per 
cent.6 
Internment in New Guinea 
In the last two months before the Japanese invasion, 'leaders of the Rabaul 
community tried to maintain an appearance of normality' . 7 But the coming of the 
war was obvious to all townsfolk. From early December, Japanese reconnaissance 
planes appeared, which forced the War Cabinet to order compulsory evacuation 
of civilians from Papua and New Guinea. At the evacuation, the colonisers 
revealed their ugliness. They left some New Guinean servants and labourers 
without any instructions and rejected the evacuation of about several thousand 
Chinese 'regardless of their request' . 8 They also distrusted New Guinean 
policemen and disarmed them. 
As in Australia, the administration interned some enemy aliens promptly in 
Papua and New Guinea. Germans were the first. They were interned no matter 
how long their residence was, as John McCarthy, a patrol officer, recollected: 
'Now suddenly their nationality was important. Whether they supported Hitler 
didn't matter; they were different from other men. '9 The same principle was 
applied to the Japanese, although some Japanese had already left New Guinea, 
because they knew that war was about to break out. The Japanese government 
secretly informed them of the likelihood of war in the near future. 10 They were 
told that the arrival of Nan'yo Boeki's liner Takachiho Maru in March 194 1  was 
4Nagata Yuriko, Japanese Internment in Australia during World War II, PhD thesis, University of 
Adelaide (Adelaide 1993) . 69. 
5Memorandum for the War Cabinet, 9 May 194 1 ,  AA, MP729/6 65/40 1 / 135, 'Internment of 
Japanese-Policy' . 
6Noel Lamidey, Aliens Control in Australia, 1 936-46 (Sydney 1974) . 53. 
7Neville Threlfall, 'From Mangroves to Frangipani: the story of Rabaul and East New Britain' ,  
unpub. ,  Australia National University (Canberra 1988) . 36 1 .  
8David Wu, The Chinese in Papua New Guinea 1 880-1 980 (Hong Kong 1 982) , 40. 
9John McCarthy, Patrol into yesterday: my New Guinea years (Sydney 1963) . 179. Some German 
Catholic and Lutheran missionaries were not interned. 
1°Interview by the author with Tabuchi, Philip (son ofTabuchi Yoshimatsu), 4 Feb. 1994, Kavieng, 
PNG. 
Chapter 5. Elimination, 1 94 1 -1 949 1 25 
the last chance for evacuation. 1 1  Just before the war, the Japanese government 
set up an Evacuation Committee in the Department of Foreign Affairs and began 
to advise Japanese in the South Seas to return to Ja pan. The government kept 
the actions top secret in order to prevent leaks about preparation for war. 12 
Despite that, most Japanese (33 people) remained in New Guinea. 13 Most were 
long time residents of more than 30 years and had established businesses. Above 
all, 1 0  of them had New Guinean or local wives and had children. 
Early in the morning on 8 December 1 94 1 ,  as soon as the news of the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and Malaya reached Rabaul, the internment of 
the Japanese, who were scattered around New Guinea, began. At 1 1  o'clock, all 
22 Japanese in Rabaul were arrested and interned in the Rabaul jail. 14 On the 
following day, two plantation managers in Manus, Ikesaki Tokuyoshi and 
Hagiwara Hikota, were arrested. 15 On the same day, Kikuchi Matsukichi, a 
fisherman, was captured in Buka Island adjacent to Bougainville. 16 On 1 0  
December, 1 0  Japanese (Ikeda and Ishibashi families) were arrested on the same 
Island. 17 On 1 2  December, Nakamura was arrested in Talasea. 18. The last 
Japanese was Sasaki Hikokichi, a fisherman and a plantation hand and the only 
Christian Japanese (Anglican) , who was arrested at Madang on 7 May 1 942. 19 
The internment was a dreadful event, particularly for the 1 0  Japanese who 
had local wives. They were separated from their families. The administration 
imprisoned the husbands in the Rabaul jail with other Japanese, while keeping 
their wives and children in a separate compound. 20 Then the administration sent 
the Japanese husbands with other Japanese to Australia for internment. It also 
tried to take some young mixed-race Japanese, following the policy decided by the 
1 11nterview by the author with Hatamoto Otosaku, 3 July 1993, Nagasaki, Japan. 
12Got6 Ken'ichi, ShOwa ki nihon to indoneshia [Japan in the Showa period and Indonesia) (Tokyo 
1986) . 3 1 7. 
13Australian archives present inconsistent figures on the Japanese; the Commonwealth 
Investigation Branch in Queensland recorded 29 Japanese (27 from New Guinea and 2 from Papua) 
('Japanese internments, 9 Dec. 4 1 ,  AA, BP242/ 1 Q39362, while the Prisoners of War Information 
Bureau recorded 34 Japanese (33 can be confirmed coming from Papua and New Guinea but one file 
is misplaced) (AA, MPl 103/ 1 MJ 18500-MJ 18533) . The author uses 33 as most accurate figure. 
14Diary kept by Nagahama Taichi, 8 Dec. 194 1 ;  Nagahama's figure of the Japanese contradicts with 
that of Australian record. It was 16,  according to AA, MP1 1 03/ l MJ 18500-MJ 18533. 
15AA, MPl 1 03/ 1 MJ 18508 and MJ 185 1  l .  
16Ibid. ,  MJ 185 14. 
17Ibid. ,  MJ 18525, MJF18526, MJF18526A, MJ 18526B, MJ 18527 ,  MJ 18528, MJ 18529, MJ 18530, 
MJ 1853 1 ,  MJ 18532. 
18Ibid. , MJ 18519.  
191bid . ,  MJ 18533; Dossier, AA, A367 C72587. 
20Interview by the author with Andrew Nakamura (son of Nakamura SOshichi) , 23 Jan. 1994, 
Rabaul, PNG. 
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War cabinet in June 1 940 to intern 'all Japanese males over 1 6  years within 
Australia and its territories, except those with diplomatic or consular privileges' .2 1 
But this attempt failed, because their mothers resisted desperately. Mapole 
Nakamura was one of the brave mothers. She threatened to kill herself if they 
took her son away.22 
The internment agonised Nagahama who had just married in Japan and 
whose wife was due to join him in New Guinea soon. He had married Fusae, a 
woman of his home village Goryo, whom he met when he was back home on a 
holiday from May 1 938 to December 1 939. But he alone came back to New 
Guinea because Fusae was pregnant. She delivered a baby girl in April 1940. But 
while she was preparing to come to New Guinea, the international situation 
deteriorated and finally war broke out and she could not come to her husband. 23 
The internment caused complicated feelings to the Japanese. Although they 
felt that they were betrayed by the Australians with whom they had been on good 
terms for a long time, they still had a deep attachment to New Guinea where they 
had lived for over 30 years. Probably those who had experienced World War I 
expected that the battle would be small in scale and soon over and they would 
resume their civilian life. At the same time, their patriotism may have been 
aroused, hearing air-raid sirens and actual bombing. Some hoped in vain that 
Japanese troops might come to rescue them, then New Guinea would be a 
Japanese territory and they would enjoy all privileges that their white 
counterparts had. Some wrote on the wall of the jail in Japanese that they would 
help the troops as interpreters so that the troops would try to free them from the 
internment.24 However, without seeing the Japanese troops, they were loaded in 
the Malaita with other white evacuees at 5:30 p.m. on 8 January 1 942. The ship 
sailed during the night to avoid Japanese planes and reached Sydney on 1 1  
January via Kieta, Samarai, Cairns and Brisbane.25 
In Papua, Tanaka and Murakami were interned on 9 December. The 
recollection of J. Gill, an Australian intelligence officer, exemplifies the 
internment policy. He recalled that 'I had met both Tom Tanaka and Murakama 
[sic] and whilst I do not think they were part of the Japanese war machine I 
suppose it was necessary in the interests of national security to intern them, 
21AA, AWM54, Written Records ( 1939- 1945) . 780/ 1 /6, Report on the Directorate of Prisoners of 
War and Internees at Army Headquarters, Melbourne, 1939- 195 1 ,  Vol. l ,  Part 1 ,  Enemy Internees, 4. 
22Ibid. 
23A letter from Nagahama Fusae to Kosaka Zentaro (Foreign Minister) . Sept. 1960, possession of 
Nagahama Fusae, Amakusa, Kumamoto, Japan. 
24lnterview with Hatamoto, op.cit. 
25Diary of Nagahama Taichi, 8 to 26 Jan. 1942, op.cit. 
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especially as the Japanese had begun bombing Nauru and Ocean Island' .26 Both 
were sent to Australia by R.A.A.F. aeroplane.27 
The Pacific War 
Battles in New Guinea 
On 23 January 1942 the Japanese South Seas Force, led by Major-General Horii 
Tomitaro, crushed a small Australian force at Rabaul 'in a matter of hours' .28 The 
landing force was more than 5,000 men strong. And their landing was supported 
by about 100 planes from four aircraft carriers. The Australians did not have the 
resources to counter such an overwhelming force, mainly because they had not 
militarised New Guinea abiding by the non-military clause that applied to the 
mandated territory. The defence line was 'so thin that it was stretched to 
invisibility' .29 No major military forces had existed, apart from the New Guinea 
Volunteer Rifles, comprising about 80 militiamen trained from the outbreak of the 
war in Europe, until March 194 1  when the 2 /22 Battalion and small numbers 
of other units arrived. Although in September the 1 7th Anti-Tank Battery was 
added, the total defence capability (other than infantrymen) remained only two 
six-inch guns, searchlights and three out-dated three-inch anti-aircraft guns.30 
Then the War Cabinet, seeing the loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse, decided to 
reinforce Port Moresby but deserted Rabaul, arguing that 'it was important to 
retain the garrison at Rabaul as 'an advanced observation line' ,  but its 
reinforcement was not possible because of the hazard of transporting a force from 
the mainland and of maintaining it. 3 1 
The Japanese occupation of Rabaul was followed by occupation of other New 
Guinea islands. Their main aim in New Guinea and the Solomons campaigns was 
'to cut the US-Australia line' in the southwest Pacific in order to defend Japanese 
positions in Micronesia and the Philippines. 32 Ideologically the operation was 
26 J. Gill, 'The last Days of Rabaul, '  Journal of the Royal Historical Society of Queensland, IV(3) , 
( 196 1 ) ,  639. 
27'Memorandum for the Director of Prisoners of War and Internees, Department of the Anny,' 26 
May 1947, AA, A5 18/ l BM836/ l .  
28McCarthy, op.cit. , 197. 
29McCarthy, op.cit. , 188. 
30Lionel Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust (Canberra 1957) , 394. 
31Ibid . ,  396. 
32B6ei cho b6ei kenshii sho senshi shitsu [Defence Agency, Defence Training Institute, War History 
Office],  Minami taiheiyo rikugun sakusen [The army's operations in the South Pacific] , vol. l (Tokyo 
1967a), 56. 
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performed under the scheme to construct the Dai Toa Kyoei Ken (Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere) . 
However, the Japanese forces were 'entirely unprepared for the geography' of 
New Guinea, because the army had had little interest in the area until the 
outbreak of war.33 Most troops were transferred from China and were equipped 
for continental warfare. Like their counterparts, they knew little about jungle 
warfare and a tropical climate . 
The Japanese victory did not last long. From mid- 1 942, the Japanese began 
to lose; the Allied forces defeated the Japanese at Milne Bay and pushed back 
their advance on the Kokoda Trail. Then the Allied forces started mopping up 
retreating Japanese from Moro be to West Sepik, while re-taking Manus and 
air-raiding Rabaul. The Japanese could not make an effective counter-attack due 
to their lack of logistic planning. Although the Japanese constructed a strong 
fortress at Rabaul and occupied some other parts, most of Papua and New 
Guinea remained under Allied control . Japanese losses were enormous: about 
60,000 were killed in battle and 1 10,000 died of sickness and starvation, whereas 
the Australians lost about 14 ,500.34 
Some Japanese troops committed atrocities and intensified the Australian 
image of evil Japanese. The best-known case was the Tol Massacre in which 
about 1 60 Australian soldiers were slaughtered after their surrender; there were 
also cases of cannibalism and rape . The sinking of the Montevideo Maru that 
carried Australian internees, although it was sunk by a US submarine, also 
deeply affected the post-war Australian perceptions of the Japanese in New 
Guinea, because most internees were local residents. 
However, it was undoubtedly Papuans and New Guineans who experienced the 
most difficult and horrifying times. They were killed by bombing and forced to 
work for the troops (both Japanese and the Allied) and their gardens were 
ravaged by starving soldiers. Their suffering was immeasurable, but the decline 
of their population in the early post-war period shows the tremendous scale of 
the impact of the war. 35 
33B6ei ch6 b6ei kenshu sho senshi shitsu [Defence Agency, Defence Training Instltute, War History 
Office] . Tobu nyii ginia h.Omen rikugun kokii sakusen [Eastern New Guinea area: the army's air 
operations) (Tokyo 1967) . 5.  
34Peter Ryan, 'World War II '  in Peter Ryan (ed. ) .  Encyclopedia of Papua and New Guinea, Vol.2 
(Melbourne 1972) . 1223. Til.is is high relative to other estimates and higher than the total number of 
graves and names of those with no known graves recorded in the war cemetartes. 
35Hank Nelson, '01 Japan: from incident to generalisation: Papua New Guinea 1942- 1945' , paper 
presented to the international conference: 'Stirrup, Sail and Plough: Continental and Maritime 
influence on Japanese identity' ,  20-23 Sept. , Australian National University (Canberra 1993 
September) . 7-9. 
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Climax ofnanshin-ron 
The Japanese waged a propaganda war. Nanshin-ron advocates reinforced the 
justification for Japanese southward invasion, while the Australians were busy 
presenting an evil image of barbarous and brutal 'Japs' .36 As a result, the images 
of patriotic Japanese residents in New Guinea and the cruel Japanese military 
(accurate in some cases) were created and both became the basis of post-war 
perceptions. 
In Japan, publication of nanshin literature reached a climax. Although there 
is no data to cover the period from 1 94 1  to 1 945, according to the bibliography 
published by the Nihon Takushoku Kyokai (Japan Colonisation Society) in 1944, 
the number of pieces (books and articles) for general reference on the South Seas 
published in 1 942 alone is 37.9 per cent of those published from the Meiji 
period. 37 Similarly, the literature about Papua and New Guinea increased. The 
Society listed 40 books and articles for 1942 and 1943, against 84 from the Meiji 
period .38 
Nanshin-ron advocates continued to emphasise historical linkages. Irie wrote 
Mefji nanshin shi ko (History of southward advancement in the Meiji  period) in 
1943, in which he re-introduced Enomoto's plan to colonise South Pacific islands, 
as well as introducing Meiji  nanshin-ron advocates and the stories of Japanese 
who migrated to Southeast Asia, South Pacific islands and Australia. He 
concluded that 'we have to express our sincere gratitude to our pioneers who 
devoted their lives to the South Seas and left their footprints after suffering from 
many hardships' .39 Similarly, Sawada Ken wrote Yamada Nagamasa to nanshin 
senku sha (Yamada Nagamasa and pioneers of southward advancement) in 1 942 
and mentioned Japanese traders and entrepreneurs who were successful in the 
South Seas since the 1 5th century. He argued that 'the Great Asia War is the 
expression of our national strength that our ancestors have built in the last two 
36Bill Hornadge, The Yellow Peril: A squint at some Australian attitude towards Orientals (Dubbo 
197 1) .  52. 
37Nihon takushoku kyokai [Japan Colonisation Society) (ed. ) .  Z6ho nanpo bunken m.okuroku 
[Bibliography of the South Literature, revised edition) (Tokyo 1944) . The total number of books and 
articles for general reference published since the Meiji period to the early 1943 was 2, 1 04, and the 
figure for 1942 was 798. 
38lbid . ,  233-235,  3 1 8-3 19.  The author found about 50 more books and articles published from 
1942 to 1945, but uses the listing of the Japan Colonisation Society because it indicates the general 
interest of the Japanese during wartime. 
39lrie Toraji, Meyi nanshin-shi ko [History of southward advancement in the Meiji period) (Tokyo 
1943) . 300. 
1 30 JAPANESE SETTLERS IN PAPUA AND NEW GUINEA 
thousand and six hundred years since the foundation of the Empire. '40 
Suganuma Teifii , one of the few militaristic Meiji nanshin-ron advocates who had 
been almost unknown until then, suddenly became popular. In 1 942 two books 
were written about him: Eguchi Reishiro's Nanshin no senJcu sha Suganuma Teifii 
den [Autobiography of Suganuma Teifu, a pioneer of southward advancement] 
and Hanazono Kanesada's Suganuma Teifii.4 1 Ota Kyozaburo, a successful 
entrepreneur who owned a large Manila hemp plantation in Davao in the 
Philippines, was also admired; Nomura Aimasa wrote Dabao no chichi Ota 
kyozaburo (Father of Davao, Ota kyozaburo) . 42 
The Japanese in New Guinea were no exception. Five books and one journal 
article devoted the whole or some part to Komine and other Japanese.43 Ono and 
Nagakura highlighted Komine's bravery in assisting both German and Australian 
pacification of New Guineans and the Australian navy at the capture of the 
Ko met. 
Even a mixed-race Japanese was highlighted. Okada Seizo, a special 
correspondent of the Asahi newspaper, devoted a chapter to mixed-race boys. He 
described how Yamashita Wakao (son of Yamashita Shichinosuke, one of the 
plantation managers in Manus) paddled from Rabaul to Manus to tell the 
islanders to help the Japanese, and the islanders came to Rabaul in 500 canoes 
full of provisions and surprised the Japanese. Okada also wrote about Kai Chew, 
a Chinese boy. According to Okada, he had been waiting for a chance to take 
revenge on the British because his father was killed brutally by a British official. 
After the Japanese occupation, Kai Chew joined the Japanese troops and served 
on the Kokoda Trail and was killed .44 Oral evidence as well as common sense 
denies these stories. Wakao never went back to Manus during the war and the 
islanders never paddled 500 canoes. Kai Chew was forced to work for the 
Japanese but he never went to Kokoda and he is still alive .45 
40Sawada Ken, Yamada Nagamasa to nanshin senku sha [Yamada Nagamasa and pioneers of 
southward advancement] (Tokyo 1942) . 2 .  
41Eguchi Reishiro, Nanshin no senku sha Suganuma Teifu den [Autobiography of Suganuma Teifu, 
a pioneer of southward advancement] (Tokyo 1942) . Hanazono Kanesada, Suganuma Teifu (Tokyo 
1942) . 
42Nomura Airnasa, Dabao no chichi Ota kyozabur6 [Father of Davao, Ota kyozaburo] (Tokyo 1942) . 
430no Yoshiharu, Toa ky6 ei-ken to nyu ginia [The East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and New Guinea] 
(Tokyo 1 942) . 1 67-76. Nagakura Kyosuke, Goshu oyobi minami taiheiy6 [Australia and the South 
Pacific] (Tokyo 1943). 3 17-27. Shibayama Tekenori, Nyu giniya [New Guinea] (Tokyo 1942) . 73-5. Asahi 
shinbun sha [Asahi Newspaper Co. ] ,  Nyu giniya [New Guinea] (Tokyo 1943) , 6 1 .  Totsuka GO, 'Nyfiginiya 
no kaihatsu sha [Developers of New Guinea] , '  Gaichi Hy6ron [Colonial review] , 5(43) ( 1942) , 86-7. 
440kada Seizo, Nyu ginia kessen-ki [Bloody Battle in New Guinea] (Tokyo 1943) . 202-3. 
450ral evidence collected by the author, Jan. -Mar. 1994, Rabaul, Kimbe, Manus, PNG. 
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New Guineans were also used as propaganda. The writers emphasised that 
they were grateful to the Japanese who liberated them from Anglo-Saxon rule. 
Umino Jliz6, a naval correspondent, described New Guineans as 'shin k6min (new 
Imperial subjects) ' .46 Asahi guraju [Asahi Photograph] ,  a photographic magazine, 
conveyed a visual image of co-operative New Guineans. It showed smiling faces 
of local children learning Japanese in a school established by the navy at 
Kavieng, and of adults constructing roads: some of those New Guineans were 
wearing caps with the emblem of the rising sun. 47 
All this nanshin propaganda was to reinforce one of the ideological backbones 
of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere-hakkO-ichiu (the eight corners of 
the world under one roof) . The 'one roof is of course Japan. 
The lives of families of Japanese settlers 
Contrary to the propaganda, the mixed-race Japanese were not always loyal to 
the Japanese forces. In Rabaul the Japanese occupation caused mixed feelings 
in the remaining families, particularly in the mixed-race children. They saw their 
fathers' country's army defeat and ill-treat the Australians who were their fathers' 
long time friends. Perhaps some older ones rejoiced to see some friendly and kind 
Japanese soldiers and willingly helped them. 48 But most children feared the 
Japanese, seeing or hearing about public beheadings or other punishments, and 
obeyed them. Phillip, a son of Tabuchi Yoshimatsu, recollects: 'we were told to 
work for the Japanese, or see the consequence' .49 Small ones did not understand 
what was happening and just did what they were told by the Japanese or white 
missionaries. In contrast, New Guinean wives had a different view. They simply 
did not want to be involved in the war, and kept away from the Japanese or went 
into the bush to hide like other New Guineans.50 
The sons of Yamashita, Sakane and Ikesaki, were staying at Nagahama's 
residence at the time of the internment. They were the oldest group of the 
mixed-race children. Nagahama was caring for Yamashita Wakao, after his father 
(Shichinosuke) committed suicide in Manus. Wakao attended the Mission School 
in Rabaul. Nagahama also looked after Phillip Sakane after his father died in 
1934. Phillip went to the same Mission School and took a carpentry class but was 
46Umino Jiizo and Yoshioka Senz6, Papua (Tokyo 1944), 1 18. 
47'Minami no hate no nippon kyoiku [Japanese education in the far South) ' ,  Asahi gurafu [Asahi 
Photograph] , 2 Sept. 1942, in Asahi shinbun sha [Asahi Newspaper Co. ] .  Asahi gurafu ni mirn sh6wa 
no ses6 [Social aspects seen in Asahi gurafu in the Showa period) (Tokyo 1975) ,  68-9. 
48All oral evidence confirms that the Japanese soldiers treated well the mixed-race Japanese 
children. 
49lnterview with Tabuchi, op.cit. 
50lnterview with Nakamura, Andrew (son of Nakamura SOshichi) , 23 Jan. 1994, Rabaul, PNG. 
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dismissed from the class because of misbehaviour. After that, he learnt 
boatbuilding at Izumi's yard. 51 Nagahama told the two boys to take care of his five 
houses when he was taken to Australia. 52 After the Japanese landed at Rabaul, 
Wakao and a son of Ikesaki collaborated with the Japanese. They went to Wide 
Bay with the Japanese troops and worked as clerks to record particulars of 
Australian soldiers and civilians who escaped from Rabaul. 53 In March 1 942, 
Wakao was ordered to work as a driver.54 Probably he was working reluctantly 
and disobeyed the order. He was imprisoned with the Allied prisoners from 
January to May in 1 944. During his imprisonment, he often witnessed the 
Japanese beating prisoners.55 
Eleven mixed-race Japanese children stayed in the Vunapope Catholic 
Mission. Soon the Kempei (Military Police) found them and demanded that the 
Mission give them better treatment. The Bishop reluctantly agreed. 56 Later the 
Japanese removed the five boys, telling the Father that they would educate them 
in the Japanese language and way of life with a qualified teacher. But they left 
six girls. 57 
Pius Yukio Kikuchi, the third child of Kikuchi Ichisuke, was among the five 
boys. At the Japanese camp he did not receive much education but spent most 
of his time working for the Japanese. But Kikuchi relates that it was not a hard 
life for him; the Japanese were kind and taught him many things about Japan. 
The new life was an exciting time for a young boy. He recalls: 
From 1 943 to 1 945, I worked for the Japanese force. All mixed-race Japanese children 
were told to work for the Japanese force. I looked after horses and pigs and dug 
tunnels. I worked for the gunshuku-han butai [Accommodation Unit] in Toma. Bonny 
Shigeru Nakamura, Jo Kisaburo Nakamura, Paul Izumi and Endo were there, too. 
Bonny was a cook and once ran away, but was caught, and beaten by the back edge 
of katana [Japanese sword] as punishment. I worked for Sergeant Kanai and 
Watanabe. Watanabe was higher than Kanai . Kanai is the one who beat up Bonny 
Nakamura, but usually he was a veiy kind gentleman. He beat Bonny to show the 
51Statement of Nagahama in interview with camp officer at Loveday, date unknown, AA, A367 
C66677. 
52'Extracts from general file No.G 7035/42-re Japanese internees, Taichi NAGAHAMA,' 20 Jan. 
1943; 'Property statement-internees, Taichi Nagahama, '  2 Mar. 1942, ibid. 
53'Statement of L.L. Robinson of the New Guinea Vol�teer Rifles to F. Holland Esquire, a member 
of the New Guinea Administrative Unit at Wide Bay, South Coast New Britain, '  27 Feb. 1942, AA, 
MP 1 587I 1 97E. 
54'Full statement of atrocity or crime by Bernard Wakao Yamashita, '  17 Dec. 1945, ibid. 
55lbid. 
56Leo Scharmach, This crowd beats us all (Sydney 1960). 2 12- 13 .  
571bid. 
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seriousness o f  disobeying the order. I also worked fo r  Major Sakakibara. Japanese 
soldiers treated children well and were never cruel. 58 
Three sons of Asanuma Ichimatsu (Michael, Felix and Anthony) worked in the MP 
headquarters. They were put in a school and were taught Japanese language and 
songs, but they spent most of their time fixing boots for the soldiers. 59 It was 
alleged that the MP used the boys to punish others. At the Rabaul War Trial a 
white civilian witness stated that 'a [New Guinean] boy was flogged insensible by 
Felix Asanuma, a half-caste resident of Rabaul, then in Japanese uniform 
working for the Ramale Kempei' .60 However, no oral evidence from either New 
Guineans or mixed-race Japanese can confirm the flogging. 
Louise Asanuma, a wife of Ichimatsu, was in Rabaul when the Japanese 
landed, but she fled to her Filipino father's plantation at Wide Bay to avoid the 
battle. Louise's sister Josephine, who married Kimura Hideichiro, was also with 
them. However, soon the Japanese forces advanced to Wide Bay, chasing 
retreating Australians. The family was caught in an awkward situation. The 
Japanese commander asked them about the Australians. The family probably 
knew where the Australians went, but they said they did not. The Japanese 
believed them because they considered the family pro-Japanese after finding out 
that the two women were married to Japanese. The Japanese treated the family 
well and provided food.61 
In Manus, the remaining families went to the bush to hide and local people 
looked after them. The Ikesaki family was looked after by the Dipon family (a 
large clan in Momote) . 62 The Yamashita family left Pityilu Plantation for the bush 
in mainland Manus.63 
In Papua, the remaining families were ill-treated by the Australians who feared 
the possibility of their assistance to the Japanese. Adults were taken to a 
compound at Gili Gili and were forced to construct the airfield or to do other 
58lnterview by the author with Pius Kikuchi (son of Kikuchi Ichisuke) . 18 Mar. 1994, Brisbane, 
Australia. 
59lnterview by the author with Michael Asanuma (son of Asanuma lchimatsu) , 2 1  Mar. 1994, 
Brisbane. Australia. 
60'Full statement of atrocity or crime by Alfred Creswick, '  12 Oct. 1945, AWM54 1 0 1 0/4/ 1 72. 
611nterview by the author with Anthony Asanuma (son of Asanuma Ichimatsu) , 19 Mar. 1994, 
Brisbane. Australia; the same episode was introduced by Mizuki Shigeru (a Japanese veteran who 
became one of the best-known comic artists, in his factual comic) . 'Lemon kahan [By River Lemon] , 
in Yiirei Kanch6 [Ghost Captain) (Tokyo 1993) . 55- 1 02.  
621nterview by the author with Lopar, John; Churuwas, Agnes; Chokoni, Lucas; Nabraposiu, 
Joseph and Lopra, Matilda (elders) . 28 Feb. 1994, Papitelai, Manus, PNG. 
631nterview by the author with Keksan, Kamui; Pokupeal, Sotil; Ngapen, Amos; Pombuai, Hendry; 
Kahu, Kaspar and Sandrel, Simon (elders) , 14 Feb. 1994, Pityilu Island, Manus, PNG. 
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manual labour. Children were kept in a compound at Baraga throughout the 
war.64 Mary Tanaka was probably the worst treated . Some villagers alleged that 
she looked after a wounded Japanese. The Australians believed this without 
investigating and locked her up in a cell until the end of the war despite her plea 
that it was other Papuans who helped the Japanese.65 
Return of Tashiro 
Tashiro Tsunesuke was one of the Japanese residents to come back to Rabaul 
during the war and experience the war in Papua and New Guinea. Probably he 
had the same dilemma as Komine had at the outbreak of World War I, caught 
between patriotism and relations with local people. Although it is hard to know 
how strong his patriotism was, both written and oral evidence show that he 
cherished his good pre-war relations and saved lives of New Guineans, white 
missionaries, Chinese planters and Australians. 
In March 1 94 1  he went back to Japan in the last Nan'yo Boeki liner. As soon 
as the war broke out, he was called up to serve the navy as a gunzoku (civilian) .66 
At that time the navy was recruiting Japanese civilians who had experience in the 
South Seas.67 On 26 December he was posted to the 2nd Nazuru Naval Special 
Landing Party at Saipan. On 1 February 1942 he was transferred to the 8th Base 
Force which was commanding the operations in New Guinea. Then on 1 0  April 
he was back in Rabaul, being assigned an additional post under the command 
of the minsei-bu (civil administration department) in New Britain.68 Until the end 
of the war he worked mainly as an interpreter, because he spoke fluent English 
and Pidgin and had local knowledge. He was extremely useful for the navy which 
knew little about New Guinea. He was dispatched to Milne Bay, Bougainville, 
Nakanai, Talasea and Manus. 69 
Tashiro impressed Vice-Admiral Kusaka Jin'ichi, supreme commander of the 
naval forces in New Guinea. Kusaka wrote about Tashiro's service in his memoir. 
He praised his service which saved the naval land unit in Milne Bay and quoted 
64lnterview by the author with Namari, Kesaya (grand daughter of Tamiya Mabei) . 30 Dec. 1993, 
Biwa village; Tetu, Billy (grandson of Tamiya Mabei) . 25 Dec. 1993, Basilaki Island, Milne Bay, PNG. 
651nterview by the author with Tanaka, Mary (daughter of Tanaka Taichiro) . 22 Dec. 1993, Samarai, 
Milne Bay, PNG. 
66'Curriculum vitae' , date unknown, AA, A47 1 / l  8 12 1 1 .  
67B6eichoo6ei kenshii sho senshi shitsu [War History Office, Defence Training Institute, Defence 
Agency] (ed. ) .  Nanp6 no gunsei [Civil administration in the South] (Tokyo 1985) .  1 83.  
68'Currtculum vitae',  op.cit. 
69'Curriculum vitae' ,  ibid. Kusaka Jin'ichi, Rabauru sensen fj6 nashi [All quiet on the Rabaul Front] 
(Tokyo 1968) , 7 4-7. 
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Tashiro's diary fully over three pages.70 Later, Tashiro engaged in tasks such as 
investigating construction sites for airstrips, recruiting and placating New 
Guineans mainly at Rabaul and Bougainville. According to Kusaka, once he was 
successful in recruiting a thousand New Guineans, and Kusaka expresses deep 
gratitude for Tashiro's hard work.71 
However, Tashiro did not betray his local friends. In Bougainville, he 
acquiesced in the presence of Lieutenant Mason, an Australian coast-watcher, 
and the leaking of information by Wong You, a Chinese planter at Kieta. 72 
According to oral evidence, Tashiro did not harm the locals. 73 Lest other Japanese 
officers should understand, he instructed the islanders in Pidgin to take a neutral 
stand for their own safety.74 Similarly, in Rabaul he protected the interests of the 
mixed-race people and Chinese and visited the Vunapope Mission to see that 
children were well-treated.75 
Life in internment in Australia 
Australians treated the internees well, abiding by the letter and spirit of the 
Geneva Convention; the internees received the same amount of rations as the 
camp guards and were similarly housed. 76 Most Japanese internees had no 
bitterness about their treatment by the camp authorities and conditions in the 
camps. 77 Australian camp authorities hoped that if they treated prisoners of war 
and internees humanely then the Axis powers would reciprocate and treat any 
Australian prisoners with equal care. 78 
Upon their arrival at Sydney, the Japanese from Rabaul were entrained to Hay 
Camp in a grazing area about 750 kilometres inland. They arrived at the camp 
on 27 January and met Tanaka and Murakami from Samarai and the Japanese 
from the New Hebrides. There were already about 900 Japanese in the camp, 
mainly from Australia and New Caledonia. On the following day, the camp officers 
body-searched the new Japanese and confiscated all cash and other belongings. 79 
7°Kusaka, op.cit. , 75-7. 
711bid . ,  77. 
72A.l.B. , Report on Bougainville-New Ireland-Choiseul (B.S.l .P.) Network, 21 Sept. 44 to 31 May 
1945, in Gavin Long, 111e Final Campaigns (Canberra 1963), 137. A similar comment was made in Eric 
Feldt, 111e Coast Watchers (Melbourne 1946) . 136-7 .  
731nterview by the author with Pulau, Joseph (elder from Bougainville; the first Bougainvillean 
doctor and now lives in Rabaul) . 25 Jan. 1994, Rabaul, PNG. 
74Read to Commander, H.Q.  8 M.D. , 19 Sept. 1946, AA A47 1 / l  8 12 1 1 . 
75Interview with Asanuma, op.cit. 
76Bevege, op.cit. , 194. 
77Nagata, op.cit. , 192. 
788evege, op.cit. , 144. 
79Diary of Nagahama, 27 and 28 Jan. 1942, op.cit. 
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Mixing with other Japanese was a new experience for those from New Guinea. 
A small group, whose main social contact had been with non-Japanese, was 
suddenly swallowed up in a large group of the same race. Naturally that gave 
them a new and clear sense of their national identity. The news of Japanese 
victories stimulated their patriotism; they need no longer hide their practice of 
Shinto or Buddhism nor their admiration for the Japanese Empire. 
Nagahama's diary shows the rise of patriotism in the camp.80 Hearing about 
the fall of Singapore, the Japanese in the camp gathered and worshipped in the 
direction of Japan and prayed silently for the souls of the Japanese soldiers who 
perished in the battle. They also heard that the Allied bombers raided Tokyo and 
other cities, but presumed the news was propaganda. They celebrated the 
Emperor's Birthday on 29 April, singing a national anthem and praying for 
Japanese soldiers. They had a feast and enjoyed a swno tournament. In the camp 
the Japanese considered the Battle of Coral Sea a Japanese victory and held a 
celebration with a gorgeous dinner. The news of the Japanese abortive midget 
submarine attack against Sydney and Newcastle was solemnly conveyed. And 
from time to time, they organised lecture series, entitled kokusei taikai 
(Conference on National Situation) , delivered by academic internees in the camp. 
The lectures were designed to keep their morale high. 
On 1 2  April 1943, the Australian government made a new decision on the 
status of Japanese internees. It classified merchant seamen as prisoners of war 
(POWs) and distinguished them from 'internees' .  After this, the government 
decided that Hay Camp would hold only POWs and Loveday Camp in South 
Australia only internees. 8 1 The new status was inconsistent in the case of the 
Japanese from Papua and New Guinea. Technically all were engaged in the 
maritime industry, because even planters or plantation managers had to operate 
vessels to transport copra. But at this stage only Izumi, a boatbuilder, was 
considered a merchant seaman and thereby a POW, while other boatbuilders or 
fishermen were considered civilians. 82 
On 10  May 1943, 350 Japanese were transferred from Hay to Loveday Camp 
in South Australia. All the Japanese from Papua and New Guinea except Izumi 
were among them. 83 The Australians thought that Loveday was 'one of the best 
locations chosen for the purpose of internment camps' with 'its temperate climate 
80Ibid. ,  1 1  Feb. to 2 0  July 1942. 
81Nagata, op.cit . ,  164. 
82Diary of Nagahama, 10 May to 4 July 1943, op.cit. 
83lbid. ,  12 May 1943. 
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and its abundance of reticulated water' . 84 On the contrary, Loveday did not 
impress the Japanese. When they arrived, a sand storm was raging. Their first 
impression of the camp site was that they had been brought to the middle of the 
desert. 85 About two months later, the camp authority rechecked the occupations 
of the Japanese and re-classified Endo, Onoue, Hatamoto, Nakamura and Kimura 
as POWs and sent them back to Hay Camp with about 1 00 other Japanese.86 
The Japanese found camp life satisfactory. Nagahama recalled no complaints 
about the treatment and Hatamoto spoke of the good treatment. Although they 
were forced to do various work (farming, carpentry, wood cutting, etc) . this was 
not too hard. They were fed well. They could receive medical treatment in the 
camp hospitals. And they had time for their own pastimes such as sports or 
organising other entertainments. For instance, Hatamoto used to enjoy making 
toys for the children in the camp in his spare time. 87 
The Australian guards observed that the Japanese were the most placid 
prisoners and many were not security risks. 88 A Loveday camp official described 
them: 'The Japanese: Subservient, were model prisoners. Their fanatical desire 
to maintain "face" made them easy to handle in their eagerness to obey all orders 
and instructions to the letter. '89 But the camp authorities were concerned about 
Nagahama who had managed to keep a lot of cash and was lending it to others.90 
The camp authority banned transfers of money among internees, although 
admitting that Nagahama's lending was a bona fide action and did 'not appear to 
represent an attempt on his part to gain for himself "political" influence in the 
Compound' . 91 Similarly, the authorities did not approve of his lending £40 to 
Tsurushima, which Nagahama attempted to send in exchange for three rings.92 
He also tried in vain to send money to Onoue at Hay Camp. 93 The authorities kept 
watching out for Nagahama's money lending with deep suspicion; they even 
refused his offer to pay for the poultry for New Year's Day on the ground that 'this 
84Advertiser, South Australia, Internment in South Australia (Adelaide 1946) . 2 1 .  
85lnterview with Hatamoto, op.cit. 
86Diary of Nagahama, 4 July 1943, op.cit. 
87Interview with Hatamoto, op.cit. 
88Bevege, op.cit. , 1 50. One exception was the uprising at Cowra Camp in Aug. 1944. But the 
incident did not affect the Japanese in other camps: the Japanese in Loveday Camp indeed assured 
the camp authority that they would not follow suit. 
89Advertiser, South Australia, op.cit. , 10.  
90'MJ. 185 18 NAGAHAMA Taichi-lending of money to internees, '  25 Aug. 1943, AA, A367 / 1  
C666777. 
911bid. 
92'Ref these H Q  memo 8267 of 2 1 Aug 43, '  10 Nov. 1943, AA, 0 190 1 N278 1 .  
93Nagahama to Onoue, 1 6  Nov. 1943, ibid. 
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apparent generosity is really intended to extend Nagahama's influence in the 
compound' . 94 
Many Japanese died at Loveday, as quite a few were interned in spite of their 
old age: 1 08 Japanese died compared to 1 8  Italians and seven Germans. 95 Tanaka 
Taichiro was among them. He got sick and was hospitalised. In the Barmera Base 
Hospital his name was placed on the 'dangerously ill' list on 30 May 1 945.96 Then 
he recovered for some time and his name was moved to the 'seriously ill' list on 
1 0  July.97 However, his condition deteriorated once again and his name was 
placed on the 'dangerously ill' list on 20 November: the cause was unresolved 
pneumonia. 98 Then he finally succumbed to the illness. He developed a cerebral 
vascular condition and passed away on New Year's Eve in the 64 Camp Hospital . 
His burial was held at 1 1  o'clock in the morning on New Year's Day in 1 946.99 He 
was 68 years old . 100 
Those who had been separated from their families in New Guinea were anxious 
about their safety, hearing the news of the Allied bombing of Rabaul and other 
areas and the battle in Manus. Bad communication increased their anxiety, 
except Kikuchi and Asanuma who were lucky enough to receive letters from New 
Guinea. 101 Others could not hear anything from their families despite writing 
many times. Nakamura's letters never got through, and a sympathetic official of 
the International Red Cross Committee sought advice from the Minister of State 
for External Affairs on Nakamura's communication with his family. 102 Similarly 
Hagiwara and Sasaki got no replies from their families. 103 
In 1 943 negotiations on exchanging internees began between Japan and 
Australia. The Japanese government nominated 678 Japanese including four 
from New Guinea (Hatamoto, Mano, Nagahama and Tsurushima) . 104 The 
Australian government refused to exchange the four for the obvious reason that 
94'Ref. this H g  memo 10044 of 10 Nov 43' , 28 Jan. 1944, ibid. 
95Advertiser, South Australia, op.cit. , 25. 
OOWar Diary of Intelligence Summary, 14CD Loveday camp, '  30 May 1945, AA, AWM52, 8/7 /42. 
97 1 0  July 1945, ibid. 
9820 Nov. 1945, ibid. 
993 1 Dec. 1946, ibid. 
100·coroners ACT, 1935, South Australia, '  date unknown, AA, A5 1 8/ l BM836/ 1 .  
101 'Interviews with Japanese internees at no.4  camp, Tatura' , 23 July 1946, AA. ,  A367 C72533. 
102Morel to Evatt, 5 Feb. 1945, AA, Al066 IC45/ 16/2/2. 
103'1nterviews with Japanese internees at no.4  camp, Tatura' ,  22 July 1946, AA. ,  A367 C72534; 
A367 C72587. 
1o+nie Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London to Prime Minister's Department, Canberra, 
22 July 1943, AA, Al608/ l AF20/ l / l  Part 2 .  
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they were very likely to pass their knowledge of New Guinea to the Japanese 
military. 
Deportation 
Australian policy 
The end of the war was good news to the internees. They expected to be freed 
from the confinement of three and half years and go home to see their families. 
However, through newspapers and correspondence with their families, they knew 
of the devastation of Rabaul. Probably they knew about a huge number of 
Japanese POWs and their trials: they could imagine the ill-feeling of the local 
white residents against themselves. They also knew about the devastation of 
Japan-the atomic bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima and the occupation by 
Allied forces. 
The Australians were determined to make New Guinea a Japanese-free area 
for the defence and governance of New Guineans. The Australians regarded the 
pre-war Japanese presence as part of nanshin: the Japanese were all associated 
with espionage activities. They also thought that the Japanese occupation 
undermined Australian authority. Therefore the Australians decided that any 
Japanese influence had to be eliminated in order to restore their pre-war colonial 
rule. 
The repatriation of Japanese internees began in late February 1 946. According 
to Australian sources, at least seven Japanese from Papua and New Guinea 
(Murakami, Asanuma, Hagiwara, Ikesaki, Kikuchi [Matsukichi] , Kikuchi 
[Ichisuke] and Sasaki) formally applied for release in Australia. 105 Then six out of 
the seven (leaving Kikuchi Matsukichi) were transferred to Tatura Camp. 106 On 
2 1  February 1 946, 1 8  Japanese internees from New Guinea were deported to 
Japan with over 2 ,000 other Japanese, according to Regulation 20C of the 
National Security (Aliens Control) Regulations. It is not known whether they 
wished to return to Ja pan. They included the families of Ikeda and Ishibashi, 
Arata, Kikuchi (Matsukichi) , Mano, Mori, Nagahama, Segawa, Tashiro, Tsujii and 
Tsurushima. 107 The rest of the 1 0  Japanese applied to return to Papua and New 
105Memorandum for the camp commandant, S.A. Loveday, 8 Feb. 1946, AA, Al066/4 IC45/ l / l  l/5. 
Some petitions of ex-residents in Australia to release in Australia are kept in the same file. 
106Nominal roll: internees marched out to Tatura Internment Group' ,  28 Feb. 1946, AA, AWM52, 
8/7 /42. 
101'0rder for repatriation under Regulation 20C of the National Security (Aliens Control) 
Regulations,' Minister of State for Immigration, 23 Feb. 1946, AA, A437 46/6/72. 
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Guinea. 108 The Australian government could not deport the 1 0, because they had 
local wives in Papua and New Guinea who were technically British subjects, and 
their release had to be negotiated with the Attorney-General. 109 
Roland Browne, the Acting Director-General of Security, interviewed the 1 0  
who were then moved to Rushworth Camp, following the instructions of the 
Attorney-General. At the interviews they all expressed their strong desire to go 
back to live with their families. 1 10 Browne found that 'in all of these cases there 
is no objection to release' and reported no objection to their return provided that 
approval be granted by the Department of External Territories. 1 1 1  The only 
exception was Kimura who, Browne thought, 'is an intelligent type and has a veiy 
good knowledge of New Guinea waters and it may be thought desirable that he 
should be required to return to his own country' . 1 12 
However, the Department of External Territories objected, supporting the view 
of the administrator Murray who was firmly against their return because of the 
possible 'ill-effect' on the natives. 1 13 The administration's first task after the war 
was restoration of the pre-war relationship between white masters and black 
servants. Any Japanese influence that undermined the authority of white masters 
had to be removed. White planters also feared the destruction of pre-war colonial 
relations and petitioned the Minister for External Affairs against their return. 1 14 
Murray was aware of the ethical issue that the rejection of the return of the 
1 0  Japanese meant separation from their families. But he argued that: 
In considering the separation from their families that the long war separation will act 
as a shock absorber and moreover it must be recollected that in some instances the 
bonds of affection are no greater than would be expected of the general run of irregular 
unions as no doubt many are. 1 1 5 
108Minister for Immigration to Attorney-General, Mar. 1946, ibid. 
109Col. Lloyd to Attorney-General, 24 Jan. 1946, ibid. 
1 10'Interview with Japanese internees, '  22 July 1946, AA, A367 C72533, C72534, C72537, C72538, 
C72539, C72540, C72546, C72587 and C72588. 
1 1 1Browne to the Secretary of the Department of External Territories, 23 Aug. 1946, AA, A373/ l 
1 1 505/48. 
1 12'Case No.9 1 .  KIMURA Hideichiro, '  date unknown, ibid. 
1 13Secretary of the Department of External Territories to the Director-General of Security, 25 Sept. 
1946, ibid. 
1 14secretary of the Pacific Territory Association to Minister of External Affairs, 1 8  Aug. 1945, AA, 
A5 18/ l BB836/2. 
1 15Secretary of the Department of External Territories to the Director-General of Security, 25 Sept. 
1946, op.cit. 
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Oral evidence denies Murray's argument. Their wives and children were all 
longing to see the return of their husbands and fathers. 1 16 
Browne objected to Murray's view and emphasised the point that 'they have 
been away from Japan for many years, ranging from 29 to 45, and to separate 
them permanently from their wives and families now in my opinion would be 
wrong' , and recommended that 'to return them to their home surroundings, from 
which they were taken into custody, is the only reasonable solution to the 
problem' . 1 17 
Browne and Murray kept on pressing their arguments to the 
Attorney-General's Department. 1 18 However, Browne's view met overwhelming 
opposition from the Director-General of Security, Murray, Deputy Administrator 
Phillips and the Assistant Secretary of the Department of External Territories. 
The Director-General of Security reiterated a traditional Australian fear of 
Japan's nanshin: 
Japanese who were in the islands pre-war, can only be regarded as having been part 
of the Japanese system of infiltration and espionage related to their so-called 
'southward expansion movement' . . .  The South West Pacific area is a vital strategic 
region in which unremitting vigilance is a constant requisite. Clearly, no Japanese 
should again be allowed anywhere within such strategic zone . . .  Upon all material 
counts the re-entrance of any Japanese would be of ill-effect and it is strongly advised 
that none be allowed to proceed to any of the areas referred to. 1 1 9 
When Browne argued that the Japanese never exhibited anti-British 
sentiments before the war, 120 Phillips countered saying that they simply had no 
chance to express such sentiments and emphasised that 'the loyalty of Japanese 
to their Emperor and country is so notorious that I find it hard to imagine that 
these Japanese would not have immediately rallied to Nippon had they still been 
in the Territory when the Japanese forces arrived' . 12 1 Phillips also scored a point 
by arguing that 'their return may constitute an extreme provocation to European, 
Asiatic and native residents who suffered terribly at enemy hands during the 
occupation' .  122 
1 16Interview by the author with the descendants of Ikesaki, Kikuchi, Asanuma, Izumi, Endo, 
Nakamura, Murakami and Tanaka families. December 1993 to March 1994, PNG and Australia. 
1 17Browne to Secretary of Attorney-General's Department, 2 Oct. 1946, AA, A373/ l 1 1505/48. 
1 18Ibid . ;  Murray to Secretary of Attorney-General's Department, 20 Feb. 1947, ibid. 
1 19'Japanese Internees Ex-islands' , 5 Sept. 1947, AA A472 W32 1 23. 
120Browne to Secretary of Attorney-General's Department, 5 Mar. 1947; Murray to Secretary of 
Attorney-General's Department, 20 Feb. 1947, AA. A373/ l 1 1505/48. 
121 'Re Return to the Territory of Japanese Internees' by Phillips,  12 Jan. 1948, ibid. 
122Ibid. 
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The Assistant Secretary of the Department of External Territories was more 
aggressive. He firmly denied the ethical case, regarding the intermarriages as 'all 
part of the espionage and infiltration plan' and presented a blatant racist view 
that 'Japanese have amongst other many undesirable characteristics, a complete 
lack of any sense of gratitude and certainly no sense of affection or even liking for 
any others than their own people' . More importantly, he made a point, which was 
quite persuasive then, that their return would be a betrayal to the Australians 
killed in war in Papua and New Guinea. 
Finally, and remembering the actions in New Guinea itself, of the Japanese forces 
before they were ejected, any permitted entrance or re-entrance of any Japanese to the 
Islands would be likely to be regarded by every Australian in the territory (and in 
Australia as well) as an affront-particularly to those bereaved as a result of Japanese 
aggression. 1 23 
Meanwhile the Department of the Army was eager to close the camp due to the 
cost of maintaining it. As a result, the issue was left to the jurisdiction of the 
administration, and the Japanese were to be returned to Papua and New Guinea, 
although their release was yet to be decided. 124 
The Department of the Army prepared transport for their repatriation. At the 
last moment, Murakami changed his mind and applied for repatriation to 
Japan. 125 Probably he knew that he would not live long due to his age (he was 75 
years old) and wished to see his home country again before his death. But his 
application was rejected. All 1 0  were sent back to Papua and New Guinea. 
Cynically, only Murakami was released at Samarai upon his return, while the 
other nine were kept in custody in Rabaul. 
Murray still resisted the release of the nine. They were held in a compound 
next to the one for the Japanese war criminals who were waiting for trial or 
serving their sentences in Rabaul. It was an illegal detention, and the Australian 
officials were aware of that. Cyril Chambers, Acting Minister of External 
Territories, wrote to the Cabinet: 
The six civilian internees were held in pursuance of the National Security (Aliens 
Control) Regulations and orders for their release were signed on 27th November, 1 946, 
and the Regulation in question expired on 3 1 / 1 2 I 1 94 7, five of these appeared to be 
123Notes taken from telephone conversation with the Assistant Secretary of the Department of 
External Territories for inclusion in a Minute to the Minister for External Territories, 29 Sept. 1947, 
ibid. 
1248rowne to Colonel Griffin, 15 Apr. 1947, ibid. 
125'New Guinea Japanese Internees, '  1 Aug. 1947, AA, A437 46/6/72. 
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held illegally . . . It is not clear whether the three who are regarded technically as 
prisoners of war who are still held . . .  are legally held. 126 
While they were in the compound, Izumi, aged 54, died of sickness and was 
buried in the cemetery near Talwat where Japanese war criminals were buried. 
He was not allowed to be buried in the European cemetery like other pre-war 
Japanese, because anti-Japanese feelings were so strong among residents, 
particularly among those who had suffered under the Japanese occupation. Some 
greatly resented the pre-war presence of the Japanese in the town and pulled out 
all Japanese graves (including Komine's memorial erected by Tatsue) in the 
European cemetery and threw them into the sea. 127 
Most families of the Japanese visited the compound, but the Japanese were 
never allowed to return to their homes even temporarily. In order to justify this 
illegal detention, the Australians fabricated a story. The District Officer in Rabaul 
reported that 'only one wife of the Japanese internees wished for their husband's 
return, the native wives of their internees having re-married' . 128 Oral evidence 
contradicts this. Most families were anxious to see the Japanese back home, and 
the re-marriages took place some years after the Japanese were deported to 
Japan. 129 
However, some Australians were sympathetic. Gordon Ehret, a long time 
friend of Asanuma, was back in Rabaul from his military service in the Middle 
East. He asked the administration to release the Japanese, explaining that they 
had nothing to do with the Japanese forces. His request was not accepted. In 
fact, Ehret was given 'the most unpleasant job' . 130 He was appointed as a guard 
for the compound, as he was one of the few civilians who had military experience. 
Over the fence, Asanuma begged Ehret for his release. Asanuma's voice still 
lingers in Ehret's ears: 'We are mates, aren't we? Why do you do this to 
me?' 13 1Also in Manus, some Australians tried unsuccessfully to release the 
126Chambers to the cabinet, 6 Jan. 1949, AA, A6006/ l 2nd CHIFLEY NOV.46-DEC.49.  
1271nteIView by the author with Uradok (elder from Matupi, a tour guide for Japanese veterans) , 17 
Jan. 1994, Rabaul, PNG; only two graves were not thrown into the sea and are now kept in the Kokopo 
Museum. 
128Chambers to the cabinet, 6 Jan. 1949, op.cit. 
1:wmteIView by the author with the descendants of Ikesaki, Kikuchi, Asanuma, Nakamura, Endo 
and Izumi, Jan. to Mar. 1994, PNG and Australia. 
130InteIView by the author with Ehret, Gordon, 22 Mar. 1994, Brisbane, Australia. 
1311bid. Ehret was sobbing when he was telling this to the author. He now has very good relations 
with Asanuma's sons in Brisbane who migrated to Australia. 
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Japanese. Whitely and Edison, planters in Momote, requested the administration 
to return Ikesaki and Hagiwara to their plantations in Manus. 132 
The administration officials knew that they had no statutory right to deport 
the Japanese: 'the eight still held cannot be deported as prohibited immigrants 
owing to their long residence in New Guinea and in regard to the five civilians 
there is no war-time legislation under which they could be removed from the 
Territory' . 133 But finally the officials managed to find a loophole. Under the 
Expulsion of Undesirable Aliens Ordinance 1 935 of New Guinea, they could be 
deported at the discretion of the administrator. Section 2 reads: 
Where the Administrator is satisfied that any person who was not born in the 
Territory-
( a) has since the commencement of the Laws Reprisal and Adopting Ordinance 
1 92 1  been convicted in the Territory of a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment 
for one year or longer: or 
(b) is a person whose presence in the Territory is injurious to the peace, order, or 
good Government of the Territory, or whose presence in the Territory is prejudicial to 
the well-being of the natives of the Territory, 
the Administrator may make an order for the deportation of that person. 
The eight Japanese were deported in 1 949, after the longest internment suffered 
by any of the Japanese. They had been interned for seven years in total. 
In contrast, Murray did not object to the release of Murakami in Samarai. 
Probably his age (75 years) was considered, but the main reason is obvious: Milne 
Bay did not suffer Japanese occupation and the damage to Australian authority 
was minimal. The Australians rebuffed the Japanese landing, and in 
Buna-Kokoda the Australians eventually pushed back the Japanese advance. The 
post-war administration saw little physical damage or need for rehabilitation. 134 
And within only two years 'almost complete rehabilitation to pre-war standard' 
was achieved. 135 Thus by the time Murakami was back, pre-war conditions were 
restored and his return would have hardly affected Australian authority. 
Murakami rejoiced to meet his wife and son, but he had to bring bad news to 
Mary Tanaka: her father Taichiro had died in Loveday. He also brought a bunch 
of Taichiro's hair and gave it to Mary. It was his only legacy to her. Tanaka's pre­
war assets (schooners, stores, boatbuilding yards, etc.) were all destroyed or 
132lnterview by the author with Pearse, Dick (ex-administration official and now an agent of 
customs in Manus), 14 Feb. 1994, Lorengau, Manus, PNG. 
133Chambers to the cabinet, 6 Jan. 1949, op.cit. 
134Territory of Papua Report 1 945-1 946 (Canberra 1947) , 13 .  
135Territory of Papua Report 1 946- 1 947 (Canberra 1948) , 14 .  
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confiscated during the war. 136 Murakami was fortunate to enjoy his last moments 
with his family and also to have support from Allan Timperly, a sympathetic 
Australian official, who was helping him by providing food. Murakami died in 
Kuyaro in the same year that he returned. 137 
Life after deportation 
A hard life was waiting for those deported from Australia and New Guinea. They 
went back to poor villages and islands where their future had not been bright, 
and which they had left decades before. Most had not returned for a long time. 
They had no means of making a living because all their assets and properties and 
even petty belongings were confiscated by the Australians on internment and 
after the war. Moreover, chaotic social conditions in early post-war Japan made 
it difficult for them to adapt to the new life. Even more depresslng, the loss of 
their assets in New Guinea was never compensated. 
Nagahama suffered the worst financially. He lost all the wealth he had 
accumulated by hard work during almost 40 years in New Guinea. The 
administration seized, liquidated and distributed his assets, which amounted to 
£2 1 ,  602, for the benefit of former Australian POW s of the Japanese, according to 
Article 14 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1 95 1  and to Section l 3F of the 
Trading with the Enemy Act 1 939- 1957. 138 He passed away at his home village 
Goryo in September 1960 while his wife was watching. His family suffered severe 
financial difficulties because Nagahama came back without any money and he 
was often sick. After his death, his wife and daughter sent a petition to the 
Japanese Foreign Ministry to inquire about the possibility of compensation for 
the loss of his assets in New Guinea. 139 But the government did not reply. 
Some were fortunate enough to resume their occupations, although it took 
many years because they had to start again from scratch. Tsurushima opened a 
new store in Shanghai. 140 Ishibashi found a job as captain of a sightseeing boat 
in his home Misaki in Kanagawa, and Hatamoto managed to start a boatbuilding 
business in his island in Goto in Nagasaki. 14 1 Very likely most others sought 
support from their relatives and suffered hardships.  Some of those who were 
136lnterview With Tanaka, Maiy, op.cit. 
1371nterview by the author With Murakami, Kalo (son of Murakami Heijiro) , 4 Jan. 1994, Misima, 
Milne Bay, PNG. 
138'War damage to property regulations: claims of Taichi Nagahama, D.J. Hill, Delegate of the 
Controller of Enemy Property, '  1 1  Sept. 196 1 ,  AA A1 379 EP/J/85 1 Sect 0.  
139A letter from Nagahama Fusae to Kosaka Zentaro (Foreign Minister) , Sept. 1960, possession of 
Nagahama Fusae, Amakusa, Kumamoto, Japan. 
140Letter to the author from Sato Sadako (grand daughter of Tsurushima) , 4 June 1993. 
141Letter to the author from Hatamoto Otosaku, 26 May 1993. 
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separated from their families in New Guinea kept on writing for some years, but 
later some re-married in Japan. 142 
In New Guinea, most wives of the Japanese went back to their home villages. 
In some cases, their mixed-race children were looked after by the Vunapope 
Catholic Mission in Kokopo. Oral evidence indicates that the local population 
showed little bitterness against them. Most were treated as before the war. New 
Guineans knew that those wives and mixed-race children were different from the 
Japanese forces. This is manifested well in the oral evidence of New Guinean 
elders who distinguish the Japanese before the war from the ones during the war 
and relate their cordial relations with the former. 143 For, example, villagers of 
Momote remained loyal to their former plantation manager, Ikesaki, and kept the 
plantation intact until his son, Peter, told them that the land was no longer 
Ikesaki's and would be returned to the villagers. 144 
Like those in Japan, generally those left in New Guinea suffered from severe 
financial hardship . Their breadwinners were taken away and never came back 
and their pre-war assets and property had all been destroyed or confiscated by 
the Japanese and the Australians since the outbreak of the war. Some years after 
the war, when some local residents began to receive war compensation, some 
descendants of the Japanese settlers asked about compensation for the losses of 
their fathers' assets. Andrew Nakamura inquired of the officials at Rabaul, then 
the Australian High Commission at Port Moresby, but received a blunt reply that 
he should ask the Japanese government because he was part-Japanese. He then 
asked an official from the Japanese Embassy, who visited Rabaul after the 
independence of Papua New Guinea. The official promised to consider the matter 
but never contacted Peter again. 145 
142Asanuma, Ikesaki and Nakamura re-married in Japan. 
1430ral evidence collected by the author, Dec. 1993 to Mar. 1994, PNG and Australia. 
144Interview by the author with Peter Ikesaki (son from the third wife of Ikesaki Tokuyoshi) . 26 Jan. 
1994, Rabaul, PNG. 
1451nterview with Nakamura, op.cit. The author also inquired at the Japanese Embassy at Port 
Moresby about the compensation but has not received a reply either. 
Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
BOTH JAPANESE NANSHIN-RON ADVOCATES AND AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS in Canberra 
perceived the migrants as an intrinsic part of an expanding empire. As a 
result, both developed perceptions in a mythical world where the migrants 
never lived. Most migrants actually left Japan to escape poverty and they were 
hardly a menace to the Australians in Papua and New Guinea economically 
or militarily. However, stuck between those perceptions, the migrants were 
obliged to play contradictory roles. Their presence gave moral support to 
Japanese expansionism through Showa nanshin-ron, and it was wrongly 
connected with the Japanese invasion during the Pacific War and provided 
Canberra with grounds to eliminate them. It is ironic that the migrants 
developed friendly relationships with individual Papuans, New Guineans, 
Chinese, Australians and Germans. Their only enemy was a mythical monster 
called nanshin, created by the nations against which powerless individuals 
had no weapons to fight, and even if they did the migrants scarcely knew of 
the distorted perceptions of them created in nations to their north and south. 
Theoretical analyses suggest that the application of a conceptualisation 
based on the world-system to the migrants is also possible. Firstly Japanese 
migrants were pearl divers from Thursday Island in the 1 890s: they were 
professional divers paid high wages by white employers and they remitted 
their money to their homes. At this stage they were simply a labour force for 
white masters, not different from Chinese or Indian coolies in European 
plantations or mines. Although they were paid well and engaged of their own 
free will, pearls were sent to European markets as a result of non-white 
labour used by white masters. So their presence reflects Japan's peripheral 
role as labour within a Europe-centred world system. Biskup and Willson also 
largely take this view in their analyses of Japanese migrants in New Guinea 
and other South Pacific islands. 1 
However, a conceptualisation based on the world-system model becomes 
complicated when some Japanese pearl divers moved to German New Guinea 
and set up their own businesses (trade, ship building, copra plantations and 
1Peter Biskup, 'Foreign coloured labour in German New Guinea: a study in economic 
development,' Journal of Pacific History, 5 ( 1970), 85- 108. Margaret Willson et al . ,  'Asian Workers 
in the Pacific' , in Margaret Willson et al (eds), Labour in the South Pacific (Townsville 1990) . 
78- 107. 
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shell fishing) , bringing in Japanese employees and using native labourers. 
Consequently they formed an almost self-contained Japanese settlement in 
the early 1 9 1  Os. The complication arises from the fact that they served two 
cores-the European metropole and Japanese metropole. They built ships for 
the German administration and later for the Australian administration, which 
means they still functioned as a labour force to maintain European colonial 
structures, however professional or well paid . Meanwhile, they invested the 
profits from ship building in copra plantations where they employed hundreds 
of local labourers, and exported copra to Japan. Thus the Japanese 
settlement began to function as an ultra-periphery to Japan. The reason why 
it is an ultra-periphery is that its economic importance is negligible and its 
location was within the political and economic sphere of Germany or Australia 
where Japanese influence was almost nil . It is comparable to Amarshi's 
conception of the ultra-peripheral role of Papua in relation to Australia.2 
However, this concept is derived only from economic factors such as labour 
market and labour mobility. Therefore its analysis is simplistic, as Simmons 
and Guengant argue: the world-system model is only valid in its analyses of 
the political economy with its major focus on global market competition and 
its interaction with international labour mobility.3 Its major weakness is the 
lack of analysis of cultural and ideological forces. The same argument can be 
applied to the case of the Japanese in Papua and New Guinea. The model 
hardly explains the cultural factor of their birth places-coastal areas 
(Shimabara, Amakusa, and southern coastal Wakayama) where people were 
maritime-oriented. Nor does the model explain an ideological factor that is 
identified with nanshin-ron that promoted emigration to the South Pacific. 
The term 'culture' is vague. I define it as the sum of characteristics of 
localities of emigrants' birth places that make them distinctive from people in 
other areas. The common economic and demographic conditions from the late 
1 9th century to the early 20th century of those coastal areas were the low 
productivity of agriculture and rapid population increase. Local historians 
agree that these conditions stimulated overseas migration. 4 This indicates 
that if the economic and demographic conditions had been the only factors, 
the world-system model based on the assumption of reformation of the labour 
market and international labour mobility could fit nicely. 
2Azeem Amarshi, The economy: the development of peripheral capitalism', in Azeem Amarshi 
et al. (eds) , Development and Dependency: the political economy of Papua New Guinea (Melbourne 
1979) , 12.  
38.  A.  Simmons and J. P. Guengant, 'Caribbean Exodus and the World System', in M. K. Krits 
et al. ,  International Migration Systems: A Global Approach (London 1992) , 1 0 1 .  
4Kitano Norio, Amakusa kaigai hatten shi [History of overseas development of Amakusa] , Vol. l 
(Fukuoka 1985a) , 3 13. Wakayama ken [Wakayama prefecture] ,  Wakayama ken imin shi [History 
of emigrants from Wakayama prefecture] (Wakayama 1957) , 125. 
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However, local historians also stress other factors. Hamana attributes 
emigration from Amakusa to 'Amakusa's proximity to Nagasaki, one of the few 
international ports of Japan for hundreds of years, that made Amakusa 
people feel that overseas countries were close' . 5 Kitano acknowledges the same 
factor, and suggests that their characteristically strong affection for their 
parents, that was partly affected by their Catholic beliefs, caused Amakusa 
youths to emigrate to help them.6 
In the case of emigration from southern coastal Wakayama, Iwasaki 
concluded that 'the cause for overseas emigration cannot be found in the 
poverty of the local economy but in factors such as stimulation by neighbours 
[who made fortunes overseas] and tradition' . 7 A later study of the emigration 
from Wakayama adds the 'development-oriented character (hatten-seO of 
Wakayama people' to the economic factors and other motives pointed to by 
Iwasaki.8 
Some of these explanations make sense in each case and are to some 
extent common to all the birth localities of emigrants to Papua and New 
Guinea. However, what typifies the emigrants is that they are maritime 
people. This is clearly indicated by their occupational background; 
shipwrights, traders, fishermen and so on. Goto also points out the nature of 
the maritime race (kaiy6 minzoku seO as one cause for their emigration in his 
study of Okinawans. 9 This outward looking maritime nature can be one 
stimulus for people to emigrate from coastal places where their attachment 
to land-based economic activities, such as agriculture, is weak or restricted 
due to the lack of land. 
The transformation of their social status was another 'pull' factor to New 
Guinea. In their home villages they were impoverished artisans or farmers or 
fishermen severely affected by the development of capitalism. In New Guinea, 
like Germans and Australians, they were treated as Europeans and as 
masters (although nominal) , and most migrants were generally prejudiced 
against the people in New Guinea, like their European counterparts. 10 Such 
status was a dream to most migrants in their home villages. Moreover their 
5Hamana Shimatsu. 'Karayuki san monogatart [Story of Japanese overseas prostitutes)' ,  Shin 
kwnamoto no rekishi 7: kindai [New history of Kumamoto 7: modern age], Vol.2 (Kumamoto 198 1) ,  
1 59. 
6Kitano, op.cit. , 3 1 1 .  Kitano, Amakusa kaigai hatten shi [History of overseas development of 
Amakusa] . Vol.2  (Fukuoka 1985b) , 370- 1 .  
7Iwasaki, Kenkichi, 'Kii hanto nangan ni okeru kaigai dekasegi imin no kenkyii, dai 2 ho [Study 
on overseas emigrants from southern coastal areas of Kii peninsula, II] ' ,  Chirigaku hyoron 
[Geographic review] . 13(3) , ( 1938) , 16. 
8wakayama-ken, op.cit. , 125. 
9Got6 Ken'ichi, 'Gyogyo, Nanshin, Okinawa [Fishery, South advancement, Okinawa] ' ,  Kindai 
nihon to shokumin-chi 3, shokuminchi-ka to sangy�ka [Modern Japan and colonies 3, colonisation 
and industrialisation] (Tokyo 1993) , 1 75. 
1°Based on the interviews with Hatamoto, Sato and Nishikawa. 
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national identity as Japanese, whom the Europeans in New Guinea perceived 
as people of a rapidly expanding empire, possibly made them proud that they 
were itto kokumin (No. I nation) . Although this was an illusion which would 
vanish instantly back in their impoverished villages, it was a sweet illusion 
that kept migrants in the land of 'dojin' (this literally means aborigines but is 
often used with some contempt) . 
The ideological factor is identical with nanshin-ron, as the ideology 
specifically encouraged Japan's economic and territorial expansion by trade 
and emigration to the South Seas (nan'y6) , although, as Hara points out, 
Japanese scholarship has hardly focused on the interaction between 
nanshin-ron and emigration. 1 1  There was certainly interaction in the case of 
Papua and New Guinea. This dates back to Enomoto's unrealised plan of 1 877 
to colonise New Guinea. 12 Reference to emigration to New Guinea was made 
in other nan'yo literature, although the amount of material was extremely 
small. 
However, close study of individual emigrants suggests weak interaction 
with nanshin-ron. Komine in the late 1 890s showed little of the character of 
a nanshin-ron protagonist. Although he was a member of Enomoto's 
Colonisation Society, the Society became inactive in 1 902 and seems to have 
been dissolved. Six years later Enomoto passed away. Thus by the time 
Komine became an established businessman in German New Guinea in the 
early 19 10s,  his links with nanshin were clearly slight. It was in his petition 
letter of 1 9 1 6  for financial assistance to the Japanese Consul-General at 
Sydney that Komine first made a statement in terms of nanshin-ron. Fourteen 
years later, when the Great Depression hit his business severely, Komine 
again sent a petition and made a similar statement. However, the fact that 
Komine's primary motive in making those statements was to gain assistance 
from the Japanese government leaves room for doubt about his commitment. 
What made Komine a full-fledged nanshin-ron protagonist was not Komine 
himself but nanshin-ron literature published from the late 1 930s to the end 
of the Pacific War. It was the period when numerous pieces were published 
as propaganda to support Japan's invasion of Southeast Asia and the South 
Pacific. Komine was lifted to the level of Yamada Nagamasa (a legendary 
Japanese who was believed to have served the Ayutaya Dynasty as a military 
adviser in the mid- l 7th century) . This was of course a response to a national 
demand to justify the Japanese invasion of New Guinea under the banner of 
'the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere' . 
1 1Hara Fujio, Nihon-t6nan ajia kankei-shi II: euyo Malaya no nihonjin [History of 
Japan-Southeast Asia relations II: the Japanese in British Malay] (Tokyo 1986) . 
12 'Yamauchi Teiun ate Enomoto Buyo shokan [A letter from Enomoto Buyo to Yamauchi 
Teiun] ' ,  Enomoto Buyo Monjo 6- 13 shi [Enomoto Buyo Archives 6- 13 end) , 1877, 
Kensei-shiryo-shitsu, National Diet Library, Tokyo. 
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As for other Japanese, the possibility of their links with nanshin-ron is even 
smaller. By the time sizeable emigration began in 1 9 12,  the nan'yo fever was 
cooling. Even if such links had existed, most of the emigrants were Komine's 
employees on two-to-three year contracts, which would have made it difficult 
to develop a special attachment to New Guinea as an extended territory of 
Ja pan, or a sense of being part of a national mission. In addition, as 
nanshin-ron was a Tokyo-based ideology limited to intellectual elites, it is 
doubtful that most migrants from the poor rural southwest of Japan were 
exposed to it. An analogy can be found in Hayase's study of Japanese 
emigration to Benget in the Philippines in the late 1 890s, 13 and in Amano's 
study of Japanese emigration to Davao in the Philippines. 14 As in these cases, 
the ideological factor existed mainly where actual emigrants were not directly 
involved. 
The settlers had little link of any kind with their government. Unlike their 
Japanese counterparts in Micronesia after World War I, they received no 
governmental assistance or government-backed investment. The lack of 
interest was illustrated well in that the government never assisted Komine's 
business in spite of his petitions of 1 9 1 6  and 1 930. Similarly, in stark 
contrast to the migration issue in Queensland, the Japanese government did 
not protest when the Australian government enforced restrictive migration 
and trade policies in New Guinea. 1\vo reasons can explain the disinterest. 
The first is economic. Papua and New Guinea were unimportant; their 
negligible trade with Japan was too small even to appear in the statistics. The 
second is political. Japan was prudent not to cause any unnecessary dispute 
with Australia that was determined to retain New Guinea. Ja pan's major 
concern was to secure German Micronesia without provoking interference 
from Australia. Similarly, the migrants had no linkage with large capitalists. 
The most successful businessman, Komine, attempted to gain financial 
backers in Japan but failed. 
It is more difficult to validate Canberra's connection of the migrants with 
Japanese military operations. First, those who determined to stay and 
consequently were interned were either long-time residents (20 to 40 years) 
with entrenched business interests or had married local women and had 
children. Oral evidence suggest that their determination was motivated by 
their business interests and loyalty to their families rather than by desire to 
assist the military operation. 
Similarly the case of the Rabaul Military Tribunal hearing of Tsunesuke 
Tashiro shows an uncommitted attitude to the military. He was one of the 
13Hayase Shinzo, 'Bengetto imin' no kyozo to jitsuzo: kindai nihon tonan qjia kankei shi no ichi 
kosatsu [Image and reality of 'Benget migrants' :  thought on modern Japan's relations with 
Southeast Asia] (Tokyo 1989) . 1 15. 
14Amano Yoichi, Dabao kuo no matsuei tachi [Descendants of Davao] (Tokyo 1990) . 95. 
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ex-Rabaul residents who worked for the minsei-bu (the civil administration 
department) of the Japanese navy as a civilian during the Pacific War. At the 
trial , he was first found guilty of beating a New Guinean to death and 
sentenced to be imprisoned for 10 years. 15 Tashiro lodged a petition and white 
missionaries also wrote letters to support his defence, claiming that he had 
acted to protect the missionaries and other indigenous people who were put 
in camps during the war. 16 The defence showed that Tashiro had an alibi (he 
was not on the scene when the death happened) , and that the allegation 
against him had been made by a New Guinean who worked for a European 
trade company which had been a rival of Tashiro's.  Significantly, an 
Australian acting-district officer of Bougainville, W.J . Read, also defended 
him, writing that Tashiro saved a Chinese planter and ordered the indigenes 
to be neutral for their own safety. 17 Although the petition was dismissed, his 
sentence was mitigated to five years. Oral evidence confirms Tashiro's good 
reputation both in the pre-war and war period; he was always on the side of 
the non-whites (especially the Chinese) and helped them during the war. 
Although Tashiro's attitude may not represent that of all Japanese settlers, 
it proves that there was at least one Japanese who was more loyal to local 
residents than to the military. 
The establishment of the Japanese colony owed much to the settlers' 
success in building amicable relations with other races. This is a significant 
aspect in terms of the colonial history of Papua and New Guinea, because the 
European (German and Australian) colonial apparatus was strictly governed 
according to race. 18 Firstly, the settlers were required to keep amicable 
relations with their white counterparts to maintain their presence in the 
colony. And they were successful, as Komine's friendly relations with both the 
German and Australian administrations demonstrated . As a result, the 
Japanese could expect minimum rivalry from their European counterparts. 
That was manifested in the selling of their goods through European stores 
and by the growth of Japan-New Guinea trade despite the restrictions. 
Similarly, the development of Japanese relations with Papuans and New 
Guineans shows their capability to adapt to the local environment. The 
Japanese could not enjoy utilising local labour to the extent that their 
European counterparts could because the colonial administrations restricted 
the right to recruit labourers through a licence system. However, this obstacle 
15Record of Military Court (Japanese War Criminals) of Tsunesuke Tashiro, promulgated 25 
Jan. 1948, AA A47 1 / l 8 12 1 1 . 
16Father Libration to Slithery, 25 Sept. 1947; Bishop Wade to the Head of War Crime 
Commission, 24 July 1947; Statement regarding the Japanese Prisoner Tashiro by missionaries 
at Vunapope, 16 July 1947, ibid. 
17Read to Commander, H.Q.  8 M.D. , 19 Sept. 1946, ibid. 
18niere are many books written about colonial rule of Papua and New Guinea. For the racial 
aspect, see Edward Wolfers, Race relations and colonial rule in Papua New Guinea (Sydney 1975) .  
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was removed to some extent by forming cordial relations with New Guineans 
by means of fulfilling traditional reciprocal obligations in gift exchanges. By 
exchanging not only goods but also people through intermarriages and the 
adoption of children, the Japanese were able to meet traditional requirements. 
Europeans largely failed to do that. Presumably the Japanese were able to win 
New Guineans' favour and were thereby able to enjoy their co-operation in 
recruiting labourers and collecting copra and marine products to the extent 
that their European counterparts could not. 
The last factor contributing to the development of the Japanese colony was 
that the European colonisers accepted and to some extent welcomed the 
Japanese presence as masters. What Germans and Australians feared was a 
challenge to their colonial structure by the indigenous population. In this 
respect, the Japanese were useful because they could assist in maintaining 
and reinforcing the colonial structure. For example, Komine assisted the 
German pacification of hostile islanders. Another typical example is the tale 
of an elder on Lou Island in Manus, who worked for Narumi (a Japanese 
skipper) with other islanders. The skipper treated the local crew so badly, 
often with violence, that the elder (then a young man) ran away, but he was 
caught by an Australian kiap and returned to the Japanese. The kiap warned 
him that he would be taken to court if he ran away again. 19 Although such a 
brutal Japanese master was rare according to oral evidence, the episode can 
verify that the Australians assisted the Japanese in maintaining their 
master-servant relationship with islanders. The Japanese national identity 
(being from a nation with an expanding empire) also seems to have facilitated 
their entry to the colonial ruling group, considering that the Chinese were not 
allowed to join the rulers and largely remained in an intermediate position 
between the whites and the indigenes. In this way, the Japanese presence 
functioned to consolidate white rule, although that was, of course, so long as 
the Japanese posed no threat to European interests. The Japanese were 
masters, but they were subordinate to the white masters. 
Thus the Japanese presence reflected both Japanese social history and the 
colonial history of Papua and New Guinea. Their migration was closely 
associated with the modernisation process of Japan in that rural-to-urban (or 
rural-to-overseas) emigration increased due to the greater inequality between 
rural areas and urban centres as the economy developed. In the context of the 
colonial history of Papua and New Guinea, the community developed into a 
colony through the capability of its members to adapt to the local 
environment and to cultivate friendly relationships with other races. Their 
presence facilitated the maintenance of the European structure. 
19Interview by the author with Kolomat, Korup and Pikeman, Poloat (elders who worked for the 
Japanese captain} . 26 Feb. 1994, Lou Island, Manus, PNG. 
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The development of the Japanese colony also contributed to the peaceful 
expansion of Japanese trade. It was this type of colony that Enomoto and 
other nanshin-ron advocates of the Meiji  period had dreamed of. But when 
Enomoto advocated colonisation, he did not have in mind these pioneers who 
were too poor, too few, too weak politically to achieve either conquest or 
massive colonies of settlers or even large profits. Even though their hard 
work, patience and diplomacy enabled them to establish such a colony on a 
small scale, nanshin-ron advocates, the Japanese military and Australian 
perceptions destroyed the possibility of their prosperity. 
This was the tragedy of the minority peoples who were always powerless 
against the great nations. Indeed, this was the tragedy of the people who were 
caught between nanshin and Australian reactions against it. 
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T he Japanese who went to Papua and New Guinea from the 1890s were on the frontier of Japanese settlement in the South Seas. In Nanshin, Hiromitsu 
Iwamoto tells the stories of those adventurous individuals, 
such as Komine, a trader and pearl diver, who flourished 
as a boatbuilder and planter in German and Australian 
New Guinea until the 1929 depression, and Tashiro, who 
was caught between his loyalty to his nation and to people 
in New Guinea. When war came in 1942, the Australians 
regarded all Japanese in Papua New Guinea as enemy 
aliens, and even those who avoided internment had assets 
destroyed and families dispersed. During the war and the 
immediate post-war period the Australian and Japanese 
governments could not, or would not, protect their 
interests. 
With his command of languages, his pursuit of 
documents, and his conversations with survivors and 
family members in Australia, Japan and Papua New 
Guinea, Hiromitsu Iwamoto has traced the accounts of 
individuals, and through them illuminated the histories of 
migrants, colonies and nations. 
Dr Iwamoto, a tertiary student in both Australia and 
Japan, completed his doctorate at the Australian National 
University in 1995. He is currently working on a broader 
study of World War II in Papua New Guinea. 
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